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Abstract
The advent of the Internet, and advances in computing and phone technology have
transformed the way society interacts and conducts business. There are well estab-
lished security processes and protocols that exist to protect people’s privacy and the
sensitive credentials needed for secure transactions. However, many areas of the world
do not have access to the high-quality technical infrastructure, equipment and ex-
pertise necessary for these security procedures to be effective. These are challenging
environments, and this thesis examines how mobile devices can be used to enhance
the security of applications in them. Three application areas are investigated: remote
e-voting; m-payments; and authentication. Two of these areas are then investigated in
the (differently challenged) online Virtual World (VW) environment.
Eight use cases are presented in total, employing a range of features available on
mobile phones to address identified security issues. The main contributions can be
found in solutions that introduce security through a Smart Card Web Server (SCWS)
application installed on the tamper-resistant smart card chip Subscriber Identity Mod-
ule (SIM) found in a mobile device. These solutions include remote e-voting on a
mobile device, branchless banking and oﬄine Single Sign-On authentication. The use
of well-established and standardised security protocols with tamper-resistant hardware
enhances the security of these proposals, and distributing processing to a number of
SIMs protects against attacks such as Distributed Denial of Service. Other work de-
scribes a Bitcoin SMS m-payment scheme, and preliminary investigations into the po-
tential for using gesture recognition dynamic biometrics on a mobile phone. The VW
applications, log-in authentication and in-world voting, are also outlined. All proposals
are analysed (informally and formally if appropriate) with respect to defined security
requirements. A discussion of the security and practicality of SCWS solutions is given,
along with suggested future research directions.
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This chapter explains the motivation behind this thesis, its research ques-
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The chapter then lists the contributions and publications that have resulted
from the work undertaken.
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1.1 Motivation
The advent of the Internet and advances in computing and phone technology have
transformed the way society interacts and conducts business. There are well established
security processes and protocols that exist to protect people’s privacy and the sensitive
credentials needed for their secure transactions. However, many areas of the world do
not have access to the high-quality technical infrastructure, equipment and expertise
necessary for these security procedures to be effective.
Regions of extreme poverty, places with insufficient governance, hazardous geo-
graphical areas, war zones, or in humanitarian crisis scenarios (e.g. after natural dis-
asters such as earthquakes and tsunamis) may not have the physical infrastructure
necessary for these security measures to work effectively. For example, there may be
inadequate, damaged or destroyed power supplies, communications and transport, with
poor physical security for equipment and personnel. Social conditions may be difficult:
for example, in a mass exodus of individuals in a humanitarian crisis, formal identity
documents and/or a home address may be lost, hindering identification and authen-
tication processes. Furthermore, low literacy levels, untrusted local institutions and
untrained officials may result in established security procedures not being followed cor-
rectly. In such situations it is a demanding task to implement fundamental security
principles in systems which deal with sensitive and potentially life-saving information.
Security of information in these challenging environments will be the focus of the re-
search presented in this thesis1.
Basic security requirements of confidentiality, integrity and availability need to be
met by any system, whatever the environment. Security questions arise which are
harder to solve in these challenging conditions than in more well resourced areas. For
example, how can you be sure that the person you are transacting with is not an
imposter when online verification of identity may not be possible? If communication
is difficult, how can sensitive information be protected locally in a secure and tamper-
resistant manner until connectivity is restored?
Mobile communications can have a real impact in these situations. Mobile phones
are easy to use, portable and secure with a range of options for communication, and
the more advanced handsets (smart phones) have sophisticated processing capabilities
which previously would have required the power of a laptop to execute. According to
the ITU Telecommunication Bureau in a 2016 report [23], seven billion people (95% of
the global population) live in a area that is covered by a cellular network, and the use
of mobile phones within the GSM network coverage is considerably higher compared
1It should be noted, that the challenging environments described in this thesis can also be found in
the developed world, in under-served communities (known as the “digital divide” [22].)
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Figure 1.1: “Sahal Gure Mohamed, 62, Texts on his Mobile Phone” by In-
ternews Europe is licensed under CC BY 2.0. Accessed 21 April 2017.
https://www.flickr.com/photos/internewseurope/7887050306
to other communication technologies - 53% of the world’s population is not using the
Internet. Figure 1.1 illustrates the far reaching availability of mobile phones. Mobile
phones and the cellular network might be the only available communications option,
but this has provided a “leap-frog” technology that can bring services to otherwise
under-served communities. The next section discusses how mobile phones can be used
to enhance security in these environments.
1.2 Using Mobile Devices for Security
Systems need a back office infrastructure, and to maintain high security levels this is
normally in a trusted environment with protected servers and trained security-aware
staff. In a challenging environment, however, this secure back-office function may be
difficult to provide locally. Mobile phones can provide links to secure servers in other
parts of the world, so a secure back office infrastructure residing in a trusted environ-
ment far removed from the operational environment can be used. The trustworthiness,
security and acceptability of a system is therefore enhanced.
The mobile phone itself has a range of available sensors, functions and secure stor-
age options that can be utilised in applications. For example, fingerprint readers can
be used for biometric authentication such as Apple’s TouchID [24] and Samsung’s fin-
gerprint verification [25]. Alternatively, the mobile phone could be used in two-factor
authentication schemes, as the phone is “something you have” and a user PIN is “some-
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thing you know” e.g. [26].
Often, the Short Message Service (SMS) can be used as a second channel to send
authentication messages containing One Time Passwords (OTPs). Applications such
as m-banking e.g. [27] or authentication software e.g. [28] can be installed on the mobile
device, but the phone platform is generally regarded as untrusted as it can be tampered
with by the user (“jail-broken” or “rooted”) or be infected with malware.
Of most relevance to this research, a mobile phone also contains the most widely
available smart card in existence, the mobile phone Subscriber Identity Module (SIM).
Smart cards are designed with tamper-resistant chip technology and storage, along with
specialised protocols and security algorithms that enable information to be processed
securely [29]. Modern smartphones may also contain a similar tamper-resistant chip
known as the Secure Element (SE). Applications installed in the tamper resistant SIM
environment that use the tightly managed, standardised protocols and functionality of
the Smart Card Web Server (SCWS) will form the main focus of this thesis.
The next section defines research questions that this work will consider along with
corresponding research objectives.
1.3 Research Questions and Objectives
With this background in mind, research questions have been formulated. These are:
1. RQ-1: How can introducing a trustworthy infrastructure based on mobile de-
vices and/or alternative methods of authentication address the differing security
requirements of a range of use cases in these environments?
2. RQ-2: How can a trusted element in a mobile device be used to enhance secu-
rity in challenging environments, where there may be limited access to technical
infrastructure and resources?
These research questions give rise to main and secondary objectives for the work
presented in this thesis. They are:
1. RO-1: (Main Objective) Design security solutions using mobile devices to en-
hance security in a range of use cases in challenging environments.
2. RO-2: (Secondary Objective) Design improved authentication methods that can
be used in challenging environments.
The next section describes the methodology adopted to meet the stated research
objectives.
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1.4 Methodology
The methodology adopted in this thesis started with a literature review that was con-
ducted to identify how mobile devices/ SIMs/ mobile networks have been used in
existing schemes in challenging environments. The literature review was then used to
derive selection criteria and provide the rationale for choosing three application areas
that were subsequently to illustrate representative security problems. These are:
• Remote e-Voting: this was chosen because the use of mobile devices for this
application area has not been widely studied, and mobile e-voting could provide
real benefits for remote communities, or in societies where attendance at a polling
station could be dangerous because of the potential for election-related violence;
• m-Payment: this was selected because there are many schemes in the develop-
ing world designed to provide financial inclusion for “unbanked” communities2,
but serious security problems have been identified with some of these solutions
e.g. [27];
• Authentication: this was included as it is a service that underpins all secure
solutions, and investigating alternative methods of local authentication could
assist in situations where online connectivity or reliable identification credentials
are not available.
Within each application area, two use cases were studied in detail, and solutions
were proposed. These proposals were subjected to informal security analysis, and
when appropriate, a mechanical formal security analysis using the automated tool
Scyther [30] was also done. Then, as an aside to the main work, two of these appli-
cation areas (e-voting and authentication) were additionally investigated in a Virtual
World (VW) environment, which exhibits similar security challenges to resource-poor
Real World (RW) scenarios. VWs and their security issues are described in detail
in Section 2.7. The full list of use cases along with the research questions/ research
objectives they address is shown in Table 1.1.
1.5 Contributions
The work presented in this thesis has made several main contributions by using tamper-
resistant trusted hardware, via SCWS applications on a SIM card. The work is novel
2In the poorest communities of the world, where average income is less than $5 a day, many people
do not have access to safe, secure and affordable financial services that could help them climb out of
poverty: these are referred to as “unbanked” individuals.
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Table 1.1: Use Cases vs Research Questions and Objectives
Ref Use Case Description RQ1 RQ2 RO1 RO2
Remote e-Voting
EV-1 SCWS Voting using Preˆt a` Voter (PAV) X X X X
EV-2 SCWS Voting using Estonian I-Voting X X X X
m-Payment
MP-1 SCWS Branchless Banking X X X X
MP-2 Bitcoin SMS m-Payments X × X ×
Authentication
Auth-1 Oﬄine SCWS Single Sign-On X X X X
Auth-2 Gesture Recognition Biometric X × X X
Virtual World Applications
VW-1 SCWS Online VW Log-In X X X X
VW-2 VW Voting X × X ×
because to the author’s knowledge, SCWS applications have not been proposed as
secure solutions before.
Secondary contributions have also been made in authentication and VW applica-
tions.
Main Contributions:
1. Using the SCWS to provide tamper resistance and protection against Distributed
Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks in remote e-voting; illustrated by using e-Voting
systems Preˆt a` Voter and Estonian I-voting as examples [1, 2];
2. Using advanced SIM capabilities - including the SCWS - to provide security
improvements on existing SIM-based m-Payment schemes [3];
3. Enabling access to secure blockchain technology via an SMS m-payment system,
to be used for charitable donation provisioning in oﬄine humanitarian aid sce-
narios [4];
4. Providing secure authentication in an oﬄine environment through a local Single
Sign-On procedure via SCWS chips installed in a SIM and standalone security
module [6];
Secondary Contributions:
1. Investigation into the use of gesture recognition to provide a dynamic, two-factor
one-step biometric authentication method [5, 7, 8];
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2. Improved online log-in to VWs using authentication via the SCWS, geolocation
and One Time Password (OTP) processes [9]
3. Introduced privacy for in-world VW voting, by locating sensitive e-voting pro-
cessing in a Trusted Secure Layer external to the VW, and using the mobile phone
network as second channel for security information [10].
Several peer-reviewed conference papers have been published following this research,
and they are listed at the end of this chapter.
1.6 Thesis Outline
The thesis is organised into parts as follows.
Part 1: Introduction and Background provides the context of the research, dis-
cusses previous work and gives background information about the application areas
selected for further study i.e. remote e-voting, m-payment and authentication. Chap-
ter 2 presents a literature review, background to the selected application areas and
the rationale behind their choice. The VW environment is also discussed. Chapter 3
explains the technologies used in solutions put forward in this thesis, in particular, the
SCWS.
Part 2: Application Areas and Use Cases proposes solution(s) that can meet
security requirements for each use case shown in Table 1.1. Chapter 4 covers remote
e-voting use cases EV-1 and EV-2. Chapter 5 deals with mobile payment use cases
MP-1 and MP-2. Chapter 6 investigates alternative authentication methods through
the use cases Auth-1 and Auth-2. Chapter 7 describes solutions for two of these appli-
cation areas in a VW setting, through use cases VW-1 and VW-2.
Part 3: Analysis and Conclusion provides further analysis of the previously pre-
sented work. Chapter 8 expands upon the security of the SCWS, and the use case solu-
tions presented previously. SCWS implementation issues are then discussed. Chapter 9
draws the thesis to its conclusion by assessing how well the stated research objectives
have been met and suggesting future research directions.
Appendices include additional information that supports the research in this thesis.
Appendix A contains supplementary information relevant to some of the use cases.
Appendix B describes the formal analysis tool Scyther, which was used to verify the
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security of some of the solutions presented. The Scyther scripts used and the results
obtained are shown here.
1.7 Chapter Summary
This chapter outlined the motivations for the research, the research objectives and
methodology, and showed the contributions which were made as a result of the work
undertaken. The structure of the thesis was laid out. The author’s related peer-
reviewed publications are now listed.
1.8 Related Publications
Publications are listed by application area.
Remote e-Voting
1. L. Kyrillidis, S. Cobourne, K. Mayes, S. Dong, and K. Markantonakis, “Dis-
tributed e-Voting using the Smart Card Web Server”, in 2012 7th International
Conference on Risks and Security of Internet and Systems (CRiSIS2012), IEEE,
2012, pp. 1–8.[1]
2. S. Cobourne, L. Kyrillidis, K. Mayes, and K. Markantonakis, “Remote e-Voting
Using the Smart Card Web Server”, International Journal of Secure Software
Engineering (IJSSE) vol. 5, no 1, pp.39–60, 2014.[2]
m-Payment
1. S. Cobourne, K. Mayes, and K. Markantonakis, “Using the Smart Card Web
Server in Secure Branchless Banking”, in International Conference on Network
and System Security (NSS2013), Springer, 2013, pp. 250–263.[3]
2. D. Jayasinghe, S. Cobourne, K. Markantonakis, R.N. Akram, and K. Mayes, “
Philanthropy On The Blockchain”, in 11th WISTP International Conference on
Information Security Theory and Practice (WISTP2017), 2017. [4]
Authentication
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1. B. Ducray, S. Cobourne, K. Mayes, and K. Markantonakis, “Authentication
Based on a Changeable biometric using Gesture Recognition with the KinectTM”,
in 2015 International Conference on Biometrics (ICB2015), IEEE 2015 pp. 38–
45. [5]
2. L. Kyrillidis, S. Cobourne, K. Mayes, and K. Markantonakis, “A Smart Card
Web Server in the Web of Things,” in Proceedings of SAI Intelligent Systems
Conference (IntelliSys 2016), Springer, 2016, pp. 769-784 [6]
3. B. Ducray, S. Cobourne, K. Mayes, and K. Markantonakis, “Comparison of
Dynamic Biometric Security Characteristics against other Biometrics”, in 2017
IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC2017). [7]
4. B. Ducray, S. Cobourne, K. Mayes, and K. Markantonakis, “Gesture Recognition
Implemented on a Personal Limited Device”, in 8th International Conference on
Information and Communication Systems (ICICS2017 ) [8] (Nominated for Best
Paper)
Virtual Worlds
1. L. Kyrillidis, G. Hili, S. Cobourne, K. Mayes, and K. Markantonakis, “Virtual
World Authentication using the Smart Card Web Server”, in International Sym-
posium on Security in Computing and Communication’ (ISSCC2013), pp. 30–
41. [9]
2. S. Cobourne, G. Hili, K. Mayes, and K. Markantonakis, “Avatar Voting in Vir-
tual Worlds”, in 5th International Conference on Information and Communica-
tion Systems (ICICS2014), pp. 1–6.[10] (Nominated for Best Paper)
3. G. Hili, S. Cobourne, K. Mayes, and K. Markantonakis, “Practical Attacks on
Virtual Worlds”, in International Conference on Risks and Security of Internet
and Systems (CRiSIS2014), pp. 180–195. [11]
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Background information describing how mobile devices and their applica-
tions are currently used in challenging environments is provided. Three
application areas for further research are selected (Remote e-Voting, m-
Payment and Authentication) and the rationale for their choice is supported
by a review of the security of existing schemes. This is followed by a de-
scription of the Virtual World environment, and further study in this (dif-
ferently) challenging area is then identified.
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2.1 Challenging Environments
Examples of challenging environments can be seen in war zones, post-disaster regions,
or communities characterised by extreme poverty and low literacy levels: informa-
tion security may be affected by human, technical or societal factors. For example,
individuals may not have formal documents, making identification and authentica-
tion difficult. Special measures may be needed, such as the use of different Know
Your Customer (KYC) banking rules for financial aid distribution to displaced pop-
ulations in humanitarian crises [31]. Physical and technical infrastructures may be
damaged or non-existent, leading to unreliable communication capabilities [32], and
available equipment may have technical constraints such as reliance on battery power
(illustrated in Figure 2.1), limited storage capability and old versions of hardware/
software [33]. Societal factors may include reduced expectations of individual privacy,
especially if devices are shared1. Low literacy and language issues may be encoun-
tered [35, 36] which will reduce the effectiveness of technical systems. Additionally,
bribery, collusion, coercion and corruption may be the societal norm: examples can be
seen at http://afrobarometer.org, where one study showed that in Kenya, police,
government officials, Members of Parliament, and business executives are most widely
perceived as corrupt [37]. As seen previously, mobile communications can provide a
“leap-frog” technology that can bring services with economic and social benefits to
these communities. The next section discusses some of the projects and commercial
schemes that use mobiles in this way.
2.2 Mobile Devices in Challenging Environments
There are a number of initiatives that use mobiles in developing countries. For example,
the Mobile for Development team within the GSMA shows the following project areas
on its website, all of which utilise mobiles to bring financial and societal advantages:
Connected Society; Mobile Money; Digital Identity; Connected Women; Mobile for
Development Utilities; m-Agri; m-Health; and Disaster Response [38]. Some example
schemes are now described.
In M-health applications, mobiles can be used to disseminate medical information
and collect data about the health of communities and individuals e.g. [39, 40]. Mobile
data collection project examples include: monitoring treatment during a pneumonia
epidemic in Pakistan [41]; obtaining sanitation information from villages after the Haiti
1In 2012, an ICT household survey carried out in Kenya found that 25% of low income people (at
the so-called “Bottom of the Pyramid”) who owned a mobile phone shared it with a family member,
usually the spouse [34].
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Figure 2.1: “Mobile Phone Charging Station” by Adam Cohn
is licensed under CC BY-NC-ND 2.0 Accessed 26 July 2017.
https://www.flickr.com/photos/adamcohn/6311096617/
earthquake (Smart Bucket) [42, 43]; and following a dengue fever outbreak in Mex-
ico [44]. Other humanitarian projects have focused on binding individual identification
to health records. For example, in one scheme [45, 46, 47], patients are given Radio
Frequency ID (RFID) tags as ID tokens, healthcare staff are given a mobile RFID
read/write device (such as a phone with Near Field Communication capability) and
the health care centre uses the data collected in an electronic medical record system.
In m-Payment schemes SMS messages can be used for transactions that allow the
unbanked access to secure financial services and hence remove the physical security
issues of handling cash itself. The most well known m-payment service in the world is
M-PESA (see Figure 2.3), operated by Safaricom in Kenya [48], and there are many
similar schemes implemented in other countries e.g. [49, 50, 51, 52, 53]. SMS messaging
has been used in humanitarian aid programmes e.g. [54, 55, 56]: in one example, a relief
operation in Syria used vouchers for aid items that were sent direct to individuals via
SMS [57].
Alternative uses for mobile phones can be seen in Delay Tolerant Network imple-
mentations such as ByteWalla [58, 59, 60, 61, 62] where the phone is used as a “data
mule” to address infrastructure challenges by providing asynchronous Internet access
2 . Another proposal, Serval mesh networks [64, 65], provides peer-to-peer connectiv-
2Delay Tolerant Networking as defined by the IETF has a specific bundle layer on top of the standard
OSI layers, described in the Bundle Protocol Specification (RFC 5050) [63]. In this thesis, it is assumed
that although network outages can occur, they are not permanent and connectivity will be restored at
some stage. Thus the use of these specialised data bundles is not needed in the solutions presented.
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ity in oﬄine environments by using a mobile phone application with mesh extender
hardware to increase the available communication range.
The use of a PIN with a mobile phone can help identify and authenticate an individ-
ual. Research has shown that illiterate users can remember and use strings of numbers
to access services. For example when using prepayment meters, illiterate users could
manage to input twenty-digit sequences (as long as they were arranged as five groups
of four digits) [66]. Also, it was found that semi-literate users were comfortable typing
digits but could not locate symbols on a phone [67].
Lack of identification introduces a major barrier to accessing basic services, however:
for example, proof-of-identity is mandatory to register a mobile SIM; also, to open a
mobile money account KYC regulations must be met. It has been reported that 20%
of adults attribute their lack of identification as a reason for being unable to access
financial services [68]. Biometric applications (i.e. “something you are/do”) can be
used for authentication when other credentials are unavailable, but there are associated
privacy concerns [69].
The next section discusses the availability and capability of the phones often found
in challenging environments.
2.2.1 Mobile Phone Availability
In the poorest communities, basic “feature phones” are commonly available, but these
have text-based interfaces that are not always suitable for the end-user e.g. illiterate
users [35]. A number of initiatives have aimed to bring low-cost smart phones to de-
veloping regions e.g. [70, 71, 20, 72]. Some of the phones which have been promoted
in this way are shown in Table 2.1. The Android One programme in India [73] takes a
different approach: the handsets are relatively expensive (around 100$) but they run
stock versions of Android3 and are guaranteed to receive the latest OS updates directly
from Google for two years after launch, increasing the security of the platform. Fol-
lowing on from Android One, Google announced Android Go [74] at the Mobile World
Congress 2018 [75]. Android Go is a stripped-down version of Android Oreo, and has
been designed to run on inexpensive (i.e. under 100$), low-end devices with limited in-
ternet connectivity. In contrast to the Android One programme, any company can use
Android Go in their products (rather than enter into partnership with Google) which
could increase the availability of low-cost smartphones generally [76, 77]. The Mozilla
Firefox OS (FxOS) [78] was designed to work with very low specification handsets and
3At time of writing - June 2017 - Android One phones shipped with Android 7.0 (Nougat)
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Table 2.1: Low Cost Smartphones [20, 21]
Phone Karbonn
Smart
A50S
Micromax
Bolt A27
Spice
Smart
Flo
Edge
NOKIA
ASHA
503
MTN
Steppa
Intex
Cloud
FX
Alcatel
Klif
OS Android
4.2.2
Android
2.3.5
Android
2.3.5
Nokia
Asha
1.2
Android
2.3.5
Firefox
OS 1.3
Firefox
OS 2.0
RAM 256MB 256MB 256MB 128MB 512MB 128 MB 256MB
Bluetooth Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Price
US$
$45 $48 $46 $46 $48 $33 $40
Release
Date
June
2014
Jan 2013 Sept
2013
Nov
2013
Jan
2014
July
2014
Q2
2015
limited data connectivity4. There were more expensive FxOS devices with NFC capa-
bility e.g. Alcatel Fire S, the Fx0 in Japan and the Mozilla Flame reference phone [79],
but FxOS support for SE processing was never made available. Neither Android One
nor the phones shown in Table 2.1 have NFC capability, although Bluetooth is usually
available. A screenshot from an FxOS phone (i.e. the user interface of an Alcatel
Flame [79]) is shown in Figure 2.2.
According to a 2017 GSMA report [80], there are approximately 4 billion smart-
phone connections globally, but smartphone usage varies greatly across regions. For
example, in mid-2017, Eastern Africa and South Asia had smartphone adoption levels
of 25% and 30% respectively, low compared to the global average (over 50%). The
GSMA attributes a major contributing factor for this is the high rate of poverty in
these areas. The GSMA also note that in India an average priced smartphone can cost
up to 16% of income for poor and low-income groups, and as a result they estimate that
over 134 million people in India cannot afford even one of the cheapest smartphones.
Even though it is predicted that smartphone prices will decrease in these emerging
markets, they will still be out of reach for these underserved communities in the near
future.
As smartphones are not necessarily available in the environments being studied,
several of the solutions presented in this thesis aim to be usable on low specification
equipment.
4FxOS was an open-source web-based mobile platform applied on top of Mozilla’s Linux Boot-to-
Gecko operating system, with a security model including sandboxing apps, a permissions scheme and
API access controlled by an application runtime layer: Mozilla discontinued all work on the FxOS
operating system in September 2016. The smartphone part of the project is now entirely maintained
by Mozilla’s volunteer community, and branded as B2G OS.
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2.3 Application Areas to be Studied
The methodology adopted in this research is to study representative application areas
as use cases, that span a wide range of security challenges. Suitable solutions that use
mobile devices to enhance security will then be proposed. Each application area will
be investigated in enough detail to allow its particular security issues to be understood
and solutions devised: exhaustive analysis is not the purpose of this thesis. In order
to give as broad an overview as possible, three application areas have been chosen: a
new theme for research, Remote e-voting using a mobile; a topic with many existing
implementations, m-payment, and an enabling technology, authentication. As an aside
to the main work, two of these applications (remote e-voting and authentication) are
also explored in the (differently) challenging VW environment.
The next sections give background information about how mobiles are currently
used in these application areas. The rationale behind the choice of each application
area is also given.
2.4 Remote e-Voting
2.4.1 Background - Remote e-Voting
Elections are important democratic events, and traditionally, voting is performed in
person at controlled physical centres i.e. poll-sites. It can be a challenge to engage
citizens and encourage them to vote, especially if voters are immobile or geographi-
Figure 2.2: Firefox OS User Interface
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cally remote. Elections have fundamental security requirements that votes should be
recorded as cast, counted as recorded and not linked to a specific voter. Only eligible
voters should be allowed to vote, and they can only cast one vote each [81]. Electronic
voting (e-voting) uses electronic processes for one or more of the following tasks in an
election: voter identification, vote casting, and/or vote counting. No entities in an
e-voting system are considered to be trustworthy, and the stringent and often contra-
dictory security requirements must be met to ensure the election’s integrity remains
intact.
Some e-voting systems are designed to address voting security requirements in the
controlled environment of an election poll-site. Examples include fully electronic sys-
tems such as Votebox [82], Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) machines [83, 84]; paper-
based ballots such as Preˆt a` Voter [85] and the Scratch Card voting system [86].
Remote e-voting enables a voter to cast their vote over the Internet. Participation
could be improved by using remote e-voting systems, as a voter can use their own
computer or mobile device to cast their vote. Examples of practical implementations
of remote e-voting include elections in Estonia [87] and Switzerland [88]. The number
of potential adversaries is very much higher for remote e-voting systems compared to
paper-based poll-site voting, and a successful attack could have far-reaching implica-
tions e.g. state-level actors may have a vested interest in affecting the outcome of an
election.
Although many e-voting processes can be cryptographically protected to ensure the
integrity and confidentiality of the votes cast, Rivest [89] identified a critical problem
with remote implementations, i.e. “interfacing the voter to the cryptography”. Security
weaknesses in hardware, operating systems and software mean that equipment cannot
be trusted, so for example, the voter’s equipment could be infected with malware
that tampers with the vote. This is known as “the secure platform problem”. Several
methods to address this have been proposed [90]. These include: having a “clean”
operating system and voting application; using special hardware attached to a PC;
secure PC operating systems i.e. trusted computing; test ballots; and security by
obscurity. Code sheet voting is also popular, when voting authorisation codes are sent
to voters before the election, via a second channel such as the postal service: examples
here include Pretty Good Democracy [18], the work of Helbach et al. [91, 92] and
Randell and Ryan [86].
Remote e-voting systems could be attacked using Internet vulnerabilities to disrupt
an election. For example, there have been a number of security concerns about the
Estonian Internet voting system, both in overall design and technical implementation.
For example, there are no DDoS countermeasures, it may be possible to link a voter
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to a vote and the procedures for cancelling re-votes may impact accuracy [93]. In the
2011 elections, there were technical web server and browser problems which hindered
the voting process [94]. It was also reported that there was an application that could
change the contents of the vote on the user’s PC without them knowing, although
this complaint was not upheld by the voting authority [95]. The scheme is not voter-
verifiable, i.e. the voter has no way of checking whether their vote has been counted
as cast: however, the voter has the option to cast a paper vote at a later stage if they
have any doubts about the security of the I-voting system5.
Technical attacks on remote e-voting infrastructures and associated sites have been
reported:
• DDoS attacks against centralised voting web-servers were seen in the 2010 Wash-
ington D.C. election [96] and the 2012 Canadian New Democratic Party Elec-
tions [97]. In the Washington D.C. case, the e-voting system was broken into
within 48 hours of it becoming available, and by taking control of the election
server, the attackers “changed every vote and revealed almost every secret bal-
lot” [96].
• Remote e-voting systems that have implemented anti-DDoS measures have opened
up new routes for attack. The 2017 state election of Western Australia (WA)
used an Internet voting system (I-Vote) from third-party vendor Scytl, in con-
junction with Imperva Incapsula, a content delivery network which provides a
DDoS mitigation service by operating as a TLS proxy. It was found that the
I-Vote server had been misconfigured, and JavaScript performed by the DDoS
protection service could be used maliciously to compromise voter credentials and
modify ballots [98].
• There were also reports of Russian influence in the US elections in 2016 [99] and
a possible DDoS attack on the U.K.’s Referendum voter registration site [100].
• In 2014, an online (unofficial) democracy polling site https://popvote.hk/ that
was canvassing opinion on future Hong Kong elections was subjected to a large
and sophisticated DDoS attack [101].
Trust in an electoral process may be low [102], and violence can occur. For example,
Kenya has a history of corruption and systemic abuse of office by public officials, and
every election since 1991 has resulted in violence [103]. The violence that erupted after
the 2008 elections was widespread and prolonged. Also, in the Russian elections in 2011,
5The I-voting scheme was amended to include voter-verifiability after the 2015 Estonian elec-
tions [19].
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there were several cyber-attacks, and individuals posted videos of ballot-box stuffing
on social media. Rumours of election-rigging circulated on the Internet - fuelled by
the fact that in some areas voter turnout appeared to exceed 140%. Protesters clashed
with armed police and 300 activists were detained: on a later occasion another 2,000
protesters were dispersed by riot police [104].
Using Mobile devices in Remote e-Voting
There are currently very few examples of mobile phone based e-voting systems: one
example of an e-voting scheme that has been implemented as an application on a mobile
devices is SEAS [105]. This was formally analysed by Campanelli et al. [106]. However,
mobile voting applications are vulnerable because mobile phone operating systems/
applications cannot be trusted to perform correctly (the secure platform problem).
Scytl developed a telephone voting system that uses a standard land line or mobile
phone [107]. However Scytl e-voting systems have been criticised in the past, notably
their claims of end-to-end verifiability [108], to which they responded by claiming the
report was inaccurate [109]. It was a Scytl system that was the victim of the DDoS
attack in the 2012 NDP elections [97], and another of their systems was used in the
2017 state election of Western Australia (WA) mentioned above.
The latest version of Scytl’s e-voting software uses client-side JavaScript, which has
been tested on Android and iPhone browsers as well as desktop implementations [110],
therefore it can be used for mobile voting. However, a vulnerability was found in the
JavaScript voting client that Scytl implemented for the State General Elections 2015
of New South Wales [111]. This occurred because third party code6 was included for
monitoring purposes. However, the 3rd party server that hosted the code had the
FREAK [112] vulnerability present, so it would be possible to exploit this and tamper
with the voting client code in the voter’s browser to modify the vote. Scytl’s view was
that this vulnerability’s potential damage to vote integrity was akin to malware on the
voter’s device [110] - which brings us back to the secure platform problem.
2.4.2 Rationale for Studying e-Voting
Remote e-voting on a mobile device is a relatively new area to research, and the systems
that have been implemented have security issues. As shown above, there are two
interesting security aspects that warrant further investigation, i.e. DDoS protection and
methods for overcoming the secure platform problem. Processing votes in the tamper-
resistant environment of the SIM in the mobile device would help with both these
6Scytl does not recommend including third party code from external servers.
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security problems. Designing a solution that offers an oﬄine mobile voting capability
could be especially useful in situations when attending a poll-site in person may be
dangerous or impractical, and the communication infrastructure is not reliable. A
mobile device can also also become an authentication factor (“something you have”)
in the voting process.
Remote e-voting proposals are presented in Chapter 4.
2.5 Mobile Payments
2.5.1 Background - M-Payment
Mobile financial systems are used to make payments to individuals/merchants. In [27],
the authors describe different types of mobile money system7.
• Mobile Payments: mobile device uses traditional banking infrastructure e.g.
Apple Pay [113] as an interface for existing accounts;
• Mobile Wallets: these store payment credentials for multiple services. Some
m-payment schemes also have mobile wallets e.g. PayPal [114];
• Branchless Banking systems: these often have simple enrolment procedures,
do not necessarily rely on Internet connectivity but will use SMS, Unstructured
Supplementary Service Data (USSD)8, or Interactive Voice Response (IVR) in
transactions. However, the security of USSD and SMS is known to be weak [117,
118].
2.5.2 M-Payment Schemes
m-Payment schemes can run using SMS-based transactions, mobile applications or NFC
applications in conjunction with a Secure Element (SE) on the mobile device.
SMS-based
SMS messaging is the lowest common denominator of mobile device communication,
available on all models including basic feature phones. SMS-based m-payment schemes
can be used with low-specification phones to providing financial services to unbanked
users. However, SMS-based m-payment schemes may not be appropriate if customers
are illiterate, unfamiliar with technology and unable to access conventional text-based
7In this thesis, the term “m-Payment” will refer to all types of mobile money systems.
8USSD is a standardised mechanism [115, 116] that allows a mobile device to communicate directly
with an MNO application to obtain MNO-specific supplementary services.
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Figure 2.3: M-PESA: “M-PESA Mobile Money Transfer in Kenya”
by Erict19 is licensed under CC BY-NC 2.0, accessed 23 May 2017.
https://www.flickr.com/photos/54869669@N02/6940221629/
user interfaces [36], and in this case it is a challenge to provide services securely. Using
a smart phone would give a more intuitive and user-friendly experience, but in general
the high cost of suitable handsets has precluded this.
Examples of SMS m-payment schemes include:
• M-PESA: The most successful m-payment service in the developing world is M-
PESA, operated by Safaricom in Kenya [48]. This provides SMS funds transfers
and cash transactions using a network of authorised agents. (The text-based user
interface is shown in Figure 2.3.)
• Bitcoin SMS Schemes: There are schemes which carry out Bitcoin transac-
tions using SMS text messages e.g. Coinapult [119], BTC Wallet [120], Coinbase
SMS service [121]9. Most of these schemes involve initial online access to set up
individual Bitcoin Wallets, which can then be maintained via SMS as well as
via online transactions. Bitwala offers a Bitcoin remittance transfer service to
Uganda, Tanzania and Nigeria that uses mobile money services [122, 123], but
again, the user needs online access to their Bitcoin Wallet. Attempts to integrate
Bitcoin directly with M-PESA have not been totally successful due to business
9The Coinbase SMS service was discontinued in March 2017, in favour of smartphone apps
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pressures [124, 125, 126]. (Other proposals to carry out Bitcoin transactions us-
ing mobile phones need a smartphone app to interact with online Bitcoin wallets
e.g. BTC Wallet [120].)
• SMS as Second Channel The SMS service can also be used as a second channel
for authentication messages containing OTPs or other security credentials from
the bank/ financial organisation10.
There are security issues associated with the use of SMS messaging for confidential/
authentication data in SMS-based m-Payment schemes. Many use proprietary security
mechanisms (security by obscurity), and there are well documented security issues in
GSM/3G mobile networks (e.g. [128]). The SMS service operates on a “best effort”
basis: messages can be delayed, dropped or arrive out of order. SMS messages there-
fore cannot be considered confidential, and as encryption is not applied to the service
by default, messages can be intercepted, snooped and spoofed and the SMS service is
vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks [129]. An attack on M-PESA involved spoofed
bank-originating SMS messages (along with knowledge of a secret obtained by social
engineering) and caused a security breach which defrauded an agent of 35,000 Kenyan
Shillings [130]. Malware can intercept/ suppress SMS messages [131], point to phishing
websites and specifically target banking applications, e.g. mobile Zeus trojan [132].
An integral part of the SMS system is the Short Message Service Centre (SMSC) where
messages are stored before delivery to the intended recipient. Messages are stored in
plaintext, so they could be tampered with by insiders at the SMSC. Possible attacks
include replay attacks, or Denial of Service (DoS) attacks where a large number of
repeated SMS messages overload the system: fuzzing attacks such as the “SMS of
Death” can result in an unusable device [133]. Other attack methods include intercep-
tion/redirection using false base stations in GSM networks, and SS7 hacking [134].
Applications on Mobile Device
An application on the mobile phone could connect a customer to a bank’s web server.
Here, authentication credentials are sent over the Internet to the bank for checking; SMS
OTP codes are sometimes used as an added security measure. However, transmitted
customer credentials can be attacked: and the bank’s web server is exposed to all
standard Internet security threats, e.g. the Open Web Application Security Project
(OWASP) Top Ten [135], or DDoS attacks [136]. Sensitive (i.e. high-value) information
10However, in May 2016, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) published a
guideline recommending the deprecation of SMS authentication as a second factor for strong authen-
tication [127].
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is stored on phone handsets, forming attractive targets for malware. The risk of banking
trojans has grown year on year. For example, in 2017, Trend Micro observed a 94%
increase in banking malware samples over those analysed in 2016: they described the
latest malware as “more obfuscated, persistent, and flexible” [137]. Macafee had similar
findings, of over 16 million mobile malware occurrences in the third quarter of 2017,
nearly double that of 12 months previously [138]. Infection can occur via Multimedia
Messaging Service (MMS) messages or Bluetooth connections e.g. Commwarrior [139].
The phone is therefore not regarded as a trustworthy platform.
A comprehensive analysis of branchless banking mobile applications can be seen
in [27], where the authors found a wide range of security problems. They encountered:
“systemic vulnerabilities spanning botched certification validation, do-it-yourself
cryptography, and myriad other forms of information leakage that allow an
attacker to impersonate legitimate users, modify transactions in flight, and
steal financial records.”
This report also found that often the terms of service for branchless banking applica-
tions shifted the liability for these security problems to the customer.
Near Field Communication Solutions
Near Field Communication (NFC) is a standardised short-range wireless technology11.
NFC allows a phone to behave as a contactless smart card or a contactless smart card
reader, over short distances (hence the term Near Field). Data can be transferred over
distances of up to 20 cm if both devices produce their own radio field (active mode),
or if only one device generates a radio field the operating distance is less, up to 10
cm (passive mode). A core part of the NFC framework is the Security Element (SE)
that is designed to provide trust between users and Service Providers (SPs). Sensitive
information can be securely stored and processed on this tamper-resistant hardware,
and the placement of the SE in the mobile device is determined through ownership, trust
and management interests. The SE can be integrated within the SIM, implemented as
an embedded hardware module or installed on a Secure Memory token.
There are many existing schemes which use NFC for m-payments, with account cre-
dentials stored on an SE e.g. Apple Pay [113]: some schemes use Host Card Emulation
(HCE) in software for payment processing. However, as phones with NFC capability
are not commonly available in the environments being studied (see the low-cost smart-
phone programmes shown in Table 2.1), NFC-based payment infrastructures will not
11Relevant standards are ISO/IEC 18092 [140],ISO/IEC 14443 [141], ISO/IEC 15693 [142], ISO/IEC
21481 [143] and Sony Felica [144]
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be included in the solutions presented in this thesis, and are considered out of scope.
2.5.3 Rationale for Studying M-Payments
As shown above, there are many m-payment solutions, but there are also associated
security concerns, often due to weaknesses in the underlying mobile communications
network. This application area was chosen to see if systems could be proposed that
would be suitable for use on basic feature phones that would result in security improve-
ments on existing SMS-based m-payment schemes.
The proposals for m-Payment solutions are presented in Chapter 5.
2.6 Authentication
2.6.1 Background - Authentication
There are two challenges which are of interest with regard to authentication: lack of
identification credentials, and a potentially unreliable communication infrastructure
that both reduce the options for the technical solutions that can be offered.
Identification Credentials
In the absence of reliable identification credentials, a mobile phone can be used for
two-factor authentication [26] i.e. “something you have” as well as “something you
know” if a PIN is used to access the phone: a PIN can be used even if the user has
low literacy skills as described in Section 2.2.1. Mobile software applications can be
used to provide authentication services, for example the Blizzard Authenticator [28] for
the VW World of Warcraft (WOW) [145]. Phone cameras can record authentication
details: this could be in the form of 3D barcodes (Quick Response) QR codes [146, 147]
for mobile payment applications [148, 149]; 2D barcodes in m-commerce [150]; or photos
of documents that can be used in mobile transactions [151]. However, mobile phone
operating systems are increasingly becoming targets for malware [137, 138], so storing
credentials in a tamper-resistant device, such as the SIM or SE, is an attractive option
that could be used to authenticate to other services e.g. [152, 153].
A phone’s microphone/ speaker can transmit audible authentication details: for
example a “sonic barcode” data-over-audio toolkit from Chirp [154], which is used in
MNO solutions and video games such as Activision Blizzard’s Skylanders Imagina-
tors [155]; and Tagpay from TagExpress which uses their patented Near Sound Data
Transfer (NSDTTM) for authentication [156]. These schemes have the advantage that
44
2.6. Authentication 2. Background
they can be easily used with feature phones, but the disadvantage is that these examples
are all proprietary solutions.
A biometric approach could also be used if other identification is not available: there
are large scale biometric projects that aim to give individuals a unique identity, to be
stored on a national database for authentication. A prominent example here is the
Aadhaar project in India [157], where people enrol by providing minimal demographic
information along with a captured biometric (fingerprint/iris). A random and unique
12 digit identity number (the Aadhaar number) is then generated which can be used
in future authentication situations.
Alternatively, sensors on a mobile phone can capture biometric information about
a person. Smartphones can be used to capture inherent information about the user:
an individual’s particular pattern of mobile phone use can provide behavioural bio-
metric input to authentication systems, for example through keystroke dynamics [158]
or touchscreen dynamics [159]. More advanced smartphones with in-built fingerprint
readers are becoming commonplace and can be used as a biometric capture devices e.g.
unlocking a phone via fingerprint readers such as Apple’s TouchID [24] and Samsung’s
fingerprint verification [25]. Other examples include MasterCard’s “pay-by-selfie” ser-
vice that uses the camera [160]; voice authentication [50]; or continuous authentication
schemes which use the behavioural characteristics of the user as they interact with
their phone during normal use, by utilising the phone’s accelerometer data [161]. A
promising research area is that of using a mobile phone’s on-board accelerometer to
record specific gestures which can then be used as a dynamic biometric, to provide the
advantage of one-step two factor authentication by combining a knowledge factor (i.e.
the gesture itself) with a biometric (i.e. the individual movement needed to perform
the gesture e.g. [162]).
Online and Oﬄine Authentication
There are several online authentication schemes which use mobile phones: these include
optical challenge-response procedures such as 2-clickAuth [163], and authentication
involving SMS messages, discussed in detail in [164]. In the work “The Quest to Replace
Passwords” [165] the authors identified and assessed the usability, deployability and
security of a range of authentication methods, including mobile phone authentication:
their examples were Phoolproof [166]; Cronto [167]; MP-Auth [168]; OTP over SMS;
Google 2-Step Account Verification. They found that mobile phone authentication
solutions were generally at least as good, and often better, than passwords over a range
of security criteria (summarised in Table 1 in [165]). However, mobile authentication
systems that can be used in oﬄine scenarios are not easily found.
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2.6.2 Rationale for Studying Authentication
Authentication underpins secure transactions and access to information. However, au-
thentication of individuals may be difficult to achieve in oﬄine situations, or where
identity credentials are not available. Investigating alternative methods that a mo-
bile device could use to provide local authentication (either through the use of the
tamper-resistant SIM, or its installed sensors) would be of interest in disconnected
environments, with the aim to achieve a security level equivalent to a 4-digit PIN. If
available, a smartphone would provide a larger range of available sensors.
The proposals for alternative authentication methods are discussed in Chapter 6.
Please note: the use of identity cards and passports for authentication will be considered
out of scope for this thesis.
The next section describes other environments which have similar inherent security
issues to those found in the resource-poor challenging environments described previ-
ously. These are the fully online environments that form Virtual Worlds (VWs)12.
Background information about VWs and their identified security threats will now be
given.
2.7 Virtual World Applications
2.7.1 Background - Virtual Worlds
Virtual Worlds are highly popular, specialised online environments where people can
interact in real-time via digital beings known as avatars13. Figure 2.4 shows a screen-
shot of a VW with several avatars. The term “Virtual World” has been defined as
“a synchronous, persistent network of people, represented as avatars, facilitated by
networked computers” [170]. Three main types of VW have been identified [171]:
• ludic worlds (game worlds/ MMORPGS), where the objective is to complete
quests and enhance your avatar’s skills and reputation, usually as part of a “guild”
or community (e.g. Blizzard’s World of Warcraft (WOW) [145]);
• civic worlds which aim to mimic real life as much as possible, with features such
as commerce, meeting places, democracy and education (e.g. Linden Research’s
Second Life (SL) [172]); these are self-contained “social spaces” [173];
12Certain VWs can also be referred to as MMORPGs - Massively Multi-Player Online Role-Playing
Games.
13The term “avatar” was first used by Morningstar [169] to describe a digital representation of a user
in a VW, so for the purposes of this thesis an avatar will be regarded as a human entity.
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• social worlds which are akin to graphical social networks (e.g. Kaneva [174]14
and SmallWorlds [175]); these tend to complement existing RW friendships and
civic participation.
Figure 2.4: Virtual World Avatars: “Avatars of Second Life Unite”
by Torley is licensed under CC BY-SA 2.0, accessed 13 June 2017.
https://www.flickr.com/photos/torley/16032382936
VWs have their own virtual currencies, which can be used to buy and sell virtual
goods: for example, in SL the currency is Linden Dollars, in WOW the currency is
Gold. As a result, in-world economies have evolved, and individuals and business
organisations have been able to exploit their money-making potential. In 2015, it was
reported that the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of SL was $500 Million [176], and
that users were cashing out approximately $60 million per year [177]: in 2017, it was
calculated that SL content creators were making more money from the VW than its
actual developer, Linden Labs [178]! There is the potential for RW financial gain, so
malicious and fraudulent activities can also be seen in VWs.
There are VW-specific security threats which affect entities within the VW itself,
and these have have been formalised in Lee and Warren’s Virtual World Security Threat
Matrix [179] (later updated in [180]), and by ENISA [181]. Lee and Warren identify
threats such as:
• information exchanged between avatars may not be encrypted and is not con-
fidential/ private; legal protection such as the EU Privacy Directive [182] only
applies to natural persons i.e. the avatars’ RW controllers;
• avatar activities may be monitored; VW developers use sophisticated data min-
ing and behaviour analysis to detect in-world cheating, through techniques very
14At the time of writing (2017) the Kaneva website now only shows casino-style “social 3D games”.
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similar to spyware [181]15;
• avatar identity cannot necessarily be verified, and identity can be reverse engi-
neered or stolen through social engineering;
• avatars can be attacked, hijacked or stalked. Some VWs, such as Eve Online [185],
actively encourage their users to devise new methods of scamming, deceiving, or
attacking each other, as part of the gameplay. Eve Online has also had issues
with corrupt VW developers [186];
• scripted bots (e.g. copybots), malicious applications and objects can crash virtual
locations, seize control of avatars and disrupt VW events in VW-specific denial
of service attacks;
• an avatar cannot determine if a VW object they are interacting with is genuine;
• cheating by users to gain advantage with respect to honest users of the VW; for
example, there is also a form of cheating called “gold farming”, where RW sweat
shops employ workers to play games specifically to generate artefacts and skilled
avatars which can be sold for hard cash on the RW black market [187];
• harassment (“griefing”) which restrict the activities of VW avatars, including
damaging VW locations and property (it has been reported that SL griefing is
turning into a “full-blown crime” [188]);
• fraudulent virtual financial activities; for example, in Eve Online, a user set up
a bank, took a great deal of money as deposits, and then disappeared with the
proceeds leaving virtual investors out of pocket [189]. There is very little legal
redress in the case of virtual theft, as most VW developers retain intellectual
property rights over in-world items created by users so no actual theft is deemed
to have taken place [190] [191];
• malicious servers which harvest personal information for future illegal use;
• and attacks through the VW Client, since once downloaded, the VW developers
have no more control over it, and users can tamper with its software by chang-
ing application logic or incoming/outgoing data. For example, malware may be
15Reports leaked by Edward Snowden in December 2013 revealed that UK and US Government Secu-
rity Agencies (GCHQ and National Security Agency (NSA) infiltrated WOW and SL as they believed
that terrorist or criminal networks could use the anonymity of the VW environment to communicate
secretly or launder money [183]. One leaked document revealed “while GCHQ was testing its ability to
spy on Second Life in real time, British intelligence officers vacuumed up three days’ worth of Second
Life chat, instant message and financial transaction data, totaling 176,677 lines of data, which included
the content of the communications” [184].
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present on the user’s machine [192], or the user’s machine can be compromised
following VW identity theft [193].
Identification and authentication procedures for users of VWs can be fairly limited,
mostly relying on static username/password combinations, which are easily compro-
mised. Virtual goods and identities can be stolen if an account is hacked, with the
danger that the user’s computer can then be compromised and RW identity theft could
occur [193]. Organised crime syndicates have been known to use the anonymity of VWs
to hide money laundering and other illegal activities [194, 195].
A study into VW user experience showed that 22.9%+ of male players and 32%+
of female players had told secrets to their VW friends which they had not revealed
to anyone in the RW [196], thus exhibiting a very relaxed attitude to information
disclosure. The perceived anonymity of the VW environment can also lead to poor
security awareness [181]. In the RW, there are basic security steps an individual can
take to check if an action is likely to be insecure (e.g. not clicking on links sent from
unknown sources, checking the SSL padlock on a browser): there are no clear VW
equivalent measures [197].
Mobile Devices and VWs
As a VW is a fully online, persistent environment, RW devices such as mobile phones
do not immediately spring to mind as appropriate security enablers. However, there
is an overlap between virtual and real worlds. There are many VW services that are
conducted externally to the world itself. These can include: VW-specific forums such
as the SL Community [198]; more generalised MMORPG discussion spaces e.g. [199];
official VW object marketplaces that use RW payment systems e.g. Blizzard’s Online
Shop where you can buy virtual pets or give them as gifts e.g. [200]; or official mar-
ketplaces where trades are negotiated in the RW but paid for in the VW using virtual
currency such as Eve Online’s marketplace forum e.g. [201] .
Examples of this RW/VW overlap can be seen in SL, where there was a facility to
use an in-world telephone system called AvaLine. This allowed users to make phone
calls to/from the RW whilst appearing as their avatar persona [202]: communication
with a non-SL user was also possible from within the VW. This was a very popular
service - in 2009, over 15 billion minutes of voice services were used [203] - but the
facility has now been discontinued.
There are existing VW security services that use phones. For example, the Bat-
tle.net Authenticator is either a physical token or an application on supported mobile
devices, used for two-factor authentication to protect against unauthorised account ac-
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cess [28]. The VW developers advise using this in conjunction with “SMS Protect” [204]
for text message verification of account recovery/ suspicious login attempt/ password
or security feature changes. However, there is a reported security vulnerability in the
Battle.net mobile authenticator application [205]. It is vulnerable to a passive eaves-
dropper during the initialisation process due to a weak one time pad key generation
algorithm on the client side, so Man-in-the-Middle attacks are possible. (Details can
be seen in [206])
2.7.2 Rationale for Studying VW Applications
Of the previously selected application areas, m-Payment does not apply to the VW
environment as its payment infrastructure is based either on standard external RW
e-commerce facilities such as PayPal, or VW currency that supports the in-world econ-
omy. However, weak authentication can lead to identity theft and other RW problems
for users of VWs, so investigating methods for enhancing VW authentication would be
useful. Equally, the remote e-voting application could be applicable in VWs: voting
in-world would enhance the immersive experience for VW users. An interesting area
to study would be how to maintain the privacy of the vote in an environment where all
activities are monitored: a mobile phone that receives voting information via a second
communication channel (the MNO network) would be a helpful security option.
Proposed solutions for VW Applications are discussed in Chapter 7.
2.8 Chapter Summary
This chapter described RW challenging environments, and presented background in-
formation relating to the application areas chosen for further study in this thesis. The
applications chosen are: a new research area (remote e-voting on mobile phones); a
well established area (mobile payments); and enabling technologies for secure processes
(authentication). The challenging VW environment was also described, and two of the
application were selected for further study in VWs.
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This chapter covers background information about technologies that are used
in the research solutions presented later in the thesis. Smart cards are de-
signed with tamper-resistant chip technology and storage, with specialised
protocols and security algorithms, so that information can be processed se-
curely. The mobile phone Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) is the most
widely available smart card in existence. This chapter describes the SIM
and its standardisation, and this is followed by an explanation of the fea-
tures, communications and security of the Smart Card Web Server (SCWS)
which provides web server functionality implemented in the restricted envi-
ronment of the SIM.
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3.1 Smart Cards in Mobile Telecommunication
Smart cards are designed with tamper-resistant chip technology and storage, with spe-
cialised protocols and security algorithms, so that information can be processed se-
curely [29]. A brief description of the use of smart cards in telecoms will now be given,
based on work from several sources [29, 207, 208, 209].
3.1.1 UICCs and SIMs
The UICC, often known as the Universal Integrated Circuit Card1 is a physically secure
chip inserted into a mobile device that uses smart card technology to identify a user,
their services (and their billing plan) to their Mobile Network Operator (MNO). The
UICC contains a microprocessor along with its own data storage and software, with
operator-defined profiles installed during manufacture that enable identification and
authentication with the mobile network.
The Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) was the term that was originally used to
describe both the physical card smart card in a Global System for Mobile Communica-
tions (GSM) phone (2G) and the telecommunication application software on that ran
on the smart card. When it became possible for the SIM to operate alongside other
smart card applications on the physical card (e.g. payment, travel or loyalty applica-
tions), i.e. when Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) networks were
introduced (now referred to as 3G), the physical hardware/low level software platform
for telecommunications became known as the UICC. The 2G SIM application evolved
into a 3G telecommunication application software that was termed the USIM.
The UICC can have multiple applications on it: for example it can have both SIM
and USIM applications so the widest range of handsets can access a particular MNO’s
services. In this thesis, the term “SIM” will be used as a generic term to describe the
smart card that consists of the UICC and its telecommunication access application soft-
ware i.e. USIM (for 3G networks) or SIM (for GSM networks). Modern SIMs can have
advanced features such as the Smart Card Web Server (SCWS) [15] which introduces
web server functionality to the SIM environment and provides a rich interface for the
user. Advanced SIMs can also perform public-key processing (PKI-capable SIM), using
standardised cryptographic algorithms for encryption/ digital signatures [210, 211].
The SIM Application Toolkit (SAT or STK) is an interface between the SIM card
and the handset that includes a set of commands used to build applications: for ex-
ample, the SIM card can send short messages, set up a call or display menu and text
items. STK applications often employ a text based menu approach and can provide
1The GSMA [208] states that UICC is neither an abbreviation nor an acronym.
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simple user interfaces. Application updates can be delivered over-the-air (OTA) [13].
It is possible to run services such as banking applications/transactions securely on the
SIM card, as seen in M-PESA [212], using encryption.
There are many standardisation bodies for telecommunications smart cards, which
have helped to establish the SIM as the most widely available smart card in the world.
The most relevant ones are now briefly described.
3.1.2 Standards
The UICC conforms to standards written by the European Telecommunications Stan-
dards Institute, (ETSI) and its Smart Card Platforms (SCP) group [213].
Inter alia, ETSI SCP define and maintain UICC standards for:
• two types of access (ISO and USB);
• Secure Remote Management procedures;
• an Application Programming Interface (API) set.
The custodians of the GSM specifications are The Third Generation Partnership
Project (3GPP) [214], and they manage and maintain 3G/4G and the SIM/ USIM
specifications (amongst others). The ISO7816 series of standards are particularly im-
portant for SIMs. The first four standards cover physical/electrical aspects, protocols
and inter-industry commands [215, 216, 217, 218]. The full list of ISO7816 standards
is available from the International Organization for Standardization website [219].
The STK interface is specified in GSM specifications: 3GPP TS 11.14 for SIM [220]
and 3GPP TS 31.111 for USIM [221]. These specifications do not define how STK
commands can be used interoperably on SIM cards from different SIM vendors. To
accommodate this, a number of other standards exist that specify how to access STK
functionality and create interoperable Java SIM applications: for example, 3GPP TS
03.19 (for SIM) [222]/ 3GPP TS 31.130 for USIM [223], 3GPP TS 03.48 [224], and
GlobalPlatform Card Specifications [225].
Of particular relevance to the work in this thesis, specifications on the features
and security for the SCWS are produced by the Open Mobile Alliance (OMA) [226].
Using web server functionality in the SIM environment forms the basis of several of the
proposals in this thesis, so the SCWS will now be described in more detail.
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3.2 The Smart Card Web Server (SCWS)
The Smart Card Web Server (SCWS) is an HTTP 1.1 server [227] implemented in the
tamper resistant environment of the SIM: its features and functionality are standardised
by the OMA. The OMA Specification states
“The SCWS is a web server, running within the Smart Card, to which local
HTTP applications in the device can connect. The security considerations
are the same as with any remote server that the user can browse with the
handset Web browser. The SCWS shall implement HTTP and HTTPS and
thus provide the same level of authentication, confidentiality and integrity
as provided by other Web servers.” [15].
When it was first introduced, the SCWS was designed to provide MNOs and de-
velopers with a powerful execution environment that combined the advantages of both
local runtimes (access to device APIs, local storage) and development using web lan-
guages (easy development, ability to retrieve data from the internet).
Additionally, the SIMAlliance proposed that the SCWS could be combined with
contactless technology interfaces embedded in a single SE so access is fast and always
on, even oﬄine. This would improve security as transactions are made directly between
the SCWS and the contactless SE [228].
The capabilities of the SCWS (version 1.2) will now be briefly outlined, summarised
from the following OMA specifications [15]2:
• Smartcard-Web-Server Approved Version 1.2.1 13 Sep 2013
• Smartcard Web Server Enabler Architecture Approved Version 1.2 05 Mar 2013
• Enabler Release Definition for Smartcard-Web-Server Approved Version1.2.1 13
Sep 2013
• Smartcard Web Server Requirements Approved Version 1.2 05 Mar 2013
3.2.1 SCWS Features
The purpose of the SCWS is to serve web pages locally to the handset’s browser. These
pages are either static HTML pages or dynamically created by Java applets running
inside the SIM i.e. it serves both static and dynamic content through the use of on-card
applications. The SCWS is owned and operated by the MNO, and is only accessible
from authorised applications on the phone handset (based on an Access Control Policy
2A more detailed explanation of the security and management of the SCWS can be found in [229].
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Figure 3.1: Smart Card Web Server Architecture (adapted from [15])
(ACP)) or a trusted Remote Administration Server (RAS) controlled by the MNO or
an authorised third party (e.g. a bank). The SCWS should not be accessed by any
other entity [15].
As the SCWS is a lightweight web server that has been specially designed to operate
in a resource restricted environment like a SIM card, the OMA specification states that
it is expected that the SCWS must implement a minimal set of HTTP 1.1 features.
These are: GET; HEAD; POST; PUT; DELETE; and optionally OPTIONS, TRACE
and CONNECT. The SCWS must support Basic Authentication and may support
Digest Authentication as defined in IETF RFC 2617 [230], but an application can
implement its own authentication scheme such as an application specific user name
and password/PIN. It is possible for users to change their SCWS passwords [15].
Figure 3.1 shows the SCWS architecture.
3.2.2 SCWS Communication
The OMA has specified that the SCWS must support TLS communication i.e.
• symmetric encryption using (RFC4279) Pre-shared Key ciphersuites for Trans-
port Layer Security (PSK-TLS) [231], where the communication between the
SCWS and any outside entity will be protected through the use of a pre-shared
key, using standardised symmetric algorithms such as AES [232].
• asymmetric encryption through the use of public key cryptography and cer-
tificates. The specification requires the use of the RSA algorithm [210].
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The SCWS communicates with an HTTP/HTTPs client (browser) [233] based on
the phone, separate from the normal SIM-to-Handset communication. There are two
possible ways for this communication to take place, via the Bearer Independent Protocol
(BIP) or HTTP/HTTPs:
• BIP is used when the SIM card does not have a TCP/IP stack. BIP is de-
fined in ETSI TS 102 223 [234] and takes place over ISO7816. A BIP Gateway
located on the phone translates TCP/IP messages to BIP commands (that the
SIM understands) and vice versa: the BIP gateway encapsulates requests in a
ISO7816 packet, passes the packet to the SCWS which can then retrieve the
original request. The port numbers used for this are 3516 (for HTTP) and 4116
for (HTTPs). The IP address used is the “loopback” or localhost IP address of
127.0.0.1.
• HTTP/HTTPs is used when the SIM card implements a TCP/IP stack. Here,
the HTTP/HTTPs client on the phone can access the card (and the SCWS)
directly without the need for the gateway. SIM cards based on JavaCard v.3.0
Connected Edition [235] can provide this functionality. HTTP communication
will use port 80, and HTTPs will use port 443: the IP address can be dynamically
allocated, but the card must be addressed by the name “localuicc”.
For the intra-phone communication, the SCWS acts as a server since it replies to
requests by client(s) on the phone. The SCWS can also operate in client mode, and
this occurs whenever the MNO or a remote trusted entity wants to update the SCWS
with new content, change settings or delete/retrieve data from the SCWS.
Figure 3.2 shows client/server modes of operation of the SCWS.
3.2.3 SCWS Administration Protocols
SCWS content should be capable of being remotely updated in a secure and managed
manner, similar to traditional web servers. SCWS administration protocols provide the
ability to upload new data (e.g. xHTML pages), delete data and change configuration
parameters for the SCWS. Depending on the amount of data that needs to be trans-
ferred, or the reason for the communication, this remote administration for the SCWS
can be done using one of two standardised protocols: the Lightweight Administration
Protocol (LAP), or the Full Administration Protocol (FAP):
• Lightweight Administration Protocol. This is appropriate when there are
settings to be changed or the content of the update is small in size. The procedure
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is done Over-The-Air (OTA) as described in [15]. An example would be when
static HTML pages need to be transferred to the SCWS.
• Full Administration Protocol. This is employed when the amount of data
to be sent is large and cannot fit into a small number of SMS messages. In
this case the Remote Administration Server (RAS), which is defined as a trusted
entity in the OMA specification, uses a Push message to communicate with an
on-card entity named the Administration Agent (AA), and establishes an HTTPs
connection to open an administration session. This Push message can be sent
either using a formatted SMS or using the OMA SIP Push Enabler [236]. The
RAS can then access and manage the data on the SIM, with applets transferred
using the procedures outlined in [237]. Such communication may be triggered
by on-card events, in which case the initiator is the local agent. The OMA
specification defines that this connection is triggered either by the RAS or by
the SIM card itself (when a certain event occurs) [15]. The FAP is used when
the amount of data is relatively large e.g. loading a Java applet. If a network
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connection problem occurs during a FAP session the AA attempts reconnection
according to a pre-defined retry policy: if the session is abandoned, an error SMS
is sent to the RAS (see [15] for details).
Both these protocols provide end-to-end authentication, integrity and confidential-
ity, via an authorised administration entity [15]. PUT and DELETE HTTP commands
are not allowed for any entity without administration privileges, and pages that only
the RAS can access must be protected using a protection set mechanism defined in the
OMA specification e.g. the “/SCWS/admin” URL.
3.2.4 Access Control Policy
The OMA specification defines a security feature to protect the SCWS from unautho-
rised access from applications that run on the phone, the Access Control Policy En-
forcer (ACPE). This determines which phone applications can be permitted to access
the SCWS, thus providing a level of protection from potentially malicious applications
on the mobile device. The ACPE will allow only certain trusted applications to access
the SCWS, using an Access Control Policy (ACP) that will be provided to the ACPE
by the SCWS over HTTP. Access to the SCWS is granted or denied based on the ACP
i.e. only applications signed by the MNO, the handset manufacturer, or other trusted
entities. The OMA states
“The ACP Enforcer is especially useful in devices that allow the user to
download and install applications in the device itself (e.g. open OS phones).
One use case is the download and installation of a malicious application
in the handset that will try to block the access to the SCWS or ask the
user for his[/her] passwords in order to access private information in the
SCWS.” [15]
3.2.5 The SCWS Remote Management Ecosystem
As the MNO owns and operates the SIM/SCWS, service providers must have a business
relationship with the MNO in order to install their applications on the SIM. The use of a
Trusted Services Manager (TSM) to manage the business ecosystem has been suggested
in the context of supporting NFC applications on mobile phones [238]. Three business
models are identified: simple mode, where only the MNO can manage applications on
the UICC; delegated mode, where the TSM can manage applications on the UICC but
needs a pre-authorisation token from the MNO; and authorised mode where the TSM
manages a specific area of the UICC without reference to the MNO. (For examples
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of the key management of these business models, please see [238].) In the SCWS
scenario, as the RAS is a trusted entity, the TSM could control it on behalf of the
service provider.
3.2.6 Interoperability
The SCWS should provide interoperability across phone handsets and operating sys-
tems, and can be used to access web content oﬄine using standard phone browsers.
Development issues that may hinder full interoperability have been identified by the
SIMAlliance [239].
3.3 Chapter Summary
This chapter described the technologies which will play an important part in the re-
search presented later in this thesis. A brief description of the features of smart cards
for telecommunication i.e the UICC (hardware) and applications i.e. SIM/USIM (soft-
ware) was provided, with relevant standards. A summary of SIM Toolkit functions was
also given, followed by details of the functionality and tightly controlled management
procedures of the Smart Card Web Server, which will be used in proposals made later
in this thesis.
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Remote (Internet) e-voting uses the voter’s own equipment to cast votes,
but is potentially vulnerable to many common attacks, which affect the elec-
tion’s integrity. Security can be improved by distributing vote processing
over many web servers installed in tamper-resistant, secure environments,
using the SCWS on a mobile phone’s SIM. A generic SCWS voting model
is proposed, using a SIM/SCWS voting application with standardised MNO
management procedures to process the votes cast. E-voting systems Preˆt
a` Voter and Estonian I-voting are presented as use-cases EV-1 and EV-2
which employ the generic SCWS voting model to enhance election security
and protect against DDoS attacks.
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4.1 Remote e-Voting Use Cases
Remote e-voting systems have to operate in unsupervised environments, leading to
opportunities for DDoS and technical attacks on the voting infrastructure, as described
previously in Section 2.4.
Security can be improved by distributing vote processing over many web servers
installed in tamper-resistant, secure environments, using the SCWS on a mobile phone
SIM. If a SIM could be used for vote processing that would introduce a trustworthy
component into the system. A mobile phone SIM is a restricted processing platform, so
a voting application cannot necessarily perform all required e-voting system functions.
It can provide a “front-end” input method to more sophisticated cryptographic e-voting
systems which do have the required resources. With this in mind, using the SIM in e-
voting will render attacks to remote e-voting system less attractive in two ways. Firstly,
installing vote processing in a trusted tamper-resistant environment that can only be
accessed by authorised parties will reduce the opportunity for malicious modifications
to the voting application. Secondly, distributing vote processing over a large number of
web servers will mean that an attacker must target multiple sites to be successful. The
SCWS introduces web server functionality to the SIM environment, so a distributed
vote processing application can be installed and run in a tamper-resistant environment.
The use of the SIM means that the vote processing application is not accessible to an
adversary who attacks the mobile phone platform.
In this chapter, a generic voting model is proposed, using a SIM/SCWS voting
application with standardised MNO management procedures to transport the votes
cast, that enhances election security, combats the secure platform problem and protects
against DDoS attacks. The generic model is then used with two e-Voting schemes, Preˆt
a` Voter (PAV) and Estonian I-voting. These particular schemes have been chosen as
they both have features which can be readily adapted to work on a phone. Also, as
the two voting schemes have different characteristics (for example, I-voting is designed
for use with the Estonian national PKI infrastructure [240]) they will be presented as
separate use cases, EV-1: SCWS-PAV and EV-2: SCWS-I-Voting to illustrate the
flexibility of the SCWS generic model. The security requirements that need to be met
by e-voting schemes are outlined in the next section.
4.2 e-Voting Security Requirements
The security requirements of a general e-voting system are to ensure that votes are:
cast as the voter intended; recorded as cast; counted as recorded; and not linkable to a
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Table 4.1: eVoting: Security Requirements
Confidentiality
EV-SR1 Secrecy of the vote (privacy)
EV-SR2 Vote cannot be traced back to a voter (unlinkability)
EV-SR3 Voter can vote without external influence (vote-buying/ coercion)
Integrity
EV-SR4 Votes should not be tampered with (recorded as cast)
EV-SR5 Votes should be included correctly in the final election result (counted
as recorded)
Authentication
EV-SR6 Only eligible voters can vote (democracy)
EV-SR7 Voters can vote only once (democracy)
Availability
EV-SR8 Voters must not be prevented from voting (forced abstention/ denial of
service)
specific voter. Also, no one should be able to determine how a voter voted. An attacker
could seek to undermine these requirements and may have many goals, including ma-
nipulating the votes randomly, denying access to the voting procedure for legitimate
voters, adding votes for a specific candidate/party (ballot stuffing), spoiling votes for a
particular candidate or gaining knowledge about a voter’s choice of candidate. By its
nature, remote voting is vulnerable to coercion and vote buying, where a voter votes
(willingly or unwillingly) as instructed by a third party1. Security requirements are
summarised in Table 4.7.
The generic SCWS e-voting proposal designed to address these security require-
ments is now described.
4.3 SCWS e-Voting Generic Model
The proposed generic model has the following stages: registration of voters; installa-
tion of voting application and credentials onto the SCWS; voter authentication; ballot
display and choosing a candidate; vote storage and sending; and confirmation that the
vote has been received/ processed by the Voting Authority.
The entities involved in the proposed generic e-voting system are shown in Table 4.2;
necessary assumptions are shown in Table 4.3.
1The proposal in this chapter acknowledges the problems caused by coercion and vote buying in
remote e-voting, but does not attempt to offer a solution to these aspects.
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Table 4.2: SCWS e-Voting Generic Model - Entities
Entity Description
MNO Mobile Network Operator: the MNO provides management services such
as Lightweight and Full Administration Protocols to update the SCWS
on the SIM, and a mobile network infrastructure.
Phone Mobile Phone and Browser: The mobile phone handset and browser
application are generally untrusted, as jail-broken operating systems or
malware can compromise the correct operation of the phone’s applica-
tions and operating system.
RAS Remote Administrative Server: this was described in Chapter 3, and
here provides the interface between the e-voting system and the voter’s
mobile SCWS. It updates the SCWS of a voter’s registered phone via
the MNO’s FAP process, using HTTPs. The RAS can be operated
by the MNO or a TTP (e.g. the Voting Authority). As explained in
Chapter 3, the RAS is defined as a trusted entity in the OMA SCWS
specification [15].
SCWS Smart Card Web Server: the user accesses the SCWS environment using
a PIN. The SCWS uses a Java applet for processing information securely.
V Voter: an individual in possession of a mobile device with a SIM with
SCWS installed, who uses the phone browser to communicates over
HTTPs with the SCWS environment
VA Voting Authority: The VA has details of all voter credentials, candidate
information, ballot forms and election parameters. It is responsible for
creating the voting application, registering voters, and receiving and
counting the votes once they have been cast.
VoteAPP Voting Application: installed on the SCWS (using installation proce-
dures described in [237]), this displays ballot forms and collects votes
ready for transfer to the VA.
4.3.1 Registration
To register, the voter must supply a mobile phone number to the VA. This will allow
security credentials to be installed on the SIM/SCWS to use with the SCWS for e-
voting. These are: voter ID (IDV), voter password/PIN, voter cryptographic key pair(s)
for encryption and signing (PUBV ,PKV ) and (SV ,V erV ), and the public key of the
VA (PUBV A) to encrypt data sent to the VA by the SCWS (e.g. the vote). There
are various ways that Voter credentials (ID/password/PIN/keys) can be obtained: for
example,
• securely created by the VA at the time of registration: if the VA is responsible for
generating voter credentials, recommended best practices should be followed e.g.
NIST SP800-57 Part1 [241]. Additionally the public key of the VA (PUBV A)
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Table 4.3: SCWS e-Voting Generic Model - Assumptions
Description
EV-A1 The MNO has authorised the VA to use a RAS to update SCWS applica-
tions and data: the VA may need to have trusted business relationships
with several MNOs to maximise the availability of the voting applica-
tion.
EV-A2 The SCWS has a one-to-one mapping to a user, i.e. only one registered
voter can use a particular SCWS.
EV-A3 A secure registration procedure is in place: the voter will supply a mobile
phone number to the VA and authorise its use so that the RAS will be
able to download the Java applet/credentials onto the correct phone
using techniques described in Chapter 3. The voter will also set a PIN/
password to access the SCWS environment.
EV-A4 The HTTPs channels between the RAS and SCWS, between the SCWS
and Browser, and between the RAS and VA are considered secure.
EV-A5 The VA is trusted not to collude with the MNO: the MNO is trusted
not to collude with any other entity, especially other network operators
(i.e. there should be a “circle of trust”.) The MNO only provides man-
agement procedures and infrastructure and should not be trusted with
sensitive voter, ballot form or election information.
Table 4.4: SCWS e-Voting Generic Model - Protocol Notation
Notation Description
EK(Z) Encryption of data Z with key K
IDX Identity of entity X
MNO Mobile Network Operator (entity)
NX Random Nonce generated by entity X
PKX/ SKX Public/ Secret Key pair of entity X. The key size should be accord-
ing to best practices (see NIST SP800-57 Part1 [241] for details).
Key pairs could be obtained from a national digital ID scheme if
available.
RAS Remote Administration Server (entity)
SX/ V erX Signing/ Verification key pair of entity X. The key size should be
according to best practices (see NIST SP800-57 Part1 [241] for de-
tails). Key pairs could be obtained from a national digital ID scheme
if available.
V Voter (entity)
VA Voting Authority (entity)
X→Y: Message sent from entity X to entity Y
(Z)SignK Signature on data Z with signature key K
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Table 4.5: SCWS e-Voting Generic Model - Security Credentials
Credential Description Location
IDV Voter ID: Size and complexity according to VA’s
policies - it is better to avoid having a voter ID
similar to the voter’s surname or other demo-
graphic information, so that it will be more diffi-
cult for an attacker to guess.
Stored on the
SIM. Known by
voter and VA.
Password Size and complexity according to best prac-
tices: e.g. at least 8 characters long with up-
per/lowercase letters, at least a number and a
punctuation character [242].
Stored on the
SIM. Known by
voter and VA.
(PUBV ,PKV )
(SV ,V erV )
Cryptographic key pairs (public/private)
(PUBV ,PKV ) used for encryption/decryption,
(SV ,V erV ) for signing/verifying - for key sep-
aration purposes, it is better to have different
key pairs for these cryptographic functions (but
this depends on the VA). Key sizes should follow
best practices (see NIST SP800-57 Part1 [241]
for details). Key pairs could be obtained from a
national digital ID scheme if available.
Private keys
PKV , SV stored
on the SIM alone.
Public keys
PUBV , V erV
also known to the
VA.
PUBV A The Public Key of the VA will be used to encrypt
data sent to VA by the SCWS (e.g. the vote). It
is best practice to use a different key for every
election, so that brute force attacks against it (if
successful) only affect one election .
Stored on the SIM
and known to ev-
erybody
should be different for every election, so that brute force attacks against it (if
successful) only affect one election.
• obtained from a national digital ID scheme if available. If a government-issued
identity scheme is used to supply voter credentials, there will be a very strong
independent link between the SCWS and voter identity, which will make it very
difficult for a voter to be impersonated. NFC phones and contactless smartcard
ID cards could provide an alternative, easy to use method for authenticating
voters, using the NFC phone as a smartcard reader. This requires an application
on the untrusted mobile handset, but authentication credentials can be protected
in transit through the phone by encryption. NFC can also allow the use of an
identity token with a strong independent linkage to identity, such as a passport
or government-issued identity card, e.g. as in [243].
• key pairs could also be generated by the SIM and sent to the VA.
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4.3.2 Installation of Application onto SCWS
Credentials are sent to the voter’s SCWS by the RAS, using FAP. Firstly, (PUBV ,PKV ),
(SV ,V erV ) and PUBV A are generated and sent to the SCWS
2. After this procedure has
completed successfully, the IDV/Password and application (code/data/optional ballot
forms) are transferred in the same way, encrypted by PUBV for decryption on the SIM
using PKV . The communication channel in both occasions is protected by HTTPs.
This is shown as Messages 1 and 2 in the protocol diagram in Figure 4.1.
The voting application (a Java applet running on the SCWS) must be given access
to the voter credentials and the keys installed on the SIM, and is able to create dynamic
content [15]. The application creates this content whenever requested and returns it
back to the SCWS (which in turns serves this content to the voter as HTML pages).
The voter may be notified about the installation, for example via an SMS, an
automatic call (such as an Interactive Voice Response (IVR)), an e-mail to a pre-
registered e-mail address or by simply updating the SCWS home page with a link
pointing to the voting site inside the SIM card. This is shown as Message 3 in Figure 4.1.
4.3.3 Authentication
The VA will again contact the voter through an SMS, IVR call or e-mail when the
election starts, and the SCWS homepage will show a “VOTE NOW” link . Clicking
the link transfers the voter to the SCWS environment and an authentication page is
displayed. In this page the voter will enter the IDV/Password/PIN issued during the
electoral registration stage. The IDV/ Password/PIN are checked against the ones that
were previously transferred to the SIM card, and that the IDV has not been used to vote
already. If the authentication is successful, the voter is presented with the ballot form,
in a format determined by the e-voting system used. (Optional Messages 7a/7b can be
used for additional processing at the VA: e.g. if the ballot form was not installed on the
SCWS by Message 2, it can be retrieved using the IDV to obtain the appropriate list of
candidates; or voter eligibility can be checked against centrally held databases). Again
all the communication takes place over HTTPs, and this stage is shown as Messages 4
to 7 in Figure 4.1.
4.3.4 Choosing a Candidate
The ballot form allows the voter to choose a candidate, with a text entry option if
required by the voting scheme used. Selecting a “VOTE” button generates the confir-
2If the keys are generated in the SIM environment and sent to the VA, this will result in an extra
message in the protocol: for simplicity, the protocol illustrates the VA installing keys on the SCWS.
67
4.3. SCWS e-Voting Generic Model 4. Remote E-Voting
Voter SCWS RAS VA 
2.((IDV, PASSWORD, VoteAPP)PUBV)https 
7a (IDV) https 6. (IDV, PASSWORD) https 
4. https://127.0.0.1:4116/evoting/index.html 
5. https://127.0.0.1:4116/evoting/login.html 
3.SMS, IVR CALL, email 
1.(PUBV, PKV,PUBVA)https 
7b (Ballot) https 
8 (VOTE) https 
9. https://127.0.0.1:4116/evoting/confirm.html 
10. Confirm(Yes/No)https 
11. https://127.0.0.1:4116/evoting/thanks.html 
12. SCWS: Encrypt/sign/store the vote 
(Vote)PUBVA||SigSV(Vote)PUBVA 
13.((Vote)PUBVA||SigSV(Vote)PUBVA)https 
14. TempID ||((Vote)PUBVA||SigSV(Vote)PUBVA)https 
15A. TempID + Confirmation 
7. https://127.0.0.1:4116/evoting/vote.html 
15B.CONFIRMATION: SMS, IVR CALL, email RAS: TempID removed 
Figure 4.1: SCWS Voting Generic Model - Protocol
mation screen, where a simple yes/no, or a PIN associated with the IDV can be used
to confirm the voter’s choice. Once the voter confirms, the vote is submitted to the
SCWS. These are Messages 8 to 11 in the protocol diagram in Figure 4.1 and again
all communication is over HTTPs. Alternatively, it is possible to select a dummy vote
process rather than a real vote, if the e-voting system allows this for verification pur-
poses e.g. as seen in the proposal by Chaum et al. [244]. This is intended to allow
the voter to challenge the e-voting system and gain reassurance that the cryptographic
processing is working correctly. Once the voter confirms, the vote is submitted to the
SCWS.
4.3.5 Vote storage and sending
The vote is now stored on the SIM card. The format of the vote is dependent on the
voting scheme used: for example, it could be a pre-assigned vote code as in [18], or
a cryptogram which determines the position of the candidates on the ballot form as
in [81]. The vote is encrypted with PUBV A (and signed if required), and this will be
68
4.4. EV-1: SCWS-PAV 4. Remote E-Voting
retrieved by the VA and subsequently deleted from the SCWS after it is cast. The vote
is also kept on the SIM for future reference, encrypted with PUBV . This encryption
is not strictly necessary, but is included to provide an additional security measure in
case space restrictions mean the vote is stored in non-tamper-resistant memory or on
the phone. A flag is set to indicate that the IDV has been used to vote. Once the
vote is encrypted, the SCWS administration agent will either trigger a connection with
the RAS, or the RAS can automatically retrieve the vote on a specific day/time. In
both cases the two entities initiate an HTTPs connection and the vote is collected
via the FAP. The RAS passes the signed vote (unchanged) to the VA, tagged with
a temporary ID so that the vote receiving process at the VA does not find out the
mobile number, as this could be used to link the voter to a particular vote. Once the
vote is received by the VA, the voter receives a notification that their vote was cast
via a second channel e.g. an SMS message, IVR or an email. Steps 12 to 15a/b in
Figure 4.1 show the vote storage and sending process. Using the SCWS model keeps
all sensitive vote information private in a tamper resistant environment, so that no one
can determine how a voter voted.
4.3.6 SCWS e-Voting Generic Model: Summary
The SCWS e-Voting generic model presented here inherits many desirable security
properties from its use of a) the tamper-resistant environment of the SIM for vote
storage and processing, and b) the standardised and tightly controlled management
procedures associated with the SCWS. A security analysis is shown later in this chapter,
in Section 4.6.
The next section describes the first e-voting use-case, EV-1: SCWS-PAV which
demonstrates how the generic SCWS model can be used with the Preˆt a` Voter e-voting
system.
4.4 EV-1: SCWS-PAV
4.4.1 Preˆt a` Voter - Background Information
Preˆt a` Voter (PAV) [81, 244, 245, 246] is a paper-based e-voting system designed for the
supervised environment of an election polling-station. The paper ballot form is used
as input to a cryptographic system. The electoral process can be audited by voters
and third parties, to give end-to-end verifiability. Voters can verify the system in two
ways: by performing dummy votes not included in the final tally, which are intended
to check that the cryptography used in the ballot form is correct; and by checking that
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their vote appears on a secure Web Bulletin Board (WBB) once it has been cast.
Voters are given a paper ballot form, and they mark their choice with an X. Every
ballot form is different, as candidates are listed in a (different) random order on each
one. There is a code (called an “onion”) which contains details of the candidate order
in encrypted form. When the vote is cast, the left hand side of the form (containing
the candidate names) is detached and destroyed, leaving the voter with a voting slip
showing the position of their vote on the form, but not who the chosen candidate was.
The vote is input to the PAV system and the voter is given the slip as a receipt which
can be checked against a web bulletin board at a later stage. The actual vote recorded
in the system is the numerical position of the voter’s choice and the onion i.e. (index,
onion).
The PAV scheme was extended in [246] by including confirmation codes for each
candidate, printed on the ballot form. These codes are calculated by the VA prior to
the election. Once a voter has cast their vote, the confirmation codes are recalculated
by the VA and relayed back to the voter at the poll-site. The voter can check this
received value against a confirmation code hidden on the ballot form under a scratch-
off strip, which only they should see. The voter’s receipt contains the position (index)
of their chosen candidate, the associated confirmation code and the onion. Figure 4.2
shows a paper ballot form with confirmation codes, before and after voting, with the
onion in the bottom right corner.
In the PAV scheme, ballot forms can be printed on demand by the voting booth, as
described in [245]. Briefly, two related onions are calculated for each ballot form, the
“booth onion”(left onion) encrypted with the public key of the voting booth, and the
“registrar onion” (right onion) encrypted in the normal PAV way. These “proto-ballot”
forms can be distributed and stored securely prior to the election. Alternatively, the
left onion could be encrypted with PUBV (rather than a booth key) without losing any
security, by using ElGamal for distributed blinding as described in [247]. On Election
Day, when a voter takes a ballot form into the voting booth, the booth reads the
left onion, uses its previously stored secret key to decrypt the onion, reconstructs the
candidate list and prints the ballot form. The vote is cast using the right onion, i.e.
(index, right onion).
4.4.2 Using the SCWS with Preˆt a` Voter
It is the ability to print ballot forms on demand, along with the use of confirmation
codes that make PAV a suitable example e-voting system to use with the SCWS model.
The advantage of using PAV with confirmation codes is that most of the cryptography
(i.e. generating the onions) is done by the VA before the election starts, so this min-
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Figure 4.2: Preˆt a` Voter Ballot Forms Before and After Voting
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Figure 4.3: EV-1: Preˆt a` Voter and SCWS
imises the amount of cryptographic processing necessary in the restricted environment
of the SIM. With suitable modifications to the generic model, the SCWS voting appli-
cation can play the part of the PAV voting booth, to decrypt the candidate ordering
and hence display ballot forms. The SCWS can also store confirmation codes securely
so that when the voter receives a code from the VA (in an SMS) the two values can be
compared. Figure 4.3 shows an overview of the design.
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Installation of Keys and Application onto SCWS
In Message 2 of the protocol shown in Figure 4.1, PAV candidate lists and proto-
ballots (including confirmation codes) are sent to the SCWS along with the voting
application and other credentials. The left onion must be encrypted with PUBV ,
using the ElGamal blinding technique mentioned earlier. It is suggested that several
proto-ballots are sent, as this allows the voter to cast dummy votes to audit the system
if they so desire.
Authentication
The authentication stage remains the same as the generic SCWS approach, but when
the ballot form is to be displayed (Message 7 in Figure 4.1), the PAV method of
constructing the candidate order must be followed. This involves decrypting the left
onion using ElGamal and PKV , and then reconstructing the candidate order using a
predetermined PAV procedure [244, 245]. The ballot form can then be displayed (minus
confirmation codes).
Choosing a Candidate/Vote Storage
Choosing the candidate and voting is the same as in the generic SCWS approach. The
confirmation code for the selected candidate is displayed along with Message 11. Once
the candidate has been chosen, the vote needs to be signed with the voter’s signing key
before it is retrieved by the RAS. A copy of the vote with its associated confirmation
code is encrypted with PUBV and stored on the SCWS. Storing the confirmation code
on the SCWS ensures that at a later stage, only the voter can see this code (as specified
in PAV). Finally, a flag will be set on the SCWS to indicate that the voter has voted.
Vote Sending
The RAS passes the signed vote (unchanged) to the VA, as in the generic model. Once
the VA has received the vote, checked its validity, and posted it to the bulletin board,
it will recalculate the confirmation code for the chosen candidate, and send it and the
temporary ID to the RAS. The confirmation code can then be returned to the voter via
a second channel (SMS/IVR/email), for checking against the one previously displayed
on the phone browser and stored on the SCWS. This provides assurance that the vote
was counted as cast because the correct confirmation code can only be generated at
the VA once it has been successfully decrypted and matched to a valid entry in the
bulletin board.
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Dummy Vote Procedure
A dummy vote should check that the confirmation codes associated with all the can-
didates shown on a ballot form are correct, to provide assurance to the voter that the
underlying cryptographic calculations are accurate. Choosing the dummy vote option
will cause the SCWS to create a different message for the VA (via the RAS) containing
(audit request, right onion), rather than the usual vote. The VA will recalculate the
confirmation codes for all the candidates on the ballot form, and send them to the
voter via the second channel: the dummy vote will not be counted. The SCWS will
display all the stored candidate confirmation codes via the browser, for the voter to
check against those received from the VA. The ballot form on the SCWS which was
used for the dummy vote would then be marked as not selectable for future voting. If
all the stored ballot forms have been used for dummy votes, optional Message 7a and
7b shown in Figure 4.1 can be invoked to obtain another batch of ballot forms from
the VA.
4.4.3 Use Case EV-1: Summary
The verification procedures of PAV gives the voter the assurance that their vote has
been cast as intended, and counted as cast. Using the SCWS model keeps all sensi-
tive vote information private in a tamper resistant environment, so that no one can
determine how a voter voted.
The next section now presents the second e-Voting use-case, EV-2: SCWS I-Voting,
which demonstrates how the SCWS e-voting generic model can be used with the Esto-
nian I-Voting scheme.
4.5 EV-2: SCWS-I-Voting
4.5.1 Estonian I-Voting System - Background Information
Internet voting has been used for elections in Estonia since 2005, underpinned by the
strong authentication provided by ID cards which use the Estonian National Public
Key Infrastructure (PKI) system for identification and digital signatures [240]. Known
as I-voting, the Estonian scheme employs the “double envelope” system, similar to
postal voting, where the vote is encrypted with the VA public key (the secret “inner
envelope”), and digitally signed by the voter (the “outer envelope”). Internet voting is
possible during a 7-day period from the 10th to the 4th day prior to election day itself,
and voters are allowed to change their vote during this time by re-voting electronically
or visiting a polling station and casting a paper vote. Only the last recorded vote
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will count: paper-based votes cancel out electronic votes. The facility to re-vote is
intended to provide some protection against coercion and vote-buying: duplicate votes
are manually cancelled by election officials. A mock “test” election is run before a real
election to identify potential problems e.g. whether voter equipment has the correct
settings or not. Internet voting is popular: 24.3% of participating voters in the 2011
Parliamentary elections used I-voting, and there is “widespread trust in the conduct
of the Internet voting” [95]. For full information about the Estonian I-voting system
please see [87].
Please note: the descriptions that follow in use case EV-2 are based on the Estonian
I-Voting Scheme as it operated until 2015: there had been criticism from the academic
community and others [248, 249], and the scheme has since been updated to include
more robust security features and provide voter-verifiability through the use of a QR-
code confirmation of the vote cast [250, 251]. The new architecture [19] is summarised
in Appendix A.2.1.
Estonian ID Cards and Mobile-ID
Estonian ID cards used in conjunction with the National PKI scheme have two PINs,
for use in authentication and signing: they are commonly employed to access a range
of online government and financial services. Since 2011, there has been an alternative
to using a physical ID card for online authentication, called Mobile-ID. This uses a
specially issued SIM, obtained from an MNO, which holds public/private key pairs
and certificates that are activated by the Police and Border Control Department. The
security of the Mobile-ID protocol has been investigated by [252], and the protocol was
found to be at least as secure as authentication with a physical ID card. Using Mobile-
ID, a phone can be used alongside a PC for authentication instead of a smart card
reader. A SIM Toolkit application [29] performs the necessary encryption/ signing.
There is a very strong link between voter identity and the Mobile-ID SIM.
I-Voting
To use I-voting, the voter must download a voting application onto their PC, and
identify themselves either using an ID card inserted into a smart card reader attached
to the PC or by Mobile-ID. Using an ID card means all the voting stages are done
via PC, firstly entering PIN1 to identify the voter and retrieve the ballot form, and
secondly entering PIN2 to sign and cast the vote once the choice is made. The Mobile-
ID procedure is more complex, and involves an external, trusted Certificate Authority
(CA) to verify signatures/certificates. A voter identifies themselves by entering their
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mobile number into the downloaded voting application. This results in identical control
codes being sent from the CA to the PC and to the mobile (via SMS). The voter must
input their identification credential PIN1 into the mobile to confirm that the control
codes received are identical. The ballot is then displayed on the PC, and the voter
makes their choice on the PC. A new pair of identical control codes is sent from the
CA to the PC and phone, to be checked by the voter (that they are the same). If so,
the voter confirms their vote by inputting their digital signature credential PIN2 into
the phone. The vote is signed and cast, and a confirmation message then appears on
the PC.
I-Voting System Architecture
The I-voting system contains several components, shown in Figure 4.4A: these include a
publicly-accessible Vote Forwarding Server (VFS), which interacts with a Vote Storage
Server (VSS) and Voter/Candidate databases behind the VA’s firewall. Each voter has
a Personal Identification Code (PIC) on the Voter database: this database is updated
daily during the voting period, with amendments to voter information. An oﬄine
Vote Counting Application (VCA) tallies the votes cast at the end of the election.
The vote itself is formed as follows: (candidate choice, random number), encrypted
with the public key of the VCA, signed with the voter’s signing key SV , and the
voter’s certificate CertV . The VFS checks whether the individual who authenticated
themselves at the start of the session is the same one who gave the digital signature,
and then forwards the vote to the VSS. The VSS checks the correctness of the digital
signature via an external CA (also called the validity confirmation server). The VSS
acquires a certificate CertV ALID that confirms the validity of the digital signature
which is then added to the signed vote.
4.5.2 Using the SCWS with Estonian I-voting
It is the use of Mobile-ID in I-voting that is of interest here: the Mobile-ID SIM has
a very strong link to a person’s identity, and has cryptographic key pairs installed
for public key encryption/signing. If a Mobile-ID SIM also has SCWS capabilities,
the SCWS generic voting model could be used with the Estonian I-Voting system to
provide a secure, fully mobile voting interface, without the need for a PC and smart
card reader/ phone. An illustration of the proposed SCWS voting alternative is shown
in Figure 4.4B.
It can be seen in Figure 4.4 that the voter’s PC plus smart card reader/mobile
phone is replaced by a phone with the SCWS voting application. The SCWS voting
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Figure 4.4: EV-2: Estonian I-Voting System and SCWS Architecture
application also performs the role of the VFS (e.g. checking the voter’s authentication
credentials). This means that there is no publicly accessible server in the SCWS solu-
tion, only the trusted MNO-controlled RAS. Control codes from the CA to the mobile
are not necessary during the SCWS voting process, as all the relevant keys and PINs
are stored in the SIM and accessible to the SCWS voting application.
The VCA and PIC equate to the“VA”and “IDV” in the previously described SCWS
generic model respectively: in the following description, the terms “VA”and “IDV” will
be used for consistency.
The SCWS I-voting procedure is shown in Figure 4.5, and is now outlined.
Installation of Keys and Application onto SCWS
In the existing Estonian system, a voting application is downloaded to the voter’s
PC: this stage needs to be modified to include an option to choose SCWS voting.
Here, the voter must authenticate themselves to the VA using the standard Mobile-ID
procedure outlined previously (Message 1 in Figure 4.5). This is to ensure that the
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Voter SCWS RAS VA 
2.((IDV, VoteAPP)PUBV)https 
7a (IDV) https 6. (IDV, PIN1) https 
4. https://127.0.0.1:4116/evoting/index.html 
5. https://127.0.0.1:4116/evoting/login.html 
3.SMS, IVR CALL, email 
1.MOBILE-ID AUTHENTICATION 
7b (Ballot) https 
8 (VOTE) https 
9. https://127.0.0.1:4116/evoting/confirm.html 
10. Confirm(PIN2)https 
11. https://127.0.0.1:4116/evoting/thanks.html 
7. https://127.0.0.1:4116/evoting/vote.html 
12. SCWS: Encrypt/sign/store the vote 
(Vote)PUBVA||SigSV(Vote)PUBVA 
13.((Vote)PUBVA||SigSV(Vote)PUBVA)https 
14. TempID ||((Vote)PUBVA||SigSV(Vote)PUBVA)https 
15A. TempID + Confirmation 15B.CONFIRMATION: SMS, IVR CALL, email RAS: TempID removed 
Figure 4.5: EV-2: SCWS I-Voting - Protocol
voter is in possession of the Mobile-ID SIM that the SCWS voting application will be
installed on, and that the VA knows the public key of the voter (PUBV ) with which to
encrypt the application installation files. As Mobile-ID SIMs already have key pairs for
encrypting/signing along with corresponding digital certificates and PINs (1 and 2),
there is no need to install any further voter keys/passwords. Message 2 of the protocol
shown in Figure 4.5 can now be used to install the voting application and public key
of the VCA (PUBV A) onto the SCWS. Ballot forms could be installed on the SCWS
at this stage if desired.
Authentication
Once the advance voting period has commenced, the authentication stage in the generic
SCWS model (Messages 4-6) can use PIN1 associated with the voter’s Mobile-ID to
access the voting application. After successful authentication, the ballot form can either
be retrieved from the SCWS voting application (if it had been installed on the SCWS
in Message 2), or optional Message 7a can be used to send the IDV to the VA (via the
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FAP/RAS) to retrieve the ballot from the VA’s centrally held candidate and voter lists
and check voter’s eligibility. Message 7b will then return the ballot form.
Choosing a Candidate/Vote Storage
Choosing the candidate and voting is the same as in the generic SCWS approach.
Once the candidate has been chosen, the vote is formed by using PUBV A to encrypt
the voter’s choice along with a random number. The digital signature credential PIN2
is used by the voter to confirm the vote, rather than through a simple yes/no choice.
The vote will then be signed with the voter’s Mobile-ID signing key SV , once the voter
has confirmed their choice. There is no need to set a flag indicating that the voter
has voted, as re-voting is permissible and back-office procedures at the VA are used to
remove duplicate votes. The vote itself is formed as follows: (candidate choice, random
number), encrypted with the public key of the VCA PUBV A, signed with the voter’s
signing key SV , along with the voter’s Mobile-ID certificate CertV .
Vote Sending
Sending and confirming the vote is as described in the generic SCWS e-voting model i.e.
the vote is retrieved by the RAS and sent to the VSS. The voter’s certificate of validity
CertV ALID is added to the vote by the VSS, after checking the correctness of the digital
signature via an external CA (validity confirmation server). The confirmation message
returned to the voter via SMS/IVR/email will show that the vote has been received by
the VA and will be stored and duly processed once the advance voting period is over.
Dummy Vote Procedure
There is no “dummy vote” procedure as such, but there is a mock election stage, where
settings etc. can be tested.
4.5.3 Use Case EV-2: Summary
The (pre-2015) Estonian I-Voting system is not voter-verifiable, so does not give the
voter the assurance that their vote has been cast as intended, and counted as cast. The
advantages of using the SCWS model is that it keeps all sensitive vote information and
processing private in a tamper resistant environment, so that no one can determine
how a voter voted, and there is no centralised voting server that can be attacked in a
DDoS exploit.
A comparison of the SCWS generic model with use cases EV-1 and EV-2 is shown
in Table 4.6.
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Table 4.6: Comparing Generic Model to EV-1 and EV-2
Stages Generic Model PAV: EV-1 I-VOTING: EV-2
Register Generate PUBV ,
PKV , PUBV A
Generate PUBV ,
PKV , PUBV A
MOBILE-ID
Install App/keys sent via
FAP
+“Proto Ballots” PUBV A sent via
FAP: MOBILE-ID
already installed
Authenticate IDV, PIN/Password
to SCWS
as per generic model MOBILE-ID PIN1
Display Optional Msg 7a/b Decrypt LO: as per generic model
Ballot Display webpage PAV method to ex-
tract ballot
Choose Select candidate Vote=(index, RO) Vote=(choice,
Nonce)
Candidate Confirm Y/N Confirm Y/N Confirm with PIN2
Dummy
Vote
Select “audit”, vote
discarded.
Receive All Confir-
mation Codes
No Dummy Vote
Msg 7a/b for more
ballots
Ballot discarded
Store Vote (Vote)PUBV A
Signed SV, Vot-
ing Flag set,
(Vote)PUBV Stored
as per generic model No Voting Flag set:
Re-voting is allow-
able
Send Vote (Vote)PUBV Signed
SV, RAS retrieves
via FAP
as per generic model as per generic model
Confirm Confirmation sent
via second channel
(SMS/IVR/email)
Confirmation code
shows vote is re-
ceived and counted
Confirmation shows
vote is received
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The next section now provides a preliminary analysis of the security of the two use
cases, EV-1 and EV-2.
4.6 Security Analysis
The security properties of the SCWS installed on the tamper-resistant SIM are de-
scribed in more detail later in this thesis, in Chapter 8. The main advantages of using
the SCWS solution for e-voting are that the SCWS, the voting site and the credentials
are stored in a secure token, the SIM card, that has defences against physical and
side channel attacks. Also, distributing the voting application to many SIMs means
that even if an attacker manages to overcome SIM defences they will only gain access
to one voter’s credentials: the voting application code is equally difficult to attack.
Forcing an attacker to target a large number of phones and their SCWS/SIMs means
that attacks are hard to scale and need extensive efforts to be effective, giving DDoS
protection. In contrast, existing remote e-voting schemes have faced common internet
application problems such as DDoS attacks [97] and SQL injections [96] and technical
failures [94]. Additionally, secure platform issues arise because the voter’s equipment
cannot be trusted to perform as expected either through malware or system vulnera-
bilities e.g. [95].
Use cases EV-1 and EV-2 are now discussed with respect to the security require-
ments set out in Section 4.2: potential attack goals and mitigations are identified.
4.6.1 Attack Goals
An attacker who seeks to undermine e-voting security requirements may have many
goals, including manipulating the votes randomly, denying access to the voting proce-
dure for legitimate voters, adding votes for a specific candidate/party (ballot stuffing),
spoiling votes for a particular candidate or gaining knowledge about a voter’s choice of
candidate. By its nature, remote voting is also vulnerable to coercion and vote buying,
where a voter votes (willingly or unwillingly) as instructed by a third party.
The most relevant attacks against remote e-voting security requirements are miti-
gated as follows:
Confidentiality (EV-SR1/EV-SR2/EV-SR3):
Attack Goal - Find out contents of vote, or how a voter voted
This attack could be done by retrieving the vote from the SCWS. The vote is stored
inside the SIM card; encrypted using PUBV A and is deleted once the vote is cast. So
the vote is always held encrypted in the secure token and inaccessible to an attacker.
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The SCWS can only be accessed from the handset’s HTTP client and the RAS, thereby
minimising the likelihood of attacks that occur remotely. An attacker would need to be
in possession of the voter’s phone and know the voter’s credentials in order to access the
SCWS voting site. The vote could be targeted when it is in transit between the SCWS
and the VA, but this communication channel is protected by HTTPs, and the RAS is a
trusted entity. The voter’s credentials are securely stored in a tamper resistant token.
Thus the confidentiality of the scheme can be reasonably assured.
Attack Goal - Prevent voter from voting
It must be noted that coercion (EV-SR3) is a generic problem which is not solved by the
use cases presented here. It is possible to use coercion resistant e-Voting schemes with
the SCWS generic model, as the system could be modified to include fake credentials
and/or duplicate (chaff) votes as seen in Civitas [253] or to use panic passwords [254].
However, combining these with voter-verifiability is an open problem, as it is difficult
to check if a vote has been cast as intended when there are elements of a voting system
designed to discard votes received but produce a valid receipt. The Estonian I-voting
system uses multiple re-voting as an anti-coercion measure. This is a compromise of
security and usability, as manually discarding multiple votes introduces new attack
points into the voting system.
Integrity (EV-SR4/EV-SR5):
Attack Goal - Change contents of vote
Tampering with the content of the vote could be attempted by the phone browser, or
when the vote is in transit. The vote in transit is protected by the security of HTTPs
for all communication channels. In EV-1: SCWS-PAV, any type of tampering with the
vote can be detected by the use of confirmation codes and a WBB where the voter may
check their vote was included as cast. This is the advantage of using a voter-verifiable
scheme, which ensures security requirements EV-SR4 and EV-SR5 are met.
However, in the pre-2015 Estonian I-voting scheme, a vote could be changed by a
malicious application without the voter’s knowledge. This is a secure platform issue,
which is not well addressed by this version of the Estonian I-voting scheme, even for
PC-based Internet voting. This inherent vulnerability is carried through the the SCWS
use case: the phone browser could change the vote undetected. An advantage of the
SCWS voting approach is that the voting application itself cannot be easily manipu-
lated by malware on the phone, unlike the Estonian PC voting application which is
vulnerable to malware [95]. This SIM based solution provides more security in that re-
spect. Tampering with the SCWS voting application to change the content of the vote
can only be done before it is installed on the SCWS/SIM. This latter possibility would
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require an insider attack at the VA or MNO, which would likely require sophisticated
and well resourced planning. So weaknesses in the e-voting scheme mean that in this
use case, EV-SR4 is not met. Also, as the pre-2015 Estonian I-voting scheme is not
verifiable by the voter, there is no way to check that votes are cast correctly, so EV-5
is not met either.
Authentication (EV-SR6/EV-SR7):
Attack Goal - Vote more than once
In EV-2: SCWS-I-voting, voters are allowed to vote multiple times during the advance
polling period, so in this case, voting more than once using the SCWS solution is not a
security issue per se: back-office procedures identify and discard duplicate votes. How-
ever, tampering with the SCWS application could generate votes without the voter’s
knowledge. As mentioned previously, it should be practically infeasible to tamper with
the SCWS voting application from the phone handset, and remote access is only possi-
ble through a trusted entity, so generating false votes that way should not be possible.
However, if an insider attack at the VA interfered with the SCWS application such that
it produced unauthorised votes for the RAS to retrieve, this would not be identified by
the pre-2015 Estonian I-voting system as it is not voter-verifiable.
In voting schemes where multiple votes are not permitted as in use case EV-1:
SCWS-PAV, an attacker might attempt the following: use one registered voter’s cre-
dentials several times on one or more phones; steal multiple IDV/Passwords/PINs and
vote on one or more phones; generate fake voter IDs; or mount insider attacks at the
VA. The countermeasures for each type of attack are as follows:
• If an attacker has gained access to the registered voter’s ID/Password/PIN during
the voting process, the credentials cannot be used to vote on the same phone
more than once. The ballot form will only be displayed when a IDV has not been
used before, as the SCWS voting application sets a flag to indicate that the IDV
has voted. The VA must also have back-office procedures to make sure that an
IDV is not used to vote more than once. If a voter’s credentials are used on a
different SCWS to the one registered for that voter at the VA, they would not be
recognised: voter credentials can only be used to access one registered SCWS.
• An attacker may obtain multiple IDV/Passwords/PINs, perhaps by coercion, and
attempt to vote many times on one phone. However, the application on the SCWS
will only recognise the credentials of the voter registered to use that particular
SCWS, and so multiple voter credentials cannot be used to vote on a single
handset. To vote successfully on several phones, the attacker would not only
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need multiple credentials, but also access to the associated physical SIM/SCWS
and its voting application, which makes this a much more difficult attack to
mount.
• Generation of fake IDVs should not be possible if stringent registration procedures
have been followed.
• Insider attacks at the VA resulting in the generation of false votes will be de-
tected by the PAV scheme because the voter would receive spurious confirmation
messages from the VA.
Denial of Service (EV-SR8):
Attack Goal - Prevent voter from voting
Voters could be prevented from voting by physical means (e.g. lost/stolen equipment),
by subverting the correct operation of the proposed voting solution, (e.g. DDoS at-
tacks), or by technical measures which suppress the vote and do not allow the VA to
retrieve it from the SCWS. The SCWS generic voting model is DDoS resistant: its
main strength is that distributing the voting application to the SCWS makes the sys-
tem resilient to centralised web server attacks, as the application is installed in many
attack resistant SIMs. There will need to be procedures in place to allow poll-site
voting for those whose handsets are lost/stolen/malfunctioning. In the SCWS solution
it is very difficult to suppress the vote by technical means: to launch a successful at-
tack, individual phone handsets must be targeted. In both EV-1 and EV-2, an SMS
confirmation message sent to the voter will give assurance that their vote has indeed
been retrieved and received by the voting authority: the confirmation code in the PAV
system additionally denotes that the vote will be counted correctly by the VA. If no
SMS is received, then the voter can raise a query with the VA and use an alternative
method to vote.
There is no centralised voting server to be attacked, hence a single point of failure
has been removed. DDoS attacks cannot easily take place because the voting processing
is dispersed among many voters. Each voter effectively has a voting server on their
SIM, so for an attack to have a significant outcome, the attacker has to infiltrate a large
number of phones and find a way to orchestrate an attack against them. A potential
attacker must also find out which phones are registered for voting in order to target
them.
The RAS could be considered a single point of failure, but it may have restricted
functions and limited access as it runs on TTP/MNO premises: it should be isolated
from any unauthorised physical access. However, although internal threats cannot be
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Table 4.7: eVoting Use Cases vs Security Requirements
Security Requirement EV-1 EV-2
EV-SR1 (Privacy) X X
EV-SR2 (Unlinkability) X X
EV-SR3 (Coercion) ×a Xb
EV-SR4 (Recorded as cast) X ×c
EV-SR5 (Counted as recorded) X ×c
EV-SR6 (Democracy) X X
EV-SR7 (Democracy) X X
EV-SR8 (Denial of Service) X X
a Not a coercion-resistant e-voting scheme.
b Re-voting allowed as anti-coercion measure.
c Not a voter-verifiable e-voting scheme (pre-2015).
ignored, it is assumed (see Table 4.3) that the MNO is trusted to provide both the
infrastructure and management procedures securely.
4.6.2 Formal Security Analysis
The Scyther protocol verification tool was used to formally analyse the generic SCWS
e-voting protocol, and no attacks were found within bounds. The Scyther tool and its
verification processes are fully described in Appendix B: the e-voting Scyther Script
and the verification results obtained are shown in Appendix Section B.2.
4.7 Chapter Summary
This chapter set out the security requirements that remote e-voting systems must meet.
A generic model for using a phone equipped with an SCWS/ SIM as a secure voter
interface for e-voting was then presented. Two e-voting schemes, PAV and Estonian
I-voting, were then used with this generic model, presented as separate use cases EV-1
and EV-2 respectively.
The strengths of the proposed design are that it uses standardised protocols, hard-
ware and communications to simplify its design and operation. The security of the
standardised elements of the design has been extensively investigated by the expert
community. Using existing tamper-resistant hardware (the SIM) with standardised
features (SCWS) along with the MNO’s FAP (via HTTPs), means that sensitive infor-
mation can be protected at all times. The voting application is only available to the
voter via an HTTPs connection from the mobile phone handset, and only authorised
84
4.8. Related Publications 4. Remote E-Voting
parties can access the SCWS voting application via the MNO network. Distributing
web server functionality to voters’ SIMs means that there is no central web server to
target, and so an attacker must compromise many phones to successfully affect the
election result. The use of the SIM’s tamper-resistant environment for the storage and
processing of sensitive voter credentials also addresses the secure platform problem.
However, some of the specified security requirements were not met in use case EV-2:
SCWS I-voting because the pre-2015 version of this voting system is not voter-verifiable:
it is not possible to be sure that a vote will be counted correctly when received by the
Voting Authority. The security of both use cases was assessed informally against the
previously defined security requirements and the generic model was formally analysed
using the protocol checking tool Scyther, and the results were promising. The principle
of using a ubiquitous device (the phone) with SCWS to provide a secure distributed
architecture for remote e-voting has been established. The voter will have a flexible
and convenient “vote-anywhere” capability in their phone, whilst the e-voting system
is protected by making the effort required to attack it prohibitively high.
A summary of how well the security requirements were met for each use case is
shown in Table 4.7.
4.8 Related Publications
Two publications resulted from the work described in this chapter:
1. L. Kyrillidis, S. Cobourne, K. Mayes, S. Dong, and K. Markantonakis, “Dis-
tributed e-Voting using the Smart Card Web Server”, in 2012 7th International
Conference on Risks and Security of Internet and Systems (CRiSIS2012), IEEE,
2012, pp. 1–8.[1]
2. S. Cobourne, L. Kyrillidis, K. Mayes, and K. Markantonakis, “Remote e-Voting
Using the Smart Card Web Server”, International Journal of Secure Software
Engineering (IJSSE) vol. 5, no 1, pp.39–60, 2014.[2]
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In remote areas of developing countries, the mobile phone network may be
the only connection with outside organisations such as banks, financial in-
stitutions or humanitarian aid providers. This chapter proposes two mobile
payment applications: MP-1, a branchless banking system for withdrawal,
deposit and transfer transactions, which uses an SCWS application on a
SIM with public key cryptography capabilities; and MP-2, an m-payment
system which uses basic feature phones to interface with online hosted Bit-
coin Wallets maintained by a charity. Here, SMS messaging is used along
with an OTP authentication token to enhance security.
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5.1 Mobile Payment Use Cases
As previously discussed in Chapter 2, there are security concerns with many existing
m-payment solutions. Two m-payment use cases are now described, MP-1: SCWS
Branchless Banking and MP-2: Bitcoin SMS m-Payment, which propose security im-
provements on existing m-payment schemes.
Use case MP-1: SCWS Branchless Banking uses a PKI-capable SCWS/SIM in a
branchless banking scheme, catering for both cash-based withdrawal/ deposit transac-
tions via a network of authorised bank agents as intermediaries, similar to M-PESA.
(An M-PESA agent is shown in Figure 5.1) . Transfers to third parties (non-agents) are
also included in the scheme. The proposed solution provides security without requiring
the customer to obtain expensive equipment or specialised software: all that is required
is an existing phone handset (complete with a standard browser) which can have an
advanced SIM installed.
Figure 5.1: M-PESA Agent: “M-PESA agent in Kibera, Nairobi, Kenya” by Fiona
Graham / WorldRemit is licensed under CC BY-SA 2.0, accessed 23 May 2017.
https://www.flickr.com/photos/worldremit/33322696760/
Use case MP-2: Bitcoin SMS m-Payment presents a new philanthropic model
whereby charities can receive donations in Bitcoin: the security of the distributed
ledger approach (blockchain) means that donations can be quickly, cheaply and trans-
parently transferred to the charity’s operations in the field. An SMS m-payment scheme
is described which allows these Bitcoin donations to be used by beneficiaries in a hu-
manitarian aid setting where there is limited internet availability. One Time Password
(OTP) security tokens are employed to enhance the authentication of SMS transac-
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tions, and the solution is a pragmatic balance between security and usability in an
environment where access to Bitcoin is not normally possible.
The security requirements that need to be met by m-payment schemes are sum-
marised in the next section.
5.2 M-Payment Security Requirements
An m-Payment system should meet the security requirements of confidentiality, in-
tegrity, authentication, availability and non-repudiation as shown in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Mobile Payments: Security Requirements
Confidentiality
MP-SR1 Sensitive information should not be disclosed to unauthorised parties,
whether during processing, in transit, or at rest.
Integrity
MP-SR2 Information must not be tampered with by unauthorised parties when
it is in transit or at rest
MP-SR3 The system must perform its tasks without unauthorised manipulation
Authentication
MP-SR4 All participants in a transaction must be authorised
MP-SR5 All transaction data must be genuine
Non-repudiation
MP-SR6 None of the participants in a transaction can subsequently deny taking
part in it
Availability
MP-SR7 A service is not denied to authorised entities: for example, through
network connectivity problems, loss of equipment such as phones, or
distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks
The next section describes the first m-Payment use-case, MP-1: SCWS Branchless
Banking, where a PKI-capable SCWS/SIM is used as the basis of a branchless banking
scheme that enables cash-based transactions to be done with bank agents, with the
option of transferring funds to third parties.
5.3 MP-1: SCWS Branchless Banking
5.3.1 Branchless Banking - Background Information
In any financial system, authentication of participating entities is vital for security.
Existing branchless banking schemes use combinations of SMS, USSD and IVR mecha-
nisms to communicate financial and authentication data between parties. For example,
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Table 5.2: Customer Authentication Methods in Branchless Banking Schemes
Scheme Authentication Mechanism
M-PESA PIN sent via USSD with proprietary encryption
EKO 6-digit printed nonces combined with user’s 4-digit PIN
ALW Voice/Fingerprint Biometrics
FSB Voice Biometrics plus scratch-card nonces
M-ATM PIN/phone no. generate key for encrypted SMS, also SMS Nonces
mCheka 6-digit PIN, IVR and SMS One Time Password (OTP)
a Reports that mChek were in difficulties surfaced in 2012 [255], and the company
is now closed.
M-PESA (Kenya) [48], uses two-factor authentication (i.e. possession of a phone and
knowledge of a PIN) with USSD and proprietary security via a SIM Toolkit (STK)
application [29], with SMS messages for transaction data: customers are issued with a
SIM containing the M-PESA application. Other branchless banking schemes include:
EKO Bank (India) [49], ALW/ZMF (India) [50], FSB (not yet deployed) [51], M-ATM
(Sri Lanka) [52], and mChek (India) [53]. Their authentication methods are shown in
Table 5.2.
SIM-based applications have many desirable security properties. Access to the SIM
is tightly controlled, so it is difficult for malware on a phone to affect a SIM application.
The SIM environment is tamper-resistant, which protects against physical attacks. If
the SIM is able to perform public key cryptographic operations (PKI-capable) it can
use standardised security algorithms [210, 211], which is a useful security feature for
branchless banking.
5.3.2 MP-1: Security Requirements
In a branchless banking system the security requirements detailed in Section 5.2 ap-
ply to to all messages sent to/from the bank, and all information stored on agent and
customer equipment. A customer needs assurance that the agent is genuine and au-
thorised to deposit their money in the correct account, an agent must make sure that
the individual withdrawing money from an account is not an impostor, and all bank-
originating messages must be authenticated. Network connectivity problems, loss of
equipment such as phones, or DDoS attacks should not affect the security of the sys-
tem, and the agent, customer or bank should not be able to deny a transaction took
place.
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CUSTOMER
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MNO infrastructure
Figure 5.2: MP-1: SCWS-Banking - Entity Diagram
5.3.3 Using the SCWS for Branchless Banking
Modern SIMs can have advanced features in addition to the SCWS, such as the ability
to perform public-key cryptographic processing (PKI-capable SIM), using standardised
algorithms for encryption/ digital signatures [210, 211].
The use case presented now employs a PKI-capable SCWS/SIM to provide security
in m-payment transactions without requiring the customer to obtain special equipment
or software. The customer visits an authorised agent to withdraw/ deposit funds, and
can also make transfers to third parties by harnessing the desirable security features
of the SCWS and its tightly managed, standardised communications. Bringing web
server functionality to the SIM environment means that users will be able to access
web content oﬄine using standard phone browsers. Users will also benefit from a richer
interface which can incorporate files, images and multimedia as required [228]. This
is particularly helpful for illiterate users, where graphical and voice based interactions
are more effective than text-based menu-style SIM-toolkit applications [36], or for the
visually challenged [256].
For brevity, this proposal will be referred to as SCWS-Banking throughout this
chapter: the required entities and assumptions are shown in Table 5.3 and Table 5.4
respectively. The relationship between entities is illustrated in Figure 5.21.
The next sections will present SCWS-Banking transaction protocols: withdrawals,
deposits and transfers. For simplicity, it is also assumed in the following descriptions
that: if any of the protocol validation checks fail an error message is sent to all par-
ticipants, the transaction is terminated and logged as unsuccessful; if the transaction
cannot be completed for any reason e.g. due to lack of connectivity, a suitable rollback
mechanism is used to reverse any partially completed processing; all cryptographic
keys are checked for validity before use; data is padded according to best practice rec-
ommendations before being encrypted using a standardised public key algorithm e.g.
1Referring to the business models described in Section 3.2.5, a TSM could control updates to the
SCWS on behalf of the bank, using delegated or authorised mode. In certain regulatory environments,
the MNO can act as the bank by storing value on behalf of the customer: the mobile phone number is
the account number, as in M-PESA [48]. Here, the simple mode business model would be appropriate.
In this use case MP-1, the term “bank” will be used for both MNO-centric and bank-centric scenarios.
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Table 5.3: MP-1: SCWS-Banking - Entities
Entity Description
Bank (B) The Bank processes all financial transactions, and maintains central
databases of customer/agent accounts. It uses the procedures outlined
in Chapter 3 to install its banking application and relevant security
credentials on customers’ and agents’ SCWS/SIMs
Agent (A) An agent is authorised to process transactions on the bank’s behalf.
Customer (C) The customer is an individual who performs financial transactions.
Recipient (R) The recipient is an individual who receives transferred value from a
customer
MNO The MNO provides the technical mobile infrastructure and standardised
SCWS administration protocols (see Chapter 3). The MNO provides
a managed space on the SCWS/SIM for the bank’s exclusive use, as
described in [257].
Phone The mobile phone handset and browser application are generally un-
trusted, as jail-broken operating systems or malware can compromise
the correct operation of the phone’s applications and operating system.
RAS The RAS is a mere conduit between the bank and participants’
SCWS/SIMs: it may be part of an MNO, TSM or bank, and passes
messages unaltered to/from the bank’s transaction processing system,
with additional phone/SIM routing information as required. The RAS
communicates with each SCWS using FAP/HTTPs sessions: however as
HTTPs is not running end-to-end throughout a whole transaction, ap-
plication level security mechanisms are included to prevent confidential
information being visible at the RAS.
SCWS A Java applet running on the SCWS will use relevant credentials and
keys present on the SIM, and create dynamic content whenever re-
quested: this applet will be referred to as the SCWS-Banking application
throughout this chapter.
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Table 5.4: MP-1: SCWS-Banking - Assumptions
Description
MP-1-A1 Registration: agents and customers register with the bank,
when appropriate identity documents are checked to satisfy bank-
ing regulations(e.g. Know Your Customer (KYC), Anti-Money-
Laundering (AML) and Countering the Financing of Terrorism
(CFT)). In some regulatory environments agents can check and
register customers [258]: in others, customers/agents must go to
the bank to register. Customers’ identity details are stored by the
bank for later use. Agents are allocated an Agent ID to display
publicly. Customers/agents are issued with SCWS/SIMs, contain-
ing the SCWS-Banking application and their account credentials
MP-1-A2 Banking Credentials on SCWS: these are: an SCWS PIN
(passwords may not be suitable for illiterate customers [36, 35]);
two customer public/private key pairs (for key separation pur-
poses, one pair for encryption/decryption and one pair for sign-
ing/verifying), with key sizes following recommended guidelines
e.g. [241]; and two bank public keys, for encrypting/verifying mes-
sages to/from the bank.
MP-1-A3 Availability of Equipment and Services: it is envisaged that
the customer will possess a mobile handset with a browser, but if
necessary their SCWS/SIM could be inserted in a shared phone
to access SCWS-Banking. An agent must have a phone with
SCWS/SIM. It is assumed a mobile phone network is available,
although connectivity could be intermittent.
MP-1-A4 Access to SCWS-Banking System: customers and agents par-
ticipating in an SCWS-Banking transaction must first authenti-
cate themselves to the SCWS environment by inputting a PIN to
the phone browser.
MP-1-A5 Account Structure: there is a one-to-one correspondence be-
tween a SCWS and a bank account number: this means that an
SCWS mobile phone number can be used to uniquely identify a
customer or agent.
MP-1-A6 Trust: the customer does not trust the agent, and vice-versa. The
bank and RAS are fully trusted.
MP-1-A7 Bank/MNO relationship: there is a trusted one-to-one rela-
tionship between the bank and MNO: i.e. a specific bank will
partner with one MNO only.
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Table 5.5: MP-1: SCWS-Banking - Protocol Notation
Notation Description
A Agent(entity)
ACX Account Number for entity X
B Bank(entity)
BALX Balance in Account ACX for entity X
BAL′X Updated Balance in Account ACX for entity X
C Customer(entity)
CHX Result of identity check for entity X, value = true/false
EK(Z) Encryption of data Z with key K
IDX Identity of entity X
NX Random Nonce generated by entity X
NAMEX Name of entity X, (i.e. a short identifying text)
PhX Phone Number of entity X
PKX/ SKX Public/ Secret Key pair of entity X
R Recipient(entity)
SX/ VX Signing/ Verification key pair of entity X
Tr Transaction Type:‘W’=Withdrawal, ‘D’=Deposit, ‘T’=Transfer
TrAmt Transaction Amount
TrCountX Transaction Counter for entity X
TrNo Transaction Number
X→Y: Message sent from entity X to entity Y
(Z)SignK Signature on data Z with signature key K
RSA [210]; and a standardised digital signature algorithm is used e.g. DSA [211]. The
notation used is shown in Table 5.5.
5.3.4 SCWS-Banking Withdrawal Protocol
In a withdrawal, the customer enters transaction details, the bank authorises them and
forwards them on to the agent to authorise in the presence of the customer. Figure 5.3
shows the messages in a withdrawal transaction.
Step 1: Customer enters TrAmt, IDA: The SCWS-Banking application generates
NC , increments TrCountC and creates message W1 using PKB, SC to encrypt and
sign. The SCWS triggers a FAP session, the RAS retrieves Message W1 (over HTTPs),
adds PhC and passes it on to the bank.
W1 C→B: (EPKB (Tr, TrAmt, IDA, NC , T rCountC))SignSC
Step 2: Bank authorises transaction: the bank uses PhC to find ACC , BALC ,
VC , PKC , NAMEC and IDC , and verifies/ decrypts Message W1 using relevant keys.
The bank checks TrCountC , and uses IDA to obtain PhA, BALA, VA and PKA. If
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TrAmt ≤ BALC , the bank generates NB and TrNo, creates Message W2 (encrypted/
signed with PKA/ SB) and sends it to the RAS with PhA. The RAS uses PhA to
forward message W2 to the agent via FAP/HTTPs.
W2 B→A: (EPKA(Tr, TrNo, TrAmt,NAMEC , IDC , NB, BALA))SignSB
(EPKA(Tr,TrNo,TrAmt,NAMEC,IDC,NB,BALA) )SignSB 
SCWS(C) SCWS(A) BANK/RAS 
(EPKB(Tr, TrAmt, IDA, NC, TrCountC) )SignSC 
(EPKC(Tr,TrNo,TrAmt,IDA, NC+1, BAL’C) )SignSB (EPKA(Tr, TrNo,TrAmt, IDC,NB+1,NA+1, BAL’A) )SignSB 
(EPKB(Tr, TrNo, CHC,,NB+1, NA) )SignSA 
WI 
HTTPs 
W2 
HTTPs 
W3 
HTTPs 
W4C 
HTTPs 
W4A 
HTTPs 
Figure 5.3: MP-1: SCWS-Banking - Withdrawal Protocol
Step 3: Agent authorises transaction: the agent SCWS-Banking application ver-
ifies/decrypts message W2 using VB/ SKA, then checks that TrNo has not been re-
ceived before. The agent inputs IDC , and the SCWS-Banking application checks if
IDC(input) = IDC(from W2) and sets CHC : NB is incremented, NA is generated, and
a transaction log is updated. Message W3 is created, retrieved via RAS/FAP/HTTPs,
the RAS adds PhA and passes it to the bank.
W3 A→B: (EPKB (Tr, TrNo,CHC , NB + 1, NA))SignSA
Step 4: Bank finalises and confirms transaction: the bank uses PhA to ob-
tain agent keys to verify/decrypt message W3. The bank inspects NB + 1 and CHC : if
the CHC = true, TrAmt is used to create BAL
′
A and BAL
′
C . The transaction is logged,
then time-stamped confirmation messages are sent to the agent/customer via SMS, and
(encrypted and signed) to their SCWS-Banking applications, via RAS/FAP/HTTPs
(messages W4A and W4C).
W4A B→A:(EPKA(Tr, TrNo, TrAmt, IDC , NB + 1, NA + 1, BAL′A))SignSB
W4C B→C: (EPKC (Tr, TrNo, TrAmt, IDA, NC + 1, BAL′C))SignSB
Step 5: Agent and customer finalise transaction: the SCWS-Banking appli-
cations verify/ decrypt message W4A or W4C (as appropriate) from the bank, update
the SCWS-Banking files with transaction data, and the transaction is logged. The
agent should only give the customer cash once the confirmation message has arrived
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from the bank. A paper transaction log is also maintained by the agent, which the
customer must sign to acknowledge receipt of the cash.
5.3.5 SCWS-Banking Deposit Protocol
A deposit is an agent-initiated transaction similar to a withdrawal, but with the message
flow reversed. The deposit protocol messages are shown in Figure 5.4, and summarised
below: again, phone numbers are added to messages between the bank and the RAS
for routing purposes.
(EPKC(Tr, TrNo,TrAmt, IDA, NB,BALC) )SignSB 
(EPKC(Tr,TrNo,TrAmt,IDA,NC+1,NB+1,BAL’C) )SignSB 
(EPKB(Tr,, TrAmt, IDC ,NA, TrCountA) )SignSA 
(EPKA(Tr, TrNo,TrAmt,IDC,NA+1,BAL’A) )SignSB 
(EPKB(Tr, TrNo, CHA,,NB+1, NC) )SignSC 
SCWS(C) BANK/RAS SCWS(A) 
D1 
HTTPs D2 
HTTPs 
D3 
HTTPs 
D4A 
HTTPs D4C 
HTTPs 
Figure 5.4: MP-1: SCWS-Banking - Deposit Protocol
Step 1: Agent inputs TrAmt, IDC (Agent to Bank)
D1 A→B:(EPKB (Tr, TrAmt, IDC , NA, T rCountA))SignSA
Step 2: Bank authorises transaction (Bank to Customer)
D2 B→C:EPKC (Tr, TrNo, TrAmt, IDA, NB, BALC))SignSB
Step 3: Customer authorises transaction (Customer to Bank)
D3 C→B: EPKB (Tr, TrNo,CHA, NB + 1, NC))SignSC
Step 4: Bank finalises and confirms transaction
D4A B→A:EPKA(Tr, TrNo, TrAmt, IDC , NA + 1, BAL′A))SignSB )
D4C B→C:EPKC (Tr, TrNo, TrAmt, IDA, NB + 1, NC + 1, BAL′C))SignSB )
5.3.6 SCWS-Banking Transfer Protocol
The bank transfers value TrAmt from a customer to a recipient (R), directly if the
recipient’s account is known, otherwise via an SMS to the recipient for redeeming
TrAmt from an agent later. Transfer messages are shown in Figure 5.5.
Step 1: Customer inputs TrAmt, PhR (Customer to Bank)
T1 C→B: (EPKB (Tr, TrAmt, PhR, NC , T rCountC))SignSC
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(EPKR(Tr, TrNo, TrAmt, NAMEC,BAL’R) )SignSB 
(EPKA(Tr, TrNo,TrAmt,PhR,NA+1 ,NAMEC,BAL’A) )SignSB 
(EPKB(Tr, TrNo, PhR,,NA,TrCountA) )SignSA 
(EPKB(Tr,TrAmt,PhR,NC,TrCountC ))SignSC 
(EPKC(Tr,TrNo,TrAmt,PhR,NC+1,BAL’C))SignSB 
(Tr, TrNo) 
SCWS(C) BANK/RAS Recipient SCWS(A) 
TI 
HTTPs 
T2C 
HTTPs 
T2R-SCWS 
HTTPs 
T4 
HTTPs 
T2R-SMS 
SMS 
T3 
HTTPs 
Alternative 
if account 
details not 
known 
Figure 5.5: MP-1: SCWS-Banking - Transfer Protocol
Step 2: Bank processes transaction (Bank to Customer/ Recipient)
T2R-SMS is sent via SMS to PhR if the recipient does not have a SCWS-Banking
account: Steps 3 and 4 are also needed in this case.
T2C B→C: (EPKC (Tr, TrNo, TrAmt, PhR, NC + 1, BAL′C))SignSB
T2R-SCWS B→R: (EPKR(Tr, TrNo, TrAmt,NAMEC , BAL′R))SignSB
T2R-SMS B→R: (Tr,TrNo)
Step 3: Recipient redeems SMS transfer (Agent to Bank)
The recipient gives the agent PhR and TrNo.
T3 A→B:(EPKB (Tr, TrNo, PhR, NA, T rCountA))SignSA
Step 4: Bank confirms transaction to agent (Bank to Agent)
The bank obtains full transaction details from its records and instructs the agent to
pay the recipient TrAmt. NAMEC can be given to the recipient for their records.
The agent should also manually record the recipients ID credentials, and maintain a
paper transaction log for non-repudiation purposes, which the customer must sign as
acknowledgment.
T4 B→A:(EPKA(Tr, TrNo, TrAmt, PhR, NA + 1, NAMEC , BAL′A))SignSB
A preliminary security analysis of the SCWS-Banking scheme will now be done.
5.3.7 Security Analysis
The security of the SCWS installed on the tamper-resistant SIM is described in more
detail in Chapter 8. The SCWS-Banking proposal is now discussed with respect to
the security requirements set out in Section 5.2. Potential attacks and mitigations are
identified and a comparison with the SMS-banking scheme M-PESA is also shown.
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• Confidentiality (MP-1-SR1): All information sent between the SCWS, RAS,
and the phone browser are protected by HTTPs against eavesdropping and man-
in-the-middle attacks whilst in transit. As HTTPs is not running end-to-end -
there are separate RAS/FAP/HTTPs sessions for each message - application level
security is also used to meet security requirements: public key encryption and
the PIN-protected tamper-resistant SCWS environment ensures that sensitive
information is kept confidential at all times.
• Integrity (MP-1-SR2/MP-1-SR3): Using HTTPs between the RAS/ SCWS/
phone browser gives reasonable assurance that information sent is not tampered
with. Messages are digitally signed to allow detection of unauthorised modifi-
cations, and challenge-responses prevent replay attacks. Replay attacks where
messages W1/D1/T1 are recorded and subsequently resent to the bank to gen-
erate multiple transaction authorisation numbers (TrNo) are prevented by the
use of transaction counters held on the SCWS and checked by the bank. The
tamper-resistant SIM makes attacks on data integrity extremely difficult.
• Authentication (MP-1-SR4/ MP-1-SR5): ID credentials are input by the
customer/agent and verified by the bank, so imposters will be identified. Digital
signatures are used in all messages for assurance that the sender is genuine,
and the RAS and SCWS authenticate each other using HTTPs. The bank is
authenticated by the use of digital signatures, and it sends confirmations via two
separate channels (SMS/ FAP to SCWS).
• Availability (MP-1-SR6): Network connection problems encountered during
a FAP session are automatically handled by the SCWS on-card Administration
Agent (see [15]). Data held on the SCWS is available oﬄine, and is only accessible
by using a PIN. Back-office procedures are needed for remote locking/ reissue of
the SIM/SCWS application and credentials when phones/SIMs are lost/damaged.
The SCWS-Banking application and credentials are installed on many SIMs, so
DDoS attacks are hard to mount because each phone has to be targeted individ-
ually and the attacker has to be in possession of the phone. A DoS attack against
a single SCWS is feasible but difficult and not scalable. The RAS is potentially
a single point of failure in terms of availability, as it controls the entire message
flow in the SCWS-Banking protocol. However, as it is a trusted entity, owned and
operated by the MNO, it is subject to tightly controlled management procedures
which should make unauthorised usage and attacks difficult.
• Non-Repudiation (MP-1-SR7): Digital signatures provide non-repudiation;
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Table 5.6: M-PESA /SCWS-Banking Security Comparison
SR M-PESA SCWS-Banking
Confidentiality
(MP-1-SR1)
Unencrypted SMS messages,
readable from phone’s SMS in-
box
Messages are encrypted, data
PIN protected on SCWS
Integrity(MP-
1-SR2/3)
Malware could intercept and
tamper with SMS messages on
phone
SMS used for confirmation only
Authentication
(MP-1-SR4/5)
Bank-originating messages not
authenticated
Digital Signatures are used for
authentication
Availability
(MP-1-SR6)
Large number of SMS messages
could flood mobile network:
needs lost/stolen phone/SIM
procedures
DDoS resistant: needs
lost/stolen phone/SIM proce-
dures
Non-
repudiation
(MP-1-SR7)
Message from bank not authen-
ticated, so no non-repudiation
Digital signatures used for non-
repudiation
additionally, transaction logs are securely held on both the agent/customer SCWS
and centrally by the bank. Paper-based transaction logs are maintained by the
agent and signed by the customer to acknowledge each transaction. Additionally,
the bank sends confirmation messages via two channels, to minimise the likelihood
of losing a message in transit.
Comparison with M-PESA SMS Scheme: Table 5.6 compares the security
of SCWS-Banking with M-PESA. It can be seen that M-PESA only partially meets
all the identified security requirements, whereas the proposed SCWS-Banking solution
satisfies them all.
5.3.8 Formal Security Analysis
The Scyther protocol verification tool was used to formally analyse the withdrawal,
deposit and transfer protocols proposed for use case MP1: SCWS Branchless Bank-
ing, and no attacks were found within bounds. The Scyther tool and its verification
processes are fully described in Appendix B, and the Scyther Scripts and verification
results obtained are shown in Appendix B.3.
5.3.9 Use Case MP-1: Summary
An SCWS-Banking scheme has been presented that uses PKI-capable SIMs equipped
with a SCWS to process branchless banking withdrawals, deposits and transfers in
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a secure and user-friendly manner. The main strength of the proposal is that it uses
standardised hardware, protocols and communications to protect sensitive information,
without the need for specialised equipment and phone applications: all communica-
tions to/from the SCWS are done via HTTPs. By storing security information on the
tamper-resistant SIM, local authentication of PINs can be done by the SCWS without
communicating credentials across a network. All transactions pass through the trusted
RAS, owned and operated by the MNO or a TTP. It is difficult to mount large scale
attacks against the system, as credentials and applications stored on each SIM must
be targeted individually. PKI-capable SIMs enable application level public key en-
cryption/ digital signatures to provide authentication and non-repudiation, using keys
stored on the tamper-resistant SCWS/SIM. Agents and customers need new advanced
SIMs containing the SCWS-Banking application and their account credentials: even
though these are more expensive than conventional SIMs, this could be a cheaper over-
all solution than setting up physical bank branches. A preliminary security analysis
indicates that the security of SCWS-Banking is higher than that offered by M-PESA.
The initial findings are promising, and the SCWS-Banking proposal meets branchless
banking security challenges very well.
We now move on to an m-Payment system proposal MP-2: Bitcoin SMS m-Payment
designed for use in humanitarian aid scenarios, that uses SMS messaging to interface
with Bitcoin wallets hosted by a charity.
5.4 MP-2: Bitcoin SMS m-Payments
5.4.1 Bitcoin for Charity - Background Information
This use case explores how blockchain technology can be used to provide financial
services in humanitarian aid scenarios, where there may not be Internet connectivity.
Full details of the proposed solution can be seen in the paper published as a result
of this work [4]: the Bitcoin processing in the protocol is described in Appendix A.3.
The following account is a summary that focuses more on the “last-mile” aspect of the
proposal i.e. using SMS messaging for financial transactions.
Bitcoin is a decentralised cryptocurrency system which works on a peer-to-peer
network. Payments are made to Bitcoin addresses (Bitcoin public keys) which can be
generated using an Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [259, 260]. A
Bitcoin transaction transfers monetary value attached to a particular Bitcoin address
by digitally signing a hash of the previous transaction together with the next owner’s
Bitcoin address, thereby creating a chain of signatures that links past and present
transactions. Transactions are permanently recorded in files called blocks, that are
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timestamped and chained together in the order they appear (the “blockchain”, also
referred to as a globally distributed cryptographic ledger), and shared/ synchronised
with all the nodes connected to the peer-to-peer network. The correctness of the
blockchain underpins the security of Bitcoin.
There has been much interest in alternative ways blockchain technology could be
used in the philanthropic sector, for example to increase transparency, openness and
trust whilst reducing transaction costs and providing new opportunities for fundrais-
ing [261, 262, 263, 264]. For example, the Royal National Lifeboat Institution (RNLI)
has accepted Bitcoin since August 2015, hoping to attract new donors from a different
demographic in addition to its typical supporters [265]. Also, the BitGive Foundation’s
donation tracking service (GiveTrack) allows donors to trace Bitcoin transactions in
real time, showing how donations are spent [266].
Blockchain based schemes have fundamental technical requirements such as Inter-
net connectivity and compatible devices that can perform the required cryptographic
processes needed for a Bitcoin transaction (e.g. secure hash generation, digital signa-
tures and secure storage of cryptographic keys). There are organisations that keep the
most up-to-date blockchain to verify and forward transactions on behalf of registered
users, via online wallets (also known as hosted wallets). However, to make a payment,
the user must be online to access their wallet via a web browser or smart phone appli-
cation. In the proposal in this use case the charity can set up hosted wallets, allocate
them to beneficiaries then transfer financial aid directly.
5.4.2 SMS m-Payment Schemes and Bitcoin
If there is no reliable Internet facility available, the online hosted wallet approach for
blockchain transactions is not a practical option. However, an SMS-based solution
could interface with a hosted wallet back-end system.
As described in Chapter 2, SMS m-payment systems have been extremely successful
in the developing world, most notably M-PESA in Kenya [212]. There are SMS-based
m-payment schemes available that facilitate Bitcoin transactions, but they have met
with varying success. None of the existing Bitcoin SMS solutions described in Sec-
tion 2.5 is suitable for the oﬄine environment under discussion, as they all require the
user to have some degree of online access to their Bitcoin Wallet. This use case presents
an m-payment system that uses SMS messages to transact with Bitcoin wallets hosted
on beneficiaries’ behalf by a charity. Oﬄine beneficiaries can then make and receive
Bitcoin payments using SMS messaging on basic feature phones. A Hash-based OTP
(HOTP) security token is included to provide some assurance that only a genuine user
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can send an SMS to make a transaction2. More information about OTPs can be seen
in Appendix A.1.1. All SMS messages used in the proposal are within the standard
160 character length.
There are two Bitcoin payment processing methods that are of interest for this use
case: Multi-Signature Addresses and Smart Contracts. Multi-Signature Addresses are
derived using a multi-signature process, where more than one private key is needed
to authorise a Bitcoin transaction. For example, a 2-of-3 multi-signature is when a
Bitcoin address is associated with three private keys and at least two out of the three
private keys are needed to authorise a Bitcoin transaction. In our proposal, “Pay To
Script Hash” (P2SH) transactions are used to process multi-signatures. To generate a
multi-signature, a Full Redeem Script which includes details of the three public keys is
hashed to generate a hashed Redeem Script which becomes the P2SH multi-signature.
The Full Redeem Script is shared between all key-holding entities. The Redeem Script
can be used to verify the transferred amount and whether its being sent to the correct
multi-signature address. It also gives details about how many signatures are needed
to make a payment. The recipient needs to provide the full Redeem Script to spend
the received Bitcoins. Some services use this technique to enhance security of hosted
Bitcoin wallets e.g. Bitgo [267]. Smart Contracts are coded instructions published
on a distributed network, that can receive inputs, execute instructions and provide
outputs. The multi-signature scheme (Option 1) can be classed as a very low level
smart contract that can only process simple Bitcoin payment transactions. A smart
contract could enable a charity to extend the services it offers: e.g. issuing aid to
beneficiaries on a regular or ad-hoc basis, small micro-finance loans, keeping of repay-
ment records, automatic communications with donors (such as donation requests/audit
reports). There have also been proposals to use blockchain smart contacts for identi-
fication of refugees [268]. However, as the Bitcoin blockchain was initially designed as
a distributed payment platform, it is not possible to run advanced smart contracts on
it, so alternative platforms such as Rootstock (RSK)[269] are more suitable.
5.4.3 MP-2: Security Requirements
The security requirements detailed in Section 5.2 apply to to all messages sent between
participants in a transaction, and all information stored on mobile devices. All par-
ties need assurance that the counter-party in a transaction is not an impostor, and all
messages that originate from the charity/aid organisation are genuine. Network con-
2Time-Based (TOTP) tokens generate new codes automatically after a set period of time: this
approach is not suitable for use with SMS messages that may be subject to potential delays in the
messaging system.
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nectivity problems, and DDoS attacks should not affect the security of the system, and
no participant in a transaction can subsequently deny it took place. An adversarial
model relating to a humanitarian aid setting has been described in [270].
The use of SMS messaging to transport financial transaction data is not ideal: the
SMS system was not designed with security in mind, and well known attacks such
as spoofing and Man-in-the-Middle may compromise the stated security requirements.
However, in an environment where this is the only communication option, the pro-
posed solution will need to strike a pragmatic balance between security, usability and
practicality.
Figure 5.6: MP-2: Bitcoin SMS Payments - System Architecture
The next section describes the proposed method to use SMS messaging in a Bitcoin
m-payment scheme.
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Table 5.7: MP-2: Bitcoin SMS Payments - Entities
Entity Description
Bitcoin Payment
Server (BPS)
This is part of the charity’s technical infrastructure, and man-
ages hosted Bitcoin Wallets on behalf of beneficiaries. It se-
curely holds Bitcoin keys for each account holder, and is con-
nected to the Bitcoin/RSK peer-to-peer network. It also checks
and signs payment requests received from the SMS-Gateway,
and once these have been authorised by one of the other key
holders, the BPS broadcasts them to the Bitcoin peer-to-peer
network.
Blockchain The distributed ledger shared between the nodes connected to
the Bitcoin peer-to-peer network.
Charity Local Of-
fice (LO)
The Charity has a local office in the disconnected environment:
the LO registers phone numbers of users, and manages distri-
bution of OTP tokens.
Charity Head
Quarters (HQ)
The Charity HQ may be geographically distant from the aid
environment, and has online access/ secure servers: the HQ
holds relevant Bitcoin private keys for all payers.
OTP Token This is a cheap Hash-based One Time Password (HOTP) se-
curity token used with every SMS transaction. The algorithm
that is used to generate the OTP is synchronised between the
BPS and each individual security token. Sample OTP gener-
ation algorithms can be found in [271, 272]. Note: this token
could be replaced by a SIM Toolkit application if the charity
has a business relationship with the MNO
SMS-Gateway This is a server that sends and receives SMS transmissions to
and from the telecommunication network, and is connected to
the BPS.
Donor Platform Donors select Bitcoin addresses from a web based donor plat-
form, and can use a Bitcoin wallet/client or fiat currency to
donate.
Payer/ Recipient Users of the system can make payments (Payer) to any other
registered user (Recipient).
5.4.4 MP-2: Using SMS with Bitcoin Hosted Wallets
The charity creates hosted wallets for beneficiaries, and during a secure registration
process at the local office, issues OTP tokens that will be used with each transaction.
The proposal involves interactions between a number of entities, described in Table 5.7:
the relationship between entities is illustrated in Figure 5.6. Necessary assumptions are
shown in Table 5.8.
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Table 5.8: MP-2: Bitcoin SMS Payments - Assumptions
Description
MP-2-A1 Charity Head Quarters (HQ): The charity operates on an inter-
national level while providing humanitarian aid for oﬄine beneficia-
ries. Revenue can come from donations made via a web-based donor
platform. The charity is a reputable and trusted entity, with secure
premises and online access/ backup servers which may be geograph-
ically distant from the aid environment.
MP-2-A2 Donors: Potential donors must have online access to use the donor
platform.
MP-2-A3 Bitcoin Payment Server (BPS): The BPS is a secure server man-
aged under industrial standard security controls and best practices
to prevent attacks. All security keys are kept encrypted and stored
securely to minimise the risk associated with data breaches.
MP-2-A4 Phones: All users of the system possess simple mobile phones (fea-
ture phones) that are protected by security code/access PINs, and
the local existing GSM network can be used for SMS messages.
MP-2-A5 Secure Registration: During a secure registration process at the
LO, the following procedures take place:
1) All users of the system register their mobile numbers and be issued
with security tokens.
2) the mobile numbers and OTP security token IDs of users are sent
to the BPS (encrypted using the LO’s private key), in batches if the
LO’s internet connection is intermittent
3) mobile numbers are assigned an OTP identifier and Bitcoin wallet
(stored online on the BPS).
MP-2-A6 OTP Security Token: This is a cheap hardware security token,
used every time an SMS transaction is made, that generates HMAC-
Based (HOTP) passcodes when the user requests (“event-driven”).
These codes remain valid until used by the authenticating applica-
tion. More information about OTP processes can be seen in Ap-
pendix A.1.1.
MP-2-A7 Trust: The SMS-Gateway and BPS are assumed to be trusted and
secure. Mobile phones are not.
104
5.4. MP-2: Bitcoin SMS m-Payments 5. Mobile Payments
Payer SMS gateway BPS 
PhP, TrAmt, PhR (PayReq SMS) BITCOIN PAYMENT SERVER 
1. Get WalletP, SP, Get WalletR 
2. Check Balp >TrAmt if not - TransDenied SMS 
3. Send AuthReq – include TrNo 
TrNo,TrAmt, PhR, BalP, TXID or RskHash 
TrNo,TrAmt, PhP, BalR, TXID or RskHash 
(PayConf SMS) 
(RecConf SMS) 
BITCOIN PAYMENT SERVER 
1. Check TrNo 
2. Generate OTPBTS 
3. OTPP=OTPBTS? if not - TransDenied SMS 
Bitcoin 
P2P 
Recipient 
(AuthReq SMS) TrNo, AuthReq 
PhP, TrNo,OTPP (Auth SMS) 
BITCOIN PAYMENT SERVER 
1) Generate New BalP BalR 
2) Send PayConf, RecConf via SMS Gateway 
 
Bitcoin Payment -  
Distributed Ledger  
Processing 
Figure 5.7: MP-2: Bitcoin SMS Payments - Protocol
5.4.5 MP-2: Bitcoin SMS Transactions
Payments can be made from charity worker to beneficiary, beneficiary to merchant, or
merchant to merchant3, and a summary of the message flow is shown in Figure 5.74.
The notation used is shown in Table 5.9, security credentials for each entity are shown
in Table 5.10 and the content of each SMS messages used is shown in Table 5.11.
Stage 1: Payment Request To make a payment, the Payer (P) types an SMS mes-
sage with payment instructions (PayReq SMS ), and sends it to a local phone number
provided by the charity, to be forwarded to the charity’s BPS via the SMS-Gateway.
The BPS retrieves Bitcoin wallets for both Payer and Recipient, checks TrAmt is
not greater than BALP , pseudo-randomly generates a three-digit number, unique per
transaction TrNo, and then sends AuthReq SMS asking for Payer’s OTP. The Payer
presses a button on the OTP token, then sends Auth SMS containing the resulting
OTP to authorise the transaction. The BPS checks the TrNo, generates OTPBPS and
compares to the received OTPP . If any checks fail, TransDenied SMS is sent to the
Payer. If all checks are passed then the BPS proceeds to making a Bitcoin payment,
using one of the two options described in Section 5.4.2.
3Merchants could use an existing Bitcoin address, registered and associated with a short Merchant
ID by the BPS, used instead of PhP / PhR in transactions.
4The two options for Bitcoin payment processing are described in full in Appendix A.3.1
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Table 5.9: MP-2: Bitcoin SMS Payments - Protocol Notation
Notation Description
AddrX Bitcoin Multi-signature Address for entity X
BPS Bitcoin Payment Server(entity)
BALX Bitcoin balance in Account ACX for entity X
LO Local Office (entity)
OTPX One Time Password generated by entity X
P Payer(entity)
PhX Phone Number of entity X
PKX/ SKX Public/ Secret Key pair of entity X
R Recipient(entity)
SX/ VX Signing/ Verification key pair of entity X (Bitcoin keys)
TrAmt Transaction Amount
TrNo Transaction Number
TXID Unique Transaction ID of a transaction recorded in the
blockchain. Also referred to as the Transaction Hash (TrHash)
TrHash Transaction Hash
X→Y: Message sent from entity X to entity Y
RSKHash Rootstock Transaction Hash
Table 5.10: MP-2: Bitcoin SMS Payments - Credentials
Entity Keys and Other Assets
Payer/ Recipient No keys, PIN for phone, HOTP token (no PIN) for making
payments
BPS SP−BPS ,AddrP−BPS , AddrR−BPS , PKLO, PhX , OTPX
LO SLO, Physical OTP tokens, phone numbers (pay-
ers/recipients), plus registration details/ OTP allocation de-
tails
Donor SDonor/ VDonor
Donor Platform AddrProject
Stage 2: Bitcoin Transaction Processing
The two options for Bitcoin transaction processing (i.e. Multi-Signature Addresses and
Smart Contracts) are described in detail in Appendix A.3.1.
Stage 3: Payment Finalisation
Once the Bitcoin/RSK transaction has completed, the BPS updates the payer/recipient
balances and sends confirmation messages via the SMS-Gateway: PayConf SMS or
PayConfRSK SMS to the Payer and RecConf SMS or RecConfRSK SMS to the Re-
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Table 5.11: SMS Payment Messages
Message Content
PayReq SMS PhP , TrAmt, PhR
AuthReq SMS TrNo, AuthReq
Auth SMS PhP , TrNo,OTPP
TransDenied SMS PhP , TrNo, PhR, Denied
PayConf SMS TrNo,TrAmt, PhR, BALP , TXID
RecConf SMS TrNo,TrAmt, PhP , BALR, TXID
PayConfRSK SMS TrNo,TrAmt, PhR, BALP , RSKHash
RecConfRSK SMS TrNo,TrAmt, PhP , BALR, RSKHash
cipient. TXID/RSKHash are included as unique IDs that can be used to trace the
particular transaction on the Bitcoin/RSK blockchain if required.
5.4.6 Security Analysis
Security aspects of the proposed SMS payment scheme now analysed with respect to
the m-Payment Security Requirements set out in Section 5.2. Potential attacks will
also be identified.
• Confidentiality (MP-2-SR1): Bitcoin donors can remain anonymous if they
choose, but this may introduce management issues for the charity. Some anony-
mous donations may need special reporting and investigation due to possible
money laundering/ suspicious financial activity regulations. For example, in the
UK, anonymous donations over £25,000 have to be reported as a “serious in-
cident” [273]. To comply with these, a charity policy may be needed requir-
ing identification for donations over a certain amount. Server attacks affecting
HQ/HQB/BPS are possible; Table 5.12 shows recommended countermeasures.
SMS messages are not encrypted by default, so there may be attacks on confi-
dentiality.
• Integrity (MP-2-SR2/MP-2-SR3): Again, there may be server attacks di-
rected at the HQ/HQB/BPS/ Donor Platform: Table 5.12 shows recommended
countermeasures to ensure the integrity of information. SMS replay/spoofing at-
tacks may occur, but the OTP in the SMSAuth message is designed to counter
these attacks. If the charity has a business relationship with an MNO, the OTP
token could be replaced with a SIM Toolkit application that generates OTPs and
encrypts messages. However this would require beneficiaries to have a SIM with
the application installed, which would reduce the ease of implementation of the
scheme: a classic security versus usability dilemma.
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Table 5.12: Attack Targets and Countermeasures
Attack Target Countermeasure
Donor Platform Platform is hosted on a secure web server adhering to in-
dustrial standard security controls to defend against external
attacks such as DDoS, website defacing, content manipulation
HQ/HQB/BPS
(DDoS)
HQ/HQB has secure premises and backup servers: BPS man-
aged under industrial standard security controls and best
practices to prevent attacks.
HQ/HQB/BPS
(privilege esca-
lation)
Server related attacks can be prevented by using security con-
trols such as: access control, routine web-application vulner-
ability assessment/patching. Data breaches mitigated by se-
curely storing security keys encrypted
SMS
(MNO/GSM)
GSM/SMS security issues partially mitigated by the use of
the OTP security token and TXID/RSKHash on confirma-
tions
SMS spoof OTP/TXID/RSKHash gives some assurance that payment is
genuine
SMS replay OTP prevents replay attacks
Blockchain/RSK
(DDoS)
DDoS attacks not viable in distributed ledger, and integrity
is innate in blockchain solutions
• Authentication (MP-2-SR4/ MP-2-SR5): Authenticating the payment re-
quest SMS uses the OTP security token for two-factor authentication. The char-
ity’s BPS authenticates the user by verifying the OTP included in the SMS, so if a
phone is lost/stolen, an attacker cannot make a valid transaction without having
the security token. The OTP is valid until it is received and processed by the BPS
so network delays will not cause adverse effects. This should give some protec-
tion against spoofing attacks. The mobile phones handset’s PIN protection will
present a barrier to attackers who steal the phone. In a point-of-sale transaction,
where a beneficiary is purchasing a product from a merchant, both parties can
compare the TrNo received on confirmation messages before a purchased product
is handed out. Social engineering may aim at obtaining privileged access to data
at HQ/BPS, so security awareness training will be needed. However, an insider
at the BPS/HQ/HQB is not able to transmit a transaction alone because of the
use of multi-signature transactions/ smart contracts.
• Availability (MP-2-SR6): The donor platform and the BPS are attractive
targets for DDoS attacks as they store keys and transaction data: see Table 5.12
for countermeasures. DDoS attacks against the blockchain are not viable due to
its innate security and distributed nature.
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• Non-Repudiation (MP-2-SR7): Every Bitcoin transaction uses digital signa-
tures and confirmed transactions are recorded on the blockchain. The blockchain
provides an immutable audit trail so a participant cannot deny their involvement.
SMS Security Issues:
The SMS system has well documented security issues, which are not addressed directly
in this proposal. However, measures have been included which could deter would-be
attackers. The use of the OTP means that replay attacks should fail, and the AuthReq
SMS from the charity should alert users to potentially fraudulent transactions. Addi-
tional assurance comes from including both TXID/RSKHash and TrNo in confirmation
SMS messages: these can be used to cross check with the Bitcoin/RSK blockchain and
in a verbal comparison between Payer and Recipient respectively, to provide an extra
level of assurance that a transaction is correct. This provides a higher level of security
than other SMS Bitcoin schemes: e.g. in Coinapult SMS, the user confirms a transac-
tion by sending an SMS containing a security code sent by the payment service in a
previous SMS, which offers limited assurance that the transaction is genuine.
5.4.7 Use Case MP-2: Summary
The use case MP-2 first identified how a blockchain based solution could be employed
with an SMS based m-payment system that uses the existing GSM network without
requiring an Internet connection. It also uses an OTP based two-factor authentication
method. The proposed SMS-based payment scheme was then evaluated for its security.
Table 5.13: M-Payment Use Cases vs Security Requirements
Security Requirement MP-1 MP-2
Confidentiality X Parta
Integrity X Parta
Availability X X
Authentication X Parta
Non-Repudiation X X
a SMS messages are not confidential/can be spoofed
5.5 Chapter Summary
This chapter discussed the security challenges of m-Payment applications, and then
presented two use cases MP-1:SCWS Branchless Banking and MP-2: Bitcoin SMS
m-Payment that offered secure solutions to these challenges. MP-1 used the tamper-
resistant security properties of the SCWS installed in a SIM with advanced capabilities
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to provide secure mobile banking transactions of withdrawal, deposit and transfer of
funds to a third party. MP-2 used SMS messaging to interface with a distributed
ledger system - the blockchain - to enable charities to offer humanitarian aid in an
oﬄine environment in the form of Bitcoin payments. The security of both use cases
was assessed informally against previously defined security requirements and MP-1 was
also formally analysed using the protocol checking tool Scyther, and no attacks were
found within bounds.
A summary of how well the security requirements were met for each use case is
shown in Table 5.13.
5.6 Related Publications
Two publications resulted from the work described in this chapter:
1. S. Cobourne, K. Mayes, and K. Markantonakis, “Using the Smart Card Web
Server in Secure Branchless Banking”, in International Conference on Network
and System Security (NSS2013), Springer, 2013, pp. 250–263.[3]
2. D. Jayasinghe, S. Cobourne, K. Markantonakis, R.N. Akram, and K. Mayes,
“Philanthropy On The Blockchain”, in 11th WISTP International Conference on
Information Security Theory and Practice (WISTP2017), 2017. [4]
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Authentication is an enabler for secure services. This chapter firstly de-
scribes a proposal that uses the SCWS as a means of secure, local Sin-
gle Sign-On (SSO) in a disconnected environment. Secondly, this chapter
discusses the potential use of gesture recognition as a dynamic biometric
authentication method on a mobile device.
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6.1 Authentication Use Cases
Authentication is a vital enabler for secure services, and is usually based on one (or
more) of the three authentication factors: knowledge - “something you know”; owner-
ship - “something you possess”; and inherence - “something you are/do”. Many of the
security issues identified in this research can be attributed to weak authentication of
an individual accessing a service.
The authentication use cases presented in this chapter utilise authentication factors
in different ways. Auth-1: Oﬄine SCWS Single Sign-On uses the tamper resistant web
functionality of the SCWS installed on a SIM, with its many security advantages, to
enhance authentication in oﬄine environments. This provides two-factor authentication
(2FA) through “something you have” (the SCWS) and “something you know” (an
SCWS PIN).
Gesture recognition can provide one-step two-factor dynamic biometric authentica-
tion i.e. “something you know” (the gesture) with “something you are” (physical biom-
etry). The advantage of dynamic biometry is that a biometric can be easily changed if
compromised. Use case Auth-2: Gesture Recognition Biometric is concerned with the
assessing the feasibility of utilising a mobile device equipped with a 3D depth camera
to use gesture recognition as a dynamic biometric authentication method. Preliminary
experiments are presented which use different 3D depth cameras (the Kinect and Leap
Motion devices) for biometric data capture.
6.2 Authentication Security Requirements
Basic security requirements are shown in Table 6.1. The most important security
requirements for an authentication system are Auth-SR3/Auth-SR4, as they are con-
cerned with accepting correct users and denying access to imposters.
The next section now describes the first authentication use case, Auth-1: Oﬄine
SCWS Single Sign-On, where an SCWS on a phone SIM communicates with a second
SCWS installed as part of a security module to provide authentication in an oﬄine
environment, through a Single Sign-On process using standardised web protocols.
6.3 Auth-1: Oﬄine SCWS Single Sign-On
6.3.1 Single Sign-On (SSO) - Background Information
Single Sign-On schemes allow a user to authenticate online to a single central server,
which then handles the user’s authentication to other participating servers.
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Table 6.1: Authentication - General Security Requirements
Confidentiality
Auth-SR1 Sensitive information should not be disclosed to unauthorised par-
ties, whether during processing, in transit, or at rest
Integrity
Auth-SR2 Information must not be tampered with by unauthorised parties
during processing, in transit or at rest, and a system must perform
its tasks without unauthorised manipulation
Authentication
Auth-SR3 Only genuine users can be authenticated successfully.
Auth-SR4 No imposters can be authenticated successfully.
Availability
Auth-SR5 Users must not be prevented from using the system: i.e. the
service is not denied to authorised entities, for instance through
distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks.
Non-repudiation
Auth-SR6 None of the participants can subsequently deny their actions took
place
An example of an SSO scheme is the Kerberos protocol, (see Figure 6.1) where a
“ticket” is obtained from a Kerberos Key Distribution Centre (KDC) and used as a
trusted credential to authenticate to other services within the network.
Figure 6.1: Kerberos Single Sign-On - Source: http://www.ibm.com/developerworks/
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The next section describes how the SCWS can be used in an oﬄine SSO solution.
A full description of this proposal is included in the paper published as a result of this
research [6].
6.3.2 Using the SCWS for SSO
The SCWS SSO protocol proposed in this chapter uses authentication tickets (tokens)
like Kerberos. By installing an authentication application on an SCWS, it provides a
decentralised mechanism, where users authenticate locally to their phones/readers. The
authentication server is effectively within the SIM-SCWS of the user’s mobile handset,
personal to the user. So there is no centralised, single point of failure/ attack target
for DDoS attacks. Authentication can also be performed in oﬄine environments, using
a variety of near-field channels to communicate.
For the proposal in this use case, an SCWS installed on a JavaCard v3.0 Connected
Edition chip that supports a TCIP/IP protocol stack [235] is used to form a secu-
rity module (referred to as MOD-SCWS) that will communicate with a corresponding
application installed (more conventionally) on a SIM (referred to as SIM-SCWS). The
MOD-SCWS needs to be installed within an electronic assembly that may be too expen-
sive to use with cheap items (e.g in the Internet of Things), but can be integrated into
high value equipment. The SIM-SCWS and MOD-SCWS can then be used to provide
a local SSO scheme using standardised communication protocols like TLS [274].
The user authenticates themselves to the SIM-SCWS, with credentials previously
stored inside the SIM card. This generates an authentication token (cf. “ticket” in Ker-
beros) to be transferred to the MOD-SCWS over a range of near-field communication
routes, in order to gain access to sensitive information stored on the MOD-SCWS. Com-
munication from the SIM-SCWS to the phone browser can be via ISO 7816, USB1.x and
USB2.0 [275]: communication from SIM-SCWS to MOD-SCWS can be via Bluetooth
Low Energy [276] or WiFi Direct [277]. Once the SIM-SCWS and the MOD-SCWS
mutually authenticate, the MOD-SCWS retrieves the token stored in the SIM card and
the user is authenticated if the token is valid and fresh.
The entities in the proposal are described in Table 6.2, and the relationship between
them is shown in Figure 6.2. The necessary trust relationship between all the entities
in the system can be achieved by a conventional X.509 certificate approach [278].
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Figure 6.2: Auth-1: SCWS Oﬄine SSO - Entity Diagram
6.3.3 Auth-1: Oﬄine SCWS SSO Protocol
The SIM-SCWS should authenticate the user1, the MOD-SCWS security module should
authenticate the SIM-SCWS and vice versa.
The user PIN/password allows the user to authenticate to the SIM-SCWS, which
creates an authentication token that is passed to the MOD-SCWS to gain access for a
specific duration of time. A MOD-SCWS accepts the local authentication result, as it
trusts the tamper-resistant SIM-SCWS. The authentication token is the concatenation
of items shown in Table 6.4, i.e. (L||T ||I). The MOD-SCWS can communicate the
requested data locally when tapped by an authenticated user/phone, without the need
for online capability.
There are two phases in the proposed SCWS Oﬄine SSO scheme: Phase 1 - User
Authentication/ Token Generation and Phase 2 - Token Authentication. These phases
can be seen in Figure 6.3.
1It is possible to have mutual authentication between the SIM-SCWS and the users browser through
the exchange of certificates
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Table 6.2: Auth-1: SCWS Oﬄine SSO - Entities
Entity Description
User The user has a mobile device with an SCWS installed (SIM-
SCWS): they communicate with both the SIM-SCWS and the
MOD-SCWS over HTTPs via the phone browser
SP Service Provider: the SP has a business relationship with the
MNO in order to install their applications on the SIM-SCWS
and MOD-SCWS.
MNO Mobile Network Operator: the MNO owns and operates the
SIM/SCWS ecosystem, and manages the administrative proto-
cols that update content on the SCWS
RAS Remote Administrative Server: the RAS is defined as a trusted
entity in the OMA SCWS specification [15].
MOD-SCWS A security module that can run the authentication application:
it consists of an evaluated smart card chip supporting JavaCard
v3.0 Connected Edition functionality, attached to an electronic
assembly that can provide accurate time from an external timer.
SIM-SCWS A Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) with an SCWS installed,
which can run the authentication application
Table 6.3: Auth-1: SCWS Oﬄine SSO - Assumptions
Description
Auth1-A1 The MNO is trusted and allows access to the SIM card (for applets
that will be used by the SCWS to run inside the SIM-SCWS).
Auth1-A2 There is a secure procedure for the development, deployment and
revocation of certificates and key pairs on the various SCWS instal-
lations.
Auth1-A3 MOD-SCWS are installed on items that have a significant value,
not tags or other low-power sensors
Auth1-A4 The MOD-SCWS receives accurate external time from an external
timer found on the electronic assembly.
Auth1-A5 Each user has a single PIN/password that allows the user to authen-
ticate to the SIM-SCWS, chosen, stored and updated in accordance
with security best practice e.g. [242]
Table 6.4: Auth-1: SCWS Oﬄine SSO - Protocol Notation
Description
L The level of access granted by the authentication token e.g. administra-
tive or standard access
T An expiration date/time
I A unique SIM card identifier, for example the Integrated Circuit Card
Identifier (ICCID) [279]
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Phase 1 - User Authentication/ Token Generation: The user authenticates
themselves to the SIM-SCWS using a PIN/password input to the phone browser: this
is communicated to the SIM-SCWS via ISO 7816/ USB1.x or USB2.0. If successful, an
authentication token is generated, signed and stored on the SIM-SCWS. The signature
is created by the private key SKSIM that is part of a key pair installed in the SIM-
SCWS.
Phase 2 - Token Authentication: The user initiates a wireless connection between
the SIM-SCWS and the MOD-SCWS: the two entities negotiate a TLS connection over
local communication channels. The signed authentication token is then transferred to
the MOD-SCWS. The MOD-SCWS checks the validity of the token, and verifies the
signature of the token using the public key PKSIM of the SIM-SCWS that is sent
during the TLS handshake. The MOD-SCWS then logs the request and if the token
has passed the verification check relevant information is sent to the phone browser over
an HTTPs connection: if the check fails, then the token and the signature are discarded
and the user is notified.
If a token is still valid, Phase 1 is not necessary so the user does not need to provide
a PIN/Password every time, only once the token stored inside the SIM-SCWS has
expired. The trust relationship between the SIM-SCWS and the MOD-SCWS means
Figure 6.3: Auth-1: SCWS Oﬄine SSO - Protocol
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that the latter will always accept a valid SIM-SCWS token.
Submitting the token to the MOD-SCWS during Phase 2 of the protocol, ensures
the freshest available token is always checked: authentication criteria may have changed
between authentication attempts, as the user may have re-authenticated to the SIM-
SCWS in the intervening period.
Performance timing estimates were done, for both processing and communication.
Total processing time was estimated as follows:
• Phase 1 - User Authentication and Token Generation - 216.40 ms
• Phase 2 - Object Authentication and Access - 143.60ms
Table 6.5 gives the estimated overall communication time needed for the whole
protocol using a variety of communication combinations.
Table 6.5: Total Oﬄine SSO Communication times (in ms)
SIM-SCWS to SIM-SCWS to SIM-SCWS to
Browser MOD-SCWS MOD-SCWS
Bluetooth LE WiFi Direct
ISO 7816 2327.04 1568.69
USB1.x 1129.82 371.47
USB2.0 1121.27 362.92
From these estimates, it can be seen that the communication speed dominates,
especially when the combination is for ISO 7816 along with Bluetooth LE. The full
details of the method employed and the calculations can be seen in the paper published
as a result of this work [6].
The next section assesses the security of use case Auth-1 in comparison to the
authentication security requirements shown in Table 6.1.
6.3.4 Security Analysis
The security properties of the SCWS installed on the tamper-resistant SIM are de-
scribed in more detail later in this thesis, in Chapter 8. Defences that address authen-
tication security requirements from Table 6.1 are as follows:
• Confidentiality (Auth-SR1): No sensitive data held on the MOD-SCWS is
made available without authentication and all data transmissions are protected
by HTTPs: this also applies to the local server SIM-SCWS. A major privacy
advantage of the proposal is that the user’s Password/PIN never leaves the local
mobile device as it is checked locally by the SIM-SCWS.
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• Integrity (Auth-SR2): The MOD-SCWS and local server SIM-SCWS will
both protect the integrity of sensitive stored data; tamper resistance of the chip
should mean it will function as intended, even if attacked. All involved entities
communicate over HTTPs channels to protect integrity of data.
• Authentication (Auth-SR3/4): The MOD-SCWS checks the validity of the
authentication token, and verifies the digital signature created by the SIM-SCWS.
The authentication token will be unusable with any other SIM, as it contains a
unique SIM identifier such as the ICCID. An attacker would also need the correct
X.509 certificate in their malicious SIM card. The SIM-SCWS is accessed using
a PIN.
• Availability (Auth-SR5): As the proposal avoids a single centralised SSO
server by distributing the authentication process over a number of trusted local
servers (SIM-SCWSs), there is no single point of failure. DDoS attacks cannot
easily take place because an attacker has to infiltrate a large number of mobile
devices/ MOD-SCWSs and this is not scalable. Denial of Service attacks on a
single device may be possible, but the attacker would need to be in possession of
the SIM-SCWS/MOD-SCWS for this to succeed.
• Non Repudiation (Auth-SR6): the MOD-SCWS verifies the token’s digital
signature using the public key of the SIM-SCWS, and access requests are logged
by the MOD-SCWS. This provides non-repudiation.
In the case of a lost or stolen mobile device, management procedures should ensure
the authentication token is erased from the local server SIM-SCWS. Any non-authorised
entity that tries to use it to access a MOD-SCWS will have to re-authenticate to create
a new token, but will be presented with a barrier as they will not know the correct
PIN/password.
Mutual authentication can be achieved if both SIM-SCWS and MOD-SCWSs have
certificates. However the installation and maintenance of these certificates may be
labour-intensive. The attack resistance of the chips could permit a longer period of
certificate validity, depending on the value of the information stored on the chips.
6.3.5 Formal Security Analysis
The Scyther protocol verification tool was used to formally analyse the SCWS SSO
protocol, and no attacks were found within bounds. The Scyther tool and its verifi-
cation processes are fully described in Appendix B: the SSO Scyther Script and the
verification results obtained are shown in Appendix Section B.4.
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6.3.6 Use Case Auth-1: Summary
An SSO solution in a disconnected environment is possible using an SCWS installed
both in an attack-resistant SIM card and a smart card chip (MOD-SCWS) embedded
within an electronic assembly. The SIM-SCWS and MOD-SCWS communicate over
a wireless communication channel: local authentication on the mobile device SIM-
SCWS produces a security token that is accepted by the MOD-SCWS. Distributing
trusted SSO authentication servers to many tamper-resistant SIM cards avoids a single
centralised point of failure/ attack target for DDoS exploits. A password/PIN is used
to authenticate the user locally on their mobile device, but attacks are not scalable as
capturing this credential will not work without the corresponding SIM card.
The next section introduces use case Auth-2: Gesture Recognition Biometric that
investigates the potential for using a mobile device to authenticate using gesture recog-
nition as a dynamic biometric.
6.4 Auth-2: Gesture Recognition Biometric
6.4.1 Gesture Recognition Biometrics - Background Information
Gesture recognition could be used in a dynamic biometric system, as it can combine
inherent physical information about the user with a knowledge factor (i.e. the gesture).
Using gestures to authenticate benefits from a natural style which is particularly suited
for non-technical users or those who are familiar with gaming or VWs. If gesture
recognition could provide equivalent security to a 4-digit PIN then this would be a
welcome additional authentication technique.
As with other biometric systems, gesture recognition needs both a sensor to cap-
ture the raw data from the gesture, and an analysis method to interpret the captured
information. Matching decisions are based on a threshold of acceptance θ. This is
used to decide how close the biometric input should be to a stored biometric template
for it to be considered a match: θ can be varied for different operating environments/
security levels required. The accuracy of a biometric system can be measured using
several means, for example using the False Positive Rate (FPR) which is when an im-
poster is able to be authenticated, or the True Positive Rate (TPR), which is when a
genuine individual is authenticated correctly. The Equal Error Rate (EER) can also be
used to compare the accuracy of different biometric systems. The EER occurs when
FPR is equal to the False Negative Rate (FNR) (defined as FNR = 1-TPR) for a fixed
threshold θ. A lower EER indicates that the system is more accurate.
Feature extraction identifies and extracts appropriate information from the cap-
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tured data. Different analysis techniques can be used, such as Hidden Markov Models
(HMM) [280]; Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) [281]; and Dynamic Time Warping
(DTW) [282]. This use case focuses on the use of DTW as the analytic system, as
it has the advantage that it needs less training samples than other classifiers such as
ANN or HMM.
The next section discusses which mobile device sensors could be used for dynamic
biometric data capture.
6.4.2 Mobile Device Sensors for Gesture Recognition
Accelerometers
The 3D accelerometer on a mobile device can be used to capture biometric data for
analysis with the DTW algorithm, as seen in the work of [283]. Accelerometers are
not ideal sensors for capturing gestures, as by recording only acceleration, useful in-
formation (such as speed and position) are lost, and they are sensitive to tilting of the
user’s hand when capturing gesture data. Further limitations occur because the device
can only track one hand. Section 6.4.3 describes a preliminary experiment using the
DTW algorithm with a mobile phone accelerometer as capture device.
A vision based sensor, such as a depth camera, can record gestures in 3D and would
allow tracking of both hands.
Depth Cameras
There is a move within the smart phone industry towards equipping mobile devices
with 3D depth cameras [284] to provide consumers with more feature-rich experiences
such as augmented reality applications. There were announcements at the International
Consumer Electronic Show (CES) in both 2016 and 2017 about phones with 3D depth
cameras. In 2016, Google revealed that Project Tango [285] would add computer vision,
depth sensing, and motion tracking technology to consumer mobile devices that year,
to include full 3D video and time-of-flight cameras as popularised in the Xbox Kinect
device [16] (illustrated in Figure 6.4). At CES 2017 the Asus Zenfone AR [286] was
announced as a high-end Tango device. There are now several handsets available which
are suitable for 3D depth camera applications [287]: for example, it was proposed to
release a smart phone with integrated Intel RealSense 3D camera for $399 in 2016 [288].
As at June 2017, the Lenovo Phab2 Pro [289] was on sale at $499.99: it uses the world’s
smallest 3D camera [290] and is also compatible with Project Tango. A summary of the
specifications and capabilities of these devices can be seen online [291]. The company
behind the Leap Motion depth camera device [292] announced at the end of 2016 that
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Figure 6.4: The Kinect Device [16]
they plan to install Leap Motion Virtual Reality technology into the same type of
processors that are currently used in smart phones, thus opening up 3D tracking to
battery-powered virtual and augmented reality devices [293].
So, having a 3D depth camera installed on a mobile device is no longer in the realm
of science fiction: the possibilities this gives for gesture recognition based biometric
authentication will now be explored through several preliminary experiments.
6.4.3 Auth-2: Preliminary Experiments
Experiments were done using a mobile phone accelerometer on a FxOS handset, the
Alcatel Flame [79], and two different depth cameras, the Kinect and the Leap Mo-
tion devices. The Kinect is a structured-light 3D scanner that records video at 30
frames/second [294]. It captures and tracks a skeleton composed of 20 points in 3D:
these represent the position of the head, neck, spine, centre hip, left and right side joints,
Figure 6.5: The Leap Motion - by SkywalkerPL, Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY
4.0)
122
6.4. Auth-2: Gesture Recognition Biometric 6. Authentication
hand, wrist, elbow, shoulder, hip, knee, ankle and foot. The Leap Motion device is an
optical tracking system based on stereo vision that uses three infrared (IR) emitters
that generate patternless IR light and two IR cameras (illustrated in Figure 6.5).
Using Accelerometer on FxOS Handset
As explained in Chapter 2, the Mozilla Firefox OS (FxOS) [78] was designed to work
with very low specification handsets and limited data connectivity. Mozilla discontin-
ued all work on the FxOS operating system in September 2016, but before that was
announced, a proof-of-concept DTW gesture recognition biometric application was in-
stalled on an FxOS phone [79], using the device’s accelerometer as a sensor. This
application was written in Javascript, as FxOS is a web-based platform: sample screen
shots can be seen in Figures 6.6 and 6.7. However, preliminary testing showed that
the application was very sensitive to initial hand position, and meaningful results were
hard to obtain.
Figure 6.6: Auth-2: Accelerometer Record/ Save Gesture (FxOS Screenshots)
Using 3D Depth Cameras
As suitable mobile handsets with 3D depth cameras were not commercially available
when this research work was done, preliminary experiments on the security, accuracy
and robustness of gesture biometrics were done using off-the-shelf depth cameras i.e. a
Kinect device as a sensor for large upper body gestures, and a Leap Motion device for
smaller hand gestures. The DTW algorithm was used in all experiments.
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Figure 6.7: Auth-2: Accelerometer Authentication (FxOS Screenshots)
Using the Kinect: There has been previous work using depth cameras as biometric
capture devices with DTW as the analysing algorithm: for example, in the work of
Aumi et al. [295]. Other research has used the Kinect depth camera as sensor. Wu
et al. [296] [297] used all 20 skeleton tracking points available on the Kinect device to
give a True Acceptance Rate (TAR) of 98.11% for 1.89% of FAR. Tian et al. also used
the Kinect with the DTW algorithm for analysis and recognition of gestures designing
a 3D signatures [298], giving a TAR of 99% for 1% FAR and 3% against attacks.
In this preliminary experiment the Kinect was used to record large upper body
gestures in an authentication experiment, using six of the available skeleton tracking
points to study gestures made by arm and hand movements: the tracking points used
were both hands, both elbows and both shoulders. The aim of the experiment was to
assess the how well a gesture recognition biometric could withstand mimic attacks, as
gestures are easily copied. Full details of the experimental method and analysis can be
seen in the paper published as a result of the work [5], but the method and results are
briefly summarised here.
The methodology for the experiment was to record gestures from one group of
volunteers (the reference group) and ask a different group of volunteers (the attacker
group) to attempt to copy them. There were 10 people in the reference group and 28
people in the attacker group.
Each member of the reference group was instructed to invent and perform a gesture
that was an easily reproducible movement of their hands and arms, not too close to the
body and less than five seconds in duration. These “reference gestures” were filmed
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using a separate camera. Each reference group volunteer then repeated their gestures
20 times, which allowed the TAR/ FAR to be calculated. In the next stage of the
experiment, each member of the attacker group was given 2 minutes to guess these
reference gestures, without being told what gestures had been previously recorded.
They were then shown a recording of a reference gesture, and they were asked to copy
the gesture as accurately as possible 10 times: this was repeated for each reference
gesture. This allows the FPR/ TRR (True Rejection Rate) to be calculated. In total,
the experiment recorded 200 genuine authentication attempts, 56 minutes of guessing
gestures, and 2800 attempts at copying reference gestures.
The results can be summarised as follows: the experiment gave an Equal Error Rate
(EER) of 2.8%, a TAR of 93% and a FAR of 1.7% when attackers had been shown
the reference gestures previously, simulating a shoulder surfing scenario where they can
see the gesture being performed. If the attackers had not seen the gesture beforehand,
then no attacks succeeded. So taking the total allocated time for attacks of this nature
gave the result that the likelihood of a successful attack was less than 1 in 11200, a
better security level than that a 4-digit PIN (which has 10,000 possible combinations).
Using the Leap Motion: In this preliminary experiment, small hand gestures were
captured by the Leap Motion device by recording the (x, y, z) positions of the palm
centre, all five fingertips and all five finger roots (i.e. eleven elements (E) for each
frame). Leave One Out Cross Validation analysis was then done on all 11 points
captured, as well as just the palm centre data points. Using palm centres removes
hand geometry information, so gives similar data to an accelerometer sensor. This
experiment resulted in 90,000 attacks and 10,000 attempts at authentication by genuine
users. Full details of the experimental method and analysis can be seen in the paper
published as a result of the work [7].
Palm centre gesture recognition was a less effective biometric than the full hand
gesture as it has less input data. For a full hand gesture, an attacker mimicking a
known gesture had 11.88% likelihood of a successful attack, whilst a genuine user had
a 88.12% chance to be correctly authenticated: the equivalent figures for the palm
gesture were TAR 74.96% and FAR 25.04%.
These experiments were used to test the performance of gesture recognition bio-
metrics implemented in a “match-on-card” application installed both on a smart card
and as an HCE application on an Android mobile. The full results can be seen in the
published paper resulting from this work [5]. It was found that the overall processing
time on the smart card was too long to be practicable, even using an optimised method
of RAM management when performing the DTW calculations: HCE results were more
promising, but would need extra security measures to be adopted as HCE does not
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offer tamper-resistance.
6.4.4 Security Analysis
The investigation of dynamic biometrics on mobile phones has been primarily concerned
with security requirements Auth-SR3 and Auth-SR4 in Table 6.1: the other security
requirements relate more to whole systems.
The results obtained show that security levels better that the use of a 4-digit PIN
can be obtained when using the Kinect for large upper-body gestures. The initial Leap
Motion results were a little disappointing, however, and for that reason Auth-SR3 and
Auth-SR4 for dynamic biometrics are assessed as “Partially Met” because accuracy of
authentication is not consistent over different sensors. (The Kinect results would be
considered to meet the security requirements). Studies based on the Kinect get better
results than Leap Motion or short range depth sensors, which may imply that the more
parts of the body that are used for the authentication, the better it is for correctly
accepting the genuine user and the rejection of potential attackers. An attacker may
be able to copy a gesture exactly after practising it several times.
In addition to making the biometric changeable, dynamic biometric schemes of-
fer another security benefit. Improvements in unlinkability occur because the same
physical characteristic can be used at different verifiers with different secret knowledge.
Table 6.6: Authentication Use Cases vs Security Requirements
Security Requirement Auth-1 Auth-2
Confidentiality X N/A
Integrity X N/A
Authentication X Partiala
Availability X N/A
Non-Repudiation X N/A
a The Kinect experiment fully meets these requirements: the Leap Mo-
tion is less accurate
6.4.5 Use Case Auth-2: Summary
Auth-2 investigated the potential for creating a gesture recognition dynamic biometric
by using the DTW algorithm for analysis, with accelerometer and depth cameras as
biometric capture devices. A proof of concept implementation of an accelerometer
based system was installed on a FxOS phone, and preliminary experiments using 3D
depth cameras (the Kinect and Leap Motion devices) were done. Security levels better
than the use of a 4-digit PIN are possible when using the Kinect for large upper-
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body gestures. In addition to providing a changeable biometric, dynamic biometry
offers unlinkability improvements because a particular physical characteristic (inherent
factor) can be used at different locations with a different knowledge factor (i.e. the
gesture itself). In future, mobile devices will potentially be equipped with 3D depth
cameras to provide users with a more feature-rich experience. The results obtained
from the preliminary experiments indicate that 3D cameras could potentially be used
for gesture recognition dynamic biometric authentication on mobile devices in future.
6.5 Chapter Summary
This chapter presented two use cases Auth-1: Oﬄine SCWS Single Sign-On and Auth-
2: Gesture Recognition Biometric. Auth-1 used the tamper-resistant security properties
of the SCWS installed in a SIM (SIM-SCWS) and a security module with a smart
card chip (MOD-SCWS) embedded within an electronic assembly to provide an SSO
solution for disconnected environments. Local authentication on the mobile device SIM-
SCWS produces a security token that is accepted by the MOD-SCWS. This distributed
authentication approach avoids a single centralised SSO server, and attacks against an
individual SCWS are not scalable as they require possession of the SIM-SCWS or
MOD-SCWS to succeed. The security of use case Auth-1 was assessed informally
against previously defined security requirements and formally using protocol checking
tool Scyther, and no attacks were found within bounds.
Use case Auth-2 investigated the potential for using depth cameras on smart phones
as sensors for dynamic biometric authentication, using the DTW algorithm to analyse
captured data. As at the time of writing, depth camera phones were not commercially
available, preliminary experiments were done using the Kinect and Leap Motion devices
to assess the accuracy and practicality of the approach. Results showed that small
hand gestures used with the Leap Motion were less accurate than upper body gestures
captured by the Kinect.
A summary of how well the security requirements were met for each use case is
shown in Table 6.6.
6.6 Related Publications
Four publications resulted from the work described in this chapter:
1. B. Ducray, S. Cobourne, K. Mayes, and K. Markantonakis, “Authentication
Based on a Changeable Biometric using Gesture Recognition with the KinectTM”,
127
6.6. Related Publications 6. Authentication
in 2015 International Conference on Biometrics (ICB2015), IEEE 2015 pp. 38–
45. [5]
2. L. Kyrillidis, S. Cobourne, K. Mayes, and K. Markantonakis, “A Smart Card
Web Server in the Web of Things,” in Proceedings of SAI Intelligent Systems
Conference (IntelliSys 2016), Springer, 2016, pp. 769-784 [6]
3. B. Ducray, S. Cobourne, K. Mayes, and K. Markantonakis, “Comparison of
Dynamic Biometric Security Characteristics against other Biometrics”, in 2017
IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC2017). [7]
4. B. Ducray, S. Cobourne, K. Mayes, and K. Markantonakis, “Gesture Recognition
Implemented on a Personal Limited Device”, in 8th International Conference on
Information and Communication Systems (ICICS2017 ) [8] (Nominated for Best
Paper)
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This chapter proposes an enhanced login procedure suitable for VWs that
harnesses the excellent security properties of the SCWS, along with OTP
processes and geolocation. This is followed by a proposal for a remote code
voting solution for in-world VW voting, where sensitive operations are pro-
cessed in a Trusted Secure Layer external to the VW infrastructure, and
Vote Code Lists are sent via the mobile network as a second channel to a
mobile phone application.
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7.1 Virtual World Use Cases
Two of the chosen application areas will now be investigated in the VW environment:
authentication and e-voting.
Weak authentication of users of VWs can lead to identity theft and other real
world problems for users. This issue is investigated in use case VW-1: SCWS Online
VW Log-In using an enhanced log-in procedure that harnesses the excellent security
properties of the SCWS, along with geolocation to authenticate a RW user to the VW.
VWs are social environments: in 2008, ENISA found that 59% of VW users joined
a community/guild [181]. In SL [172] groups are managed by a group administrator,
who determines which avatars are eligible to join. Keeping in-world VW votes private
is difficult because of constant monitoring of in-world activities, so elections are mostly
held outside the VW environment, in forums/wikis (such as [299]), detracting from the
immersive VW experience. Use case VW-2: VW Voting proposes an in-world voting
solution where the most sensitive e-voting processes are done in a Trusted Secure Layer
external to the VW infrastructure, in conjunction with Vote Code Lists sent to a mobile
phone application.
Note: The M-Payment application area is not applicable to the VW environment
as the payment infrastructure uses standard external RW e-commerce facilities such as
PayPal, or in-world VW currency.
The next section now describes the first Virtual World use case, VW-1: SCWS
Online VW Log-In.
7.2 VW-1: SCWS Online VW Log-In
Most VWs use a simple username/password as the user authentication mechanism at
login. However this relies on static data for security, which may be captured via a range
of security attacks, and exploited subsequently1. Strengthening VW authentication
should improve confidence in the environment, allowing for the introduction of new
services, such as banking, insurance, and in-world voting, which are currently held
back by security concerns regarding the identity of the RW controllers of avatars.
1Some VWs have taken a different approach to identification, however: for example, Blizzard has
taken extra security measures with regard to WOW authentication. They have an optional Battle.net
Authenticator, which is either a physical token or an application on supported mobile devices, that
can be used for two-factor authentication to protect against unauthorised account access [28]. Also,
in addition to player-chosen nicknames (BattleTags), Blizzard have introduced a voluntary, optional
level of identity called RealID into WOW [300], where Real ID friends are made aware of their WOW
friends’ real name, but no other personal information.
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7.2.1 VW-1: Security Requirements
The security requirements that an online VW Login system should meet are shown in
Table 7.1. At the successful conclusion of the protocol, there should be an assurance
that if avatar X is in the Virtual World then its legitimate real world controller (user
X) has correctly used two-factor authentication i.e. “something you have” (SCWS and
phone) and “something you know” (SCWS PIN and OTP).
Table 7.1: VW-1: SCWS Online VW Log-In - Security Requirements
Confidentiality
VW1-SR1 Sensitive information should not be disclosed to unauthorised par-
ties, whether during processing, in transit, or at rest
Integrity
VW1-SR2 Information must not be tampered with by unauthorised parties
during processing, in transit or at rest, and a system must perform
its tasks without unauthorised manipulation
Authentication
VW1-SR3 Only authorised users and the trusted RAS can access/ update
the SCWS.
VW1-SR4 Only authorised users can be logged in to the online service: the
protocol must ensure that the user is not an impostor, and is a
real world individual
Availability
VW1-SR5 Users must not be prevented from using the system: i.e. the
service is not denied to authorised entities, for instance through
DDoS attacks.
Non-repudiation
VW1-SR6 None of the participants can subsequently deny their actions took
place
In the next section, an authentication solution is proposed that uses a SIM equipped
with an SCWS, OTP processing and geolocation to strengthen authentication to the
VW Login Server2. Full details of the system can be seen in the paper published as a
result of this work [9]: a summary is now presented.
7.2.2 Using the SCWS for Online VW Log-in
The general principle behind the proposed protocol is that the user enters a VW user-
name into the VW Client, and this triggers an OTP generating process at the VW
back-end. A time-constrained OTP is produced using a nonce N and the user’s PIN,
2This solution is presented using Online VW log-in as an example, but the protocol is equally
applicable to other RW server applications.
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Table 7.2: VW-1: SCWS Online VW Log-In - Entities
Entity Description
User The user has a mobile device with an SCWS installed (SIM-SCWS):
the user communicates with the SIM-SCWS over HTTPs via the phone
browser: the User is an individual who is registered with a VW
VW Virtual World: has details of all user credentials. It is responsible for
checking user login details and creating OTPs.
MNO Mobile Network Operator: the MNO owns and operates the SIM/SCWS
ecosystem, and manages the administrative protocols that update con-
tent on the SCWS
RAS Remote Administrative Server: this is the intermediary between the VW
Server and the mobile SCWS. The RAS can also determine the phone’s
location (as it is a part of the MNO) and inform the VWS/Login Server.
VWS Virtual World Server: Provides back-end functionality for the VW, and
has all the necessary information to keep the world operating for the
user and also connect with the back-end process such as the database
and the login server.
LS Login Server: part of the Virtual World, this manages login details,
authenticates VW avatars, creates the OTP and a nonce (N) and checks
the OTP sent by the VWC.
SCWS Smart Card Web Server: the user accesses the SCWS environment using
a PIN. The SCWS uses a java applet for processing information securely.
VWC Virtual World Client: this is the interface presented to the User, and is
installed on the user PC. The VW Client provides only a graphical user
interface, and is considered insecure.
and the nonce is then sent to the user’s SCWS-enabled phone. The user enters a PIN
and the OTP is re-created locally. The displayed OTP on the phone must be input to
the VW Client on the PC, which forwards it to the VW Server for the authentication
decision. (More information about OTPs can be seen in Appendix A.1.1.) Addition-
ally, the VW Login Server checks the phone’s location against the PC’s location, using
the cell towers of the mobile network/ the mobile’s GPS adapter/ IP geolocation as
required. If both platforms are in the same geographic area then the authentication
may proceed.
The entities involved in the proposal are described in Table 7.2, and the relationship
between entities is shown in Figure 7.1. Necessary protocol assumptions are shown in
Table 7.3, and protocol message flow is shown in Figure 7.2.
There are five phases in this authentication proposal:
• Phase 1: The user makes a log-in request at the VW Client, entering their
username or other credential.
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Figure 7.1: VW-1: SCWS Online Login - Entity Diagram
• Phase 2: The user’s (previously supplied) PIN is used by the VW Login Server
to create an OTPVWS, along with a nonce N.
• Phase 3: The VW Server gets and stores the phone location, and sends N to
the SCWS. The RAS obtains the phone’s location and passes it back to the VW
Login Server.
• Phase 4: The User enters their PIN to the SCWS, which uses it to create
OTPSCWS.
• Phase 5: The user enters the OTPSCWS (displayed on the phone) into the VW
Client. This is passed to the VW Login Server for an access decision based on
whether the two OTPs match and the geolocation check is satisfactory.
A preliminary security analysis of the proposal will now be conducted.
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Figure 7.2: VW-1: SCWS Online VW Log-In - Authentication Protocol
7.2.3 Security Analysis
The security of the SCWS installed on the tamper-resistant SIM is described in more
detail in Chapter 8. However, there are several potential attack points which need to
be considered with regard to the stated security requirements (see Table 7.1, and these
will be now be analysed3.
Confidentiality (VW1-SR1): Attacks could be mounted as follows:
• Attacks on the VWC: The VW Client is the easiest target to attack, but in this
proposed system, stealing a username/user ID is not enough to complete the
login, as a SCWS/phone is used as a second factor. If there is a physical attack
on the VW Client equipment i.e. the PC is stolen, the malicious user will not be
able to login into the VW system as the real authentication secret is sent to the
phone.
3There are generic attacks which are beyond the scope of this research: the protocol does not seek
to address compromise of the VW Server or Login Server.
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Table 7.3: VW-1: SCWS Online VW Log-In - Assumptions
Description
VW-1-A1 The MNO has a business relationship with the VW developers, and has
authorised their use of a Remote Administration Server to update the
SCWS VW application and data.
VW-1-A2 The mobile phone has a one-to-one mapping to the user, i.e. only one
registered user can use a particular SCWS.
VW-1-A3 A secure user registration procedure is in place: the user will set a PIN
to access the SCWS, and must supply a mobile phone number to the VW
and authorise its use so that the RAS will be able to download the Java
applet/credentials onto the correct phone using techniques described in
Chapter 3. Additionally, during registration, a VW certificate will be
installed on the user’s VW Client to offer mutual authentication.
VW-1-A4 The HTTPs channels between the RAS and SCWS, and between the
VW Client and VW Server are considered secure.
• Malware on PC: If there is malware on the client PC (while still in possession of
the genuine user) e.g. a keylogger which records the OTP as it is input by the
user [301], it will not gain any advantage, as the short validity period of the OTP
means that authentication will probably complete before the malicious entity can
mount an attack.
• Stolen Phone: if both the phone and PC are stolen then the attacker would also
have to know the SCWS PIN to retrieve the OTP information from the SCWS,
or physically attack the SCWS/SIM card. Management procedures should ensure
the authentication applet is disabled on the SCWS via the RAS if the phone is
reported lost/stolen.
• Malware on phone - this would not be able to read credentials stored in the
tamper-resistant SCWS, as access is restricted to authorised applications con-
trolled by the ACP Enforcer
• Privacy : no sensitive data held on the SCWS is made available without authenti-
cation (via PIN) and all data transmissions are protected by HTTPs. The user’s
PIN never leaves the local mobile device as it is checked and processed locally by
the SCWS.
Integrity: (VW1-SR2)
• Data at rest: the SCWS will protect the integrity of sensitive stored data; tamper
resistance should mean it will function as intended, even if attacked.
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• Data in transit: this data is protected by HTTPs at all stages: from phone
browser to SCWS, RAS to SCWS and between the VW Client and VW Server.
• Replay attacks: Replay attacks do not work as an OTP is time-constrained and,
by definition, only used once.
Authentication: (VW1-SR3/4)
• User Authentication: The user authenticates to the SCWS using a PIN - if the
PIN is stolen it will be unusable with any other SIM, so the attacker has to be in
possession of the phone also. The OTP entered into the VWC is dependent on
credentials stored within the SCWS, which is tamper-resistant.
• VWC Authentication: There is mutual authentication between the VW Client
and VW Server as the client is given a VW certificate during registration: malware
would also have to steal or replicate this certificate for a successful attack.
Availability: (VW1-SR5)
• DDoS Attacks: The proposal distributes the authentication process to a trusted
local servers i.e. the SCWS, so there is no single point of failure.
• PC malware: If PC malware is able to perform a DoS attack against the VWC,
so that the user will not be able to submit the OTP, the inclusion of geolocation
means that the IP address of the user must also be spoofed for it to succeed.
Although this attack is possible [302], the attacker needs to simultaneously know
the location of the user /phone, spoof the IP, and mount a DoS attack against
the VWC, which add extra deterrents.
Non Repudiation: (VW1-SR6)
• Recording Login Attempts: The Login Server will keep a record of all login at-
tempts to provide non-repudiation.
7.2.4 Use Case VW-1: Summary
Relatively weak user authentication procedures often employed by VWs that rely on
static username/password combinations can lead to security issues such as identity
theft. The use case VW-1 has presented a method for using a phone, equipped with an
SCWS SIM, to enhance the log-in procedure of VWs by using OTPs and location based
checks. The use of a static password is replaced by that of a dynamically created one
(different at each login attempt) created on a separate personal device, using a tamper-
resistant chip (the SIM), and connected via a different communications channel. A
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Figure 7.3: Virtual World Voting - Polling Booth Example
preliminary security analysis was done which indicated that the proposal had promising
capabilities to prevent unauthorised access to VWs.
The next section describes the application area of remote e-voting applied to the
VW environment, in use case VW-2: VW Voting.
7.3 VW-2: VW Voting
7.3.1 VW Voting - Background Information
VWs are social environments; group decisions can be made through voting in elections,
but this is mostly done outside the VW environment, in forums/wikis (such as [299]).
Some VW elections attract large numbers of voters e.g. in 2010, the VW Eve Online’s
“Council of Stellar Management (CSM)” election [299] had 39,433 votes from over 20
countries. In-world voting would increase the realism of the VW, especially if a VW
plans to introduce revenue-sharing/political systems [303]. In-world voting has been
seen in SL, through “voting stations” (also known as “voting booths”, “voting boxes”
and “vote boxes”), that were used to generate virtual money for avatars who had
created appealing virtual objects/ buildings. Avatars would click on the voting station
to cast their vote to indicate their approval for the object and the creator would be
rewarded later. However, these were superseded and subsequent schemes have been
discontinued following abuse [304].
Possible VW voting scenes are shown in Figure 7.3, visually mimicking normal RW
voting.
Privacy concerns arise in VWs because avatars’ communications and activities are
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monitored by VW developers using sophisticated data mining and behaviour analysis to
detect in-world cheating, through techniques similar to spyware [181]. Legal protection
such as the EU Privacy Directive [182] only applies to natural persons i.e. the avatars’
RW controllers.
7.3.2 VW-2: Security Requirements
As seen in Chapter 4, voting securely is demanding task, in any environment. Within a
VW, however, extra challenges exist as both generic e-voting and VW-specific security
issues must be addressed. e-Voting security requirements that must be met are shown
again in Table 7.4. In VW voting, no RW data should be accessible to in-world entities,
and a vote in the VW should not be linkable to an avatar or its RW user.
In this proposal, a code voting approach was selected as the most suitable solution
to the secure platform problem for voting in VWs.
Table 7.4: VW-2: VW Voting - Security Requirements
Confidentiality
VW2-SR1 Secrecy of the vote (privacy)
VW2-SR2 Vote cannot be traced back to a voter (unlinkability)
VW2-SR3 Voter can vote without external influence (vote-buying/ coercion)
Integrity
VW2-SR4 Votes should not be tampered with (recorded as cast)
VW2-SR5 Votes should be included correctly in the final election result (counted
as recorded)
Authentication
VW2-SR6 Only eligible voters can vote (democracy)
VW2-SR7 Voters can vote only once (democracy)
Availability
VW2-SR8 Voters must not be prevented from voting (forced abstention/ denial of
service)
Code Voting
In code voting, a VA randomly generates voting authorisation codes, and assigns them
to candidates in a Vote Code List (VCL). The VCL is sent to voters before the election,
via a second secure channel such as the postal service. Figure 7.4 shows the functions
of a typical code voting scheme, and Figure 7.5 shows example VCLs. It can be seen
that VCLs have Vote Codes V CX confirmation codes CC (one per VCL or one per
candidate) and a (hard-to-guess) random VCL reference ID (IDV CL). To vote, the
candidate’s vote code is entered: a valid vote has the format (IDV CL,V CX). As the
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codes are random numbers, an attacker cannot tell who the vote is for without prior
knowledge of the VCL. The confirmation code is sent to assure the voter that the
vote has been received correctly by the system. It is desirable for an election to be
verifiable by individual voters/third parties, to check votes have been recorded and
counted correctly: publicly accessible Web Bulletin Boards (WBB) storing encrypted
vote information can be used here. Example code voting schemes can be seen in [86,
18, 91, 92].
Code voting has a trust assumption that the secrecy and unlinkability of VCLs will
be maintained, i.e. the security provided is not suitable for high-security elections but
should be adequate for VW voting.
In this use case, a code voting system is located in a Trusted Secure Layer (TSL),
external to the VW Server (VWS). This sends VCLs to the user’s RW phone via
the mobile network. This retains some RW elements (i.e a phone), but votes can be
cast without leaving the VW environment. Knowledge fragmentation across several
environments can then preserve the privacy of the avatar’s vote.
7.3.3 VW-2: VW Voting Using a Trusted Secure Layer
The Trusted Secure Layer (TSL)
VW processes can be insecure: data necessary for displaying and controlling the user
interface is transferred from the VW Client (VWC) to the VWS unencrypted [305], so
man-in-the-middle attacks can tamper with this data and potentially send the VWS
Figure 7.4: Code Voting Functions
139
7.3. VW-2: VW Voting 7. Virtual World Applications
NAME VOTE 
 CODE 
CONFIRM 
CODE 
CAND 1 143568 852369 
CAND 2 578963 741235 
CAND 3 753695 563254 
CAND 4 448596 789541 
VCL ID:    123456789012 
NAME VOTE 
 CODE 
CAND 1 143568 
CAND 2 578963 
CAND 3 753695 
CAND 4 448596 
CONFIRM:      854697453 
VCL ID:        13243546576 
Example A Example B 
Figure 7.5: VCL Examples:(A) SureVote [17] (B) PGD [18]
logic into an undesired state. This use case proposes to locate sensitive e-voting pro-
cessed in the TSL external to the VWS, inaccessible from the VWC. The TSL has only
two connections (both full duplex), to the mobile phone network and the VWS. These
are trusted choke points with well defined functionality and minimal data in transit
across them, reducing the TSL attack surface. Filtration and categorisation of mes-
sage/datagram packets is enforced, and only well-formed traffic is allowed. Also, white
listing checks (i.e. connections come from trusted sources) are done and traffic from
unknown sources is discarded. Data held within the TSL is encrypted using standard-
ised algorithms and best practices e.g. [241]. Secure communication protocols (such as
HTTPs) are used for all traffic into or out of the TSL: direct dedicated communication
lines could be used between the VW and TSL. Additionally, vote codes can be sent
from the TSL to the user’s mobile phone, bypassing the insecure VW.
The proposed protocol spans four distinct zones of operation: the RW, inside the
VW itself, the TSL external to the VW, and the VW Server. The entities necessary for
the proposed voting protocol are described in Table 7.5: their relationship is shown in
Figure 7.6. Assumptions made are shown in Table 7.6, and notation shown in Table 7.7.
Entities in the TSL are fully trusted, others are not.
7.3.4 VW-2: VW Voting Protocol
There are four stages required in an e-voting solution: Registration/Activation; Elec-
tion Setup; VCL Request; and Voting.
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Table 7.5: VW-2: VW Voting - Entities
Entity Description
TSL: e-Voting
Server (e-VS)
This provides code voting functions as in Figure 7.4
TSL: TSL: Regis-
trar (R)
This registers a user’s RW mobile phone number and distributes
VCLs
VW Server
(VWS)
This communicates with avatars via the Polling Booth (PB)
object in the VW. It has VW avatar/group/election databases,
but does not store any sensitive voting credentials.
RW: User (U) An individual who controls one or more avatar(s). Users need
a VW Client on their PC, and a voting application on their
mobile phone.
RW: Phone A phone application which receives and displays VCLs sent
from the Registrar over a secure mobile network communication
channel.
VW: Avatar (A) An avatar controlled by a RW user.
VW: Polling
Booth (PB)
A VW object controlled by the VWS, a “dumb terminal”, with
no cryptographic capability.
VW: Group Ad-
ministrator (GA)
An avatar authorised to create group elections, possibly with a
registered phone.
The protocol message flow can be seen in Figure 7.7.
Registration/Activation is done once per avatar. A one-time activation code AC is
used by the Registrar (R) in the TSL to link the user’s phone IDPhU with the hash of
Table 7.6: VW-2: VW Voting - Assumptions
Assumption
VW2-A1 Avatar UIDAs are uniquely identified by the VW Server: e.g. in SL, a
user account has a main avatar and up to 5 extra “alts”, each allocated
a unique username (32 Hexadecimal Code) by the VW Server.
VW2-A2 The links between Vote Codes/VCL ID are not leaked
VW2-A3 The RW user can have many VW avatars
VW2-A4 Mobile network communication between the TSL/ phone is trusted
VW2-A5 All communication/ activities within the VW environment can be eaves-
dropped, intercepted, manipulated and replayed by attackers
VW2-A6 When information is input to the VW a CAPTCHA (Completely Auto-
mated Public Turing Test to Tell Computers and Humans Apart) [306]
should be used to ensure that the data source is not a scripted bot.
VW2-A7 There is no collusion between the TSL and any other entity.
VW2-A8 All messages will include appropriate freshness mechanisms.
VW2-A9 All RW credentials held in the TSL are protected cryptographically.
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Figure 7.6: VW-2: VW Voting - Entity Diagram
the avatar ID H(UIDA): H(UIDA) is sent back to the user’s phone.
Election Set Up is required for each election. In the VW a GA inputs group ID,
election parameters EP and ballot data BC1... BCM at a PB. The VWS checks the
input data and generates generates election reference REFE and Roll i.e. the number
of avatars eligible to vote in an election. It also initialises voting status flags for all
eligible voter avatars to zero statusA1.. statusAX flags (set to 0). The VWS forwards
ballot details to the e-VS, which sets up the WBB and VCLs (enough for Roll voters
plus auditing).
Request VCL is done when an avatar enters REFE into a VW Polling Booth (PB).
The VWS checks UIDA eligibility on election database, then creates/stores H(UIDA)
The VWS sends REFE, H(UIDA) to R and sets statusA=1 (VCL requested) R re-
quests and receives a VCL from e-VS and sends the VCL and H(UIDA) to PhU : R
notes that H(UIDA) has been sent a VCL (but not which VCL). via statusA=2 (VCL
sent).
Voting is done at a PB when the avatar enters REFE . The VWS uses UIDA to check
statusA=2 The ballot is displayed on the PB and the user’s RW phone displays the
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Table 7.7: VW-2: VW Voting - Protocol Notation
Notation Description
A Avatar (VW entity)
AC Activation code
BCM Ballot Choice M
CCM Vote confirmation code for Ballot Choice M
VWS VW Server(entity)
EP Election Parameters e.g. name/ date/ time/ eligibility
e-VS e-Voting Server (entity)
G Group (of avatars) in VW
GA Group Administrator (VW entity)
H(Z) Hash of data Z using a standardised algorithm/best prac-
tices as specified in [307])
IDX Identity of entity X
NoX Random Nonce generated by entity X
PB Polling Booth (VW object)
PhX Phone number of entity X
R Registrar (TSL Entity)
REFE Election reference number
Roll Number of avatars eligible to vote in an election
statusA Avatar voting status flag, values =0,1,2,3,4
U User (RW entity)
UIDX Unique identifier for VW entity X
V CM Vote code for Ballot Choice M
VCL Vote Code List
(BC1,V C1,CC1...BCM ,V CM ,CCM IDV CL)
I→J: Message sent from entity I to entity J
VCL. At the PB, the avatar inputs IDV CL and V CN for their ballot choice BCN . The
VWS sets statusA=3 (vote in progress) The VWS adds a nonce for freshness NoVWS ,
and sends the vote to the e-VS. The VWS knows which avatar entered which vote
code, but not which IDV CLs are valid, nor which candidate V CN relates to. The e-VS
obtains/recalculates the matching CCN , posts the vote to the WBB to include it in
the counting process (possibly after a short delay in case an observer in the VW links
the vote posted to an avatar who has just voted). It should be noted, that the vote
receiving process in the e-VS only knows valid IDV CL values, not the contents of the
VCL itself. The e-VS sends CCN to the VWS with NoVWS+1. The VWS checks
NoVWS+1, displays CCN at the PB, then updates statusA=4 (voted) for the associ-
ated UIDA, and the RW user can check CCN displayed on the PB received matches
CCN on the phone.
A preliminary security analysis of the proposal now follows.
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Real World Virtual World VW Server Trusted Secure Layer  
1. (HTTPs) PhU, IDPhU 
2. (HTTPs) AC 
3. (via PB) AC 4. (HTTPs) AC, H(UIDA) 
5. (HTTPs) H(UIDA) 
6. (via PB)  IDG,EP,BC1..BCM 
7. (HTTPs) REFE,EP,BC1..BCM, Roll 
8. (via PB) REFE,EP,BC1..BCM, Roll 
9. (via PB) REFE 
10. (HTTPs) REFE , H(UIDA) 
11. REFE  
12. REFE, VCL 
13. (HTTPs) REFE, H(UIDA), VCL 
14.(HTTPs) REFE ,H(UIDA) 
15. (via PB) REFE 
16. (via PB) REFE ,BC1..BCM 
17. (via PB) REFE ,VCN,IDVCL 
18.(HTTPs) REFE , NoVWS,VCN,IDVCL 
19.(HTTPs) REFE , NoVWS,+1,CCN 
20. (via PB) REFE, CCN 
User/Phone GA A Registrar VWS E-VS 
Figure 7.7: VW-2: VW Voting - Protocol
7.3.5 Security Analysis
The security of the proposal will now be analysed with respect to the security re-
quirements shown in Table 7.4. (More details about code voting security can be seen
in [18, 91]).
Confidentiality (VW2-SR1/SR2/SR3):
• Privacy (VW2-SR1): The basis of code voting security is that without prior
knowledge of the VCLs, interception of a cast vote will reveal nothing about the
voter’s choice. The VWS can be attacked just like any other Internet-facing web
server facility e.g OWASP Top Ten [135], so sensitive vote processing has been
located externally in the TSL. VW monitoring by the VW developers will not
reveal who an avatar voted for. A malicious PB could send votes to an exter-
nal RW server, but they would not gain any meaningful information without the
corresponding VCL. A compromised VWS cannot send VCLs to unauthorised
parties, as they are processed within the TSL. Standardised secure channel pro-
tocols (e.g. HTTPs) between the TSL/VWS should give a reasonable level of
assurance that information is secure. Using a mobile phone in the voting pro-
cess provides a more trustworthy channel which is inaccessible to attackers in the
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VW: RW phone information is not entered into the insecure VW client so privacy
is maintained. The phone also authenticates the VWS and gives the user some
assurance that they are dealing with a genuine VWS, as a compromised/ fake
VWS would not be able to request VCLs. The VWS/TSL connection could be
considered a weak link, so choke points are used to prevent unauthorised access
(see Section 7.3.3).
• Unlinkability (VW2-SR2): Only a hashed avatar identifier is stored by R
in the TSL: the e-VS does not store any avatar details at all. This provides
unlinkability between vote contents and avatars. VCLs are not accessible in the
VW, so all that can be deduced is that an avatar has voted, but not who they
voted for. A human in physical proximity to the user could shoulder surf and
link a VCL to a voter. However, the nature of VWs encourages participation on
a global scale: it is unlikely (but not impossible) that an attacker is physically
present with a RW user. For example, in the 2010 CSM election [299], votes were
received from over 20 countries. Thus the threat here should be deemed fairly
small. The Registrar, however, can link VCLs to RW phones, a weakness of code
voting schemes generally. For higher security elections, this could be addressed
by including a secure key generating function in the TSL, and using it to create
an ElGamal [308] key pair for each user, to be securely stored on the user’s phone
at registration (e.g. on the mobile phone SIM). VCLs encrypted using an e-VS
ElGamal key can then be encrypted using the user’s public key via an ElGamal
distributed blinding protocol (described in [247]) without losing any security. The
contents of the VCL are not revealed in this protocol.
• Vote Buying/ Coercion (VW2-SR3): Remote e-Voting is vulnerable to co-
ercion/vote buying. Here, griefing by malicious avatars can be reported to the
VW developers, and as mentioned previously the likelihood of a RW coercion
attack is small.
Integrity (SR4/SR5):
• Recorded as Cast (VW2-SR4): The use of code voting means that manip-
ulation of a vote’s contents will not result in a valid vote. If a vote had been
tampered with, either by a compromised VWS/ VWC or an external attacker,
this would be detected because the vote confirmation code would not be received
correctly. Data in transit is protected by HTTPs for all communication between
TSL/VWS and TSL/phone. VCLs are generated in the TSL and sent via the
mobile network (which are both trusted) so a compromised VWS cannot modify
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them. The nature of code voting means that it will be very difficult for malware
to generate valid vote codes [91]: invalid vote codes will be detected through
incorrect confirmation codes. If phone malware could display a valid vote code
V CM against ballot choice BCM+1 this will be difficult to detect, but this is a
sophisticated attack.
• Counted as Recorded (VW2-SR5): In code voting the WBB is designed to
ensure votes are processed as cast.
Authentication (VW2-SR6/SR7):
• Only eligible voters can vote (VW2-SR6): Avatar eligibility is checked on
the VWS group database. A compromised activation code at registration may
result in an incorrect avatar being associated with PhU , but voting integrity is
maintained as a rogue avatar cannot vote without VCLs from the phone. (The
user can deactivate registered avatars if necessary.) Fake UIDs created by a
malicious VWS will be detected by R when requesting VCLs as H(UID) will not
match stored values.
• Voters can vote only once (VW2-SR7): At the PB, a ballot form is only
displayed after the VWS checks if a VCL has been sent and the avatar has not
voted before (using status). If a malicious PB replays existing/generates extra
votes these will also be detected when the VWS checks status. A malicious
user could create multiple accounts to gain extra votes (the Sybil attack [309]).
Incorporating a recurring cost for each additional identity is one of the strategies
to address the Sybil attack. Here, a VW-specific maximum number of avatars
can be registered with a RW phone: adding more identities requires extra RW
equipment and may provide a sufficient financial disincentive. Replaying messages
between the VWS and e-VS in the TSL are detected by the e-VS as IDV CL is
unique, hard-to-guess and cannot be re-used.
Availability - VW2-SR8
The client-server VW architecture is designed to give high availability and resilience
against general DDoS attacks. Stealing the phone gives an attacker VCL details, but to
vote they also need VW credentials (not stored on the phone). If a vote is suppressed,
either between the VWS/TSL or by a malicious PB, no confirmation code will be
received. The user can report such anomalies to the VW developers, as well as in-
world griefing activities which prevent an avatar using a PB.
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7.3.6 Use Case VW-2: Summary
Security issues in VWs have hindered the adoption of in-world voting, so voting is
mostly done via forums/wikis. A VW voting solution has been described that uses
code voting processes located in a TSL, external to the VWS, along with VCLs sent
to the user’s mobile phone. A preliminary security analysis demonstrated that the
proposal can deal with many of the specific challenges presented by voting in a VW
environment.
Table 7.8: VW Use Cases vs Security Requirements
Security Requirement VW-1 VW-2
Confidentiality X X
Integrity X X
Availability X X
Authentication X X
Non-Repudiation X N/A
7.4 Chapter Summary
Two use cases VW-1: VW Login using the SCWS and VW-2: VW Voting were de-
scribed in this chapter. VW-1 used the tamper-resistant security properties of the
SCWS installed in a SIM, along with OTPs and geolocation to offer security improve-
ments on the current static username/password authentication that is often used to
log-in to VWs. VW-2 used code voting processes located in an externally-located
TSL, along with VCLs sent to the user’s RW mobile phone. The security of both use
cases was assessed informally against previously defined security requirements.
A summary of how well the security requirements were met for each use case is
shown in Table 7.8.
7.5 Related Publications
Two publications have resulted from work on VWs covered in this chapter:
1. L. Kyrillidis, G. Hili, S. Cobourne, K. Mayes, and K. Markantonakis, “Virtual
World Authentication using the Smart Card Web Server”, in International Sym-
posium on Security in Computing and Communication’ (ISSCC2013), pp. 30–
41. [9]
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2. S. Cobourne, G. Hili, K. Mayes, and K. Markantonakis, “Avatar Voting in Vir-
tual Worlds”, in 5th International Conference on Information and Communica-
tion Systems (ICICS2014), pp. 1–6.[10] (Nominated for Best Paper)
An additional paper about VWs was also published, using material not included in
this chapter:
• G. Hili, S. Cobourne, K. Mayes, and K. Markantonakis, “Practical Attacks on
Virtual Worlds”, in International Conference on Risks and Security of Internet
and Systems (CRiSIS2014), pp. 180–195. [11]
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Several of the use cases described in this thesis use the SCWS in their
proposed solutions: a more detailed analysis of the security properties of
the SCWS and its applications is now given. This is followed by a further
discussion of the security of the use cases. The chapter ends by noting
implementation issues that relate to the SCWS.
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8.1 Security Analysis - SCWS
The main security characteristics of applications installed on an SCWS can be sum-
marised as follows:
• No Centralised Server: Distributing applications to individual SIM cards
means there is no centralised server to be attacked, hence a single point of failure
has been removed. DDoS attacks cannot easily take place because the applica-
tion is dispersed among many users. So an attacker would have to find out which
phones are registered for SCWS applications and then infiltrate a large number
of them, in order to have a significant impact on security.
• Trusted Administration: The RAS could be considered a single point of fail-
ure, but access to it is controlled, and it may have restricted functionality. The
RAS runs on MNO/TTP premises, so should be isolated from unauthorised phys-
ical access. Insider attacks at the MNO/TTP may be possible, but as the OMA
specifications define the RAS as a trusted entity, within the scope of this thesis
it is assumed that both the infrastructure and management procedures will be
securely provided.
• Secure Token: The SCWS, the application and the credentials will be stored
in a secure tamper resistant token, the SIM card. SIM defences mitigate against
physical and side channel attacks, and in the unlikely event that an attacker
circumvents these, they will only gain access to one set of credentials. Attacks
therefore are not scalable, as an attacker would have to be in possession of a large
number of phones and their SCWS/SIMs to be effective.
• Standardised Communications: When using FAP, communication takes place
over standard secure communication channels, protected by the HTTPs protocol.
HTTPs provides reasonable protection against eavesdropping and man-in-the-
middle attacks, and it is the de facto protocol used whenever security is needed
on the web. Attacks against HTTPs/TLS are possible e.g. [310, 311, 312, 112],
but using HTTPs locally reduces the likelihood of them succeeding.
• Independent Security Evaluation: The SIM/SCWS could be subjected to
an independent security evaluation, using the internationally recognised Com-
mon Criteria framework. This provides security evaluations of IT products [313].
There is a Common Criteria Protection Profile (PP) which applies to the (U)SIM
and SCWS (SFR SA, 2011) [314]. A successful evaluation against this PP means
that a SIM can withstand potential attacks like DoS on the SCWS from the
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phone handset, and unauthorised modifications to SCWS code/ servlets have
been identified and mitigated.
8.1.1 Attack Surface of the SCWS
The attack surface of a traditional web server is large. A server often hosts a number of
web sites, each of which may be accessed by a large number of users (who may or may
not be malicious), and each of these web sites could have multiple input fields (attack
points for injection etc), along with back-end databases that store data that need to be
protected. Access is either local (the administrator) or remote (users accessing the web
sites). Attack points can include vulnerable setup of scripting languages (executing on
the web server), inadequate setup of the web server itself, even tools and/or code that
reside on the server. A malicious person with physical access to the server may easily
be able to access and retrieve any non-encrypted data.
The attack surface of the SCWS is very much reduced in comparison to traditional
web servers, due to the following characteristics:
• Physical protection: The SCWS web server is physically protected as it exe-
cutes inside the tamper resistant environment of the SIM card.
• Trusted Access: as seen previously, the SCWS is not accessible to any un-
trusted remote entities. Only applications on the phone that the ACP enforcer
authorises and the trusted RAS may access the SCWS, using tightly managed
secure protocols and channels, whereas traditional web servers are designed to be
accessible by many remote users.
• Reduced Functionality: To operate in the resource-limited environment of
the SIM card, the SCWS has reduced functionality and storage capacity. The
code running will be much smaller, which in itself does not necessarily reduce the
attack surface e.g. if the code has been constructed and implemented badly, but
if properly implemented smaller code should mean there are fewer ways to attack
SCWS applications. Because of the ACP enforcer, it is difficult for malware on
the phone to attack the SCWS, but if the ACP enforcer is compromised, reduced
functionality will again limit the options for attacks.
• User Authentication: Setting a user PIN/Password to allow authentication
of individuals accessing the SCWS environment adds further protection. If this
password/PIN is retrieved by an attacker, it is not possible to access the SCWS
without possession of the phone too.
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• Attack Scalability: Remote attacks on the SCWS are difficult, due to its
trusted access protocols, and remote DDoS attacks are hard to mount. However,
a DoS attack against a single SCWS is feasible, as attacks on the SCWS from
the phone browser are theoretically possible, but these are not scalable because
the attacker would also need physical possession of the handset.
8.1.2 OWASP Top Ten Risks
The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) [135] issues a document which
includes the Top Ten vulnerabilities that affect the security of web applications 1 .
As the SCWS is a web server, these vulnerabilities could affect the security of
SCWS solutions [316]. However, some of the OWASP Top Ten do not apply to SCWS
applications.
Table 8.1 shows which of the OWASP Top Ten 2013 apply to the SCWS environ-
ment. Vulnerabilities A5 (Security Misconfiguration), A6 (Sensitive Data Exposure)
and A9 (Using Known Vulnerable Components) are shown as not relevant to SCWS so-
lutions. This is due to the tamper resistant characteristics of the SIM card, along with
the small footprint, minimal functionality and tightly controlled management of the
SCWS which should provide assurance that credentials are kept securely, and system
components remain up-to-date and configured properly.
The injection and cross site scripting exploits - A1 (Injection), A3 (Cross-Site Script-
ing (XSS)) and A8 (Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)) - can be limited by strict
filtering of input fields in the phone browser. The reduced complexity of the stripped
down SCWS also affords some protection against these vulnerabilities. It should be
noted, however, that many of the OWASP Top Ten relate more to application design
and implementation rather than web server functionality (i.e. A1, A3, A8 and A10).
Table 8.2 summarises the SCWS defences against applicable OWASP Top Ten 2013
vulnerabilities and the residual risk from using the SCWS environment.
8.2 Security Analysis - Use Cases
The security of the use cases presented in earlier chapters of this thesis is now revisited.
For each use case, security requirements were identified and an informal security anal-
ysis was done: when appropriate, formal analysis using Scyther was also performed,
1When the research in this thesis was done, the most recent OWASP Top Ten was from 2013: the
OWASP Top Ten - 2017 [315] was released in December 2017. In the 2017 version, A4 (Insecure Direct
Object References) and A7 (Missing Function Level Access Control) were merged into a new category
A5 (Broken Access Control), whilst A8 (CSRF) and A10 (Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards) were
retired.
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Table 8.1: OWASP Top Ten 2013 and Relevance to the SCWS
Reference Description SCWS
A1 Injection Untrusted data is sent as part of a command or query
e.g. SQL (Structured Query Language) or LDAP
(Lightweight Directory Access Protocol) that can trick
an interpreter into executing unintended commands or
access unauthorised data.
Yes
A2 Broken Au-
thentication/ Ses-
sion Management
Attackers can compromise passwords, keys, or session
tokens, or exploit other implementation flaws to as-
sume other users’ identities.
Yes
A3 Cross-Site
Scripting (XSS)
If an application takes untrusted data and sends it to a
web browser without proper validation, attackers can
execute scripts in the browser e.g. to hijack sessions,
or to redirect unsuspecting users to malicious sites.
Yes
A4 Insecure Di-
rect Object Refer-
ences
A direct object reference concerns an internal imple-
mentation object, e.g. file, or directory: poor access
control can lead to manipulation of these references
by attackers and unauthorised access to data.
Yes
A5 Security Mis-
configuration
Applications, frameworks, and servers should have a
secure configuration defined and deployed: these must
be implemented and maintained (defaults are often
insecure), as well as keeping software up to date.
No
A6 Sensitive
Data Exposure
Weakly protected data could be tampered with, so
sensitive data at rest/ in transit should be encrypted:
care should be taken when exchanging data with the
browser.
No
A7 Missing Func-
tion Level Access
Control
Applications must perform verify function level access
control checks on the server, otherwise attackers will
be able to forge unauthorised functionality requests.
Yes
A8 Cross-Site
Request Forgery
(CSRF)
A forged HTTP request is sent from a logged-on vic-
tims browser to a vulnerable web application that will
then be treated as a legitimate request from the victim
Yes
A9 Using Known
Vulnerable Com-
ponents
Applications using components such as libraries,
frameworks, and other software modules with known
vulnerabilities may result in a number of attacks.
No
A10 Unvalidated
Redirects and
Forwards
Without proper validation, attackers can redirect
users to malicious sites, or use forwards to access unau-
thorised pages.
Yes
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Table 8.2: OWASP Top Ten 2013 - SCWS Defences and Residual Risks
Ref Defences Residual Risks
A1 The SCWS does not support SQL or
LDAP so SQL/LDAP injection at-
tacks do not apply here.
Non - SQL/LDAP injection attacks
targeting input fields may occur.
Filtering of input will be needed.
A2 All credentials are stored inside the
tamper resistant SIM card, and
secure HTTPs connections protect
credentials whilst in transit.
Even if data from one phone leaks,
this affects one device only, and an
attacker would need to be in posses-
sion of the phone.
A3 Strict filtering of input fields will be
needed.
Limited complexity provides a cer-
tain level of assurance.
A4 Applications on the SCWS may
have different levels of access (e.g.
admin/ user), so proper authorisa-
tion and verification of all access re-
quests should be done.
There is nothing in the OMA spec-
ification that forbids an SCWS ap-
plication to have multiple users on
one SCWS, but in practice this vul-
nerability may not apply.
A7 SCWS Applications should not
show links to unauthorised
functions, and authentica-
tion/authorisation checks must
be included.
The phone browser is allowed to ac-
cess a webpage in the SIM card,
so attacks may arise (e.g. through
phone malware).
A8 The SCWS should be able to imple-
ment CSRF countermeasure such as
forcing a user to re-authenticate.
The SCWS has restricted function-
ality which provides added defences.
A10 Redirects should be validated. Manipulation of the server side (the
tamper resistance of the SCWS
should protect against this) and the
phone browser would be needed,
which is a difficult attack to perform
successfully.
and no attacks were found within bounds. The results are summarised in Table 8.3. It
can be seen that the security requirements were, on the whole, well met.
Solutions presented for the use cases fall into two categories: SCWS-based (i.e. EV-
1/2, MP-1, Auth-1 and VW-1 ) and non-SCWS-based (i.e. MP-2, Auth-2 and VW-2 ).
These categories are now discussed.
8.2.1 SCWS-based Solutions: EV-1, EV-2, MP-1, Auth-1 and VW-1
Each of these solutions exhibits the following characteristics that enhance security in
challenging environments:
• Identification: All the presented SCWS solutions provide two-factor authenti-
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cation of users, by using a correct PIN/Password for accessing the SCWS envi-
ronment (“something you know”), in conjunction with possession of the SCWS
(“something you have”). Local authentication is possible, which is particularly
relevant in use case Auth-1. Additionally, use case EV-2 demonstrated that it
is feasible to use the SCWS with National PKI schemes, using Estonian I-voting
as an example. Estonia has been called the “most advanced digital society in
the world” [317], but there are national PKI schemes being proposed for other
(possibly less technologically developed) nations such as Kenya [318] and the
Philippines [319], that could consider the SCWS approach for remote e-voting
using mobile phones.
• Connectivity: To install and update code and data on the SCWS, there must be
connectivity: however, much of the other processing can be done oﬄine without
loss of security. So, votes can be cast oﬄine in EV-1/2 and retrieved at a later
time, authentication can be done wholly oﬄine in Auth-1, and transfer requests
can be made and processed at a later time in MP-1. However, face-to-face trans-
actions such as withdrawals and deposits need to be communicated to and from
the bank in a reasonable time. Oﬄine processing is not relevant to VW-1.
• Attack Resistance: The small attack surface of the SCWS, the tamper resis-
tance of the SIM, and the resilience against DDoS attacks provided through dis-
tributing applications to a large number of SCWS/SIMs all reduce the likelihood
of attacks succeeding. Attack resistance is a welcome security feature, especially
when technical expertise may be scarce in the relevant operating environment.
This applies to all the use case solutions in this category.
8.2.2 Non-SCWS-based Solutions: MP-2, Auth-2 and VW-2
The three remaining use cases did not use the SCWS in their solutions.
The Bitcoin m-payment solution MP-2 was designed to bring the security of dis-
tributed ledger transactions to areas with the minimum available connectivity i.e. SMS
messaging only. It would be possible to use the SCWS to store credentials, and process
transactions on the SIM as in use case MP-1, by issuing advanced SCWS/SIMs instead
of the OTP token. The SCWS could generate OTPs as required, and send transaction
details via secure HTTPs communication and the RAS. However, SCWS transactions
need some online access to communicate between the RAS and the SCWS, so this
may not be a suitable option in the targeted environment. Also, the need to have a
business relationship with the MNO that owns the SIM would reduce the immediate
deployability/ interoperability of the m-payment scheme in humanitarian aid scenarios,
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where time is of the essence2. The presented solution using SMS provides a pragmatic
balance between security and usability.
In use case VW-2 there is minimal input from the mobile phone - it is used as
a mere conduit for voting credentials, via a mobile application. It would be possible
to employ an SCWS solution for storing and processing votes/voting credentials as
in EV-1/EV-2. However, this would move the voting “ceremony” to the RW as the
votes would then be input to the RW phone, rather than as an in-world voting activity.
Sending VCLs via the MNO network provides a second channel inaccessible from the
VW, so protects against in-world attacks: placing sensitive vote processing in a TSL
with a small attack surface, that is accessed using secure communication protocols (e.g.
HTTPs) introduces a trustworthy component to the proposal. Even if the VCLs are
obtained from the potentially insecure mobile phone platform, knowledge fragmentation
across four distinct zones means that they cannot be used to mount an attack without
information from the other three zones, thus increasing the complexity of a potential
attack. Again, a balance between security and usability is struck.
As Auth-2 was concerned with using depth cameras to create a dynamic biometric
based on gesture recognition, the SCWS is not relevant. It may be possible in future
to interface the authentication results from gesture recognition with the SCWS but
this would need further research. Gesture recognition has the potential to become a
flexible, non-intrusive, non-contact method for local authentication, with the advantage
that a gesture is changeable in the case of compromise. In challenging environments
this would provide a useful alternative authentication method, especially as dynamic
biometry also improves unlinkability. The feasibility of match-on-card DTW processing
of gestures captured using the Kinect/ Leap Motion devices was assessed: this could
be performed on a phone using an HCE application [8]. In future, as 3D depth cameras
become more widely available on mobile devices, the need for separate equipment to
capture data will be removed, so this dynamic biometric authentication method could
be used directly with phone sensors. However, research in this area is still at a very
early stage.
8.3 SCWS Implementation Issues
Proof of concept versions for both the generic e-voting solution and the branchless
banking application were produced in a simulated environment and successfully tested
on a laptop computer (hosting an AMD processor 2.4GHz with 2GB of RAM and 512
2Instead of OTP tokens, providing SIMs with a SIM Toolkit m-payment application installed could
be an alternative: again this would require a business relationship with the MNO, which may reduce
the potential speed of deployment.
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Table 8.3: Security Requirements for Each Use Case
Security Req. EV-1 EV-2 MP-1 MP-2 Auth-1 Auth-2 VW-1 VW-2
Confidentiality Parta Xb X Partd X N/A X X
Integrity X ×c X Partd X N/A X X
Availability X X X X X N/A X X
Authentication X X X Partd X Parte X X
Non-Repudiation N/A N/A X X X N/A X N/A
a Not Coercion Resistant e-voting scheme
b Re-voting allowed as anti-coercion measure.
c Not Voter Verifiable e-voting scheme (pre-2015)
d SMS messages are not confidential/can be spoofed
e The Kinect experiment fully meets these requirements: the Leap Motion is less
accurate
GB of hard drive): the code was created as a JavaCard 3.0 Connected Edition project
running on a simulated platform provided by NetBeans IDE. However, somewhat dis-
appointingly, the SCWS has not generally been implemented in real SIMs. Despite the
best efforts of the SIMAlliance and OMA in promoting SCWS functionality, the fact
that the SCWS is designed to be installed on the SIM raises barriers to adoption, as
the MNO owns the platform. This raises ecosystem issues, similar to those that were
encountered when NFC technology was first proposed for m-payment applications.
The card-emulation mode available on NFC phones could be used for contactless
payments using financial credentials stored on an SE, but there was much debate about
the best place to locate this SE. The options are a) on an embedded SE on the phone
(i.e. owned by the handset manufacturer), b) on the SIM (i.e. a SIM-SE owned by the
MNO) or c) on a removable SE (owned by the user) [320]. The resulting competing
management issues caused a barrier to adoption of NFC for use with mobile payments.
Google introduced an HCE solution (in software rather than hardware) for Android
Pay [321]: HCE allows developers a quicker route to market for their schemes, albeit
without the tamper resistant security of a hardware chip. However, Apple decided to
use the embedded SE route to store financial credentials and tokens for their Apple
Pay m-payment scheme [113], and NFC m-payment schemes are now more widespread.
By liaising with handset manufacturers, financial institutions can more easily “buy-in”
to the scheme and do not need their own management procedures for direct access to
the SE chip. This is a hurdle the SCWS has yet to overcome.
Another implementation issue that affects the SCWS is that it needs support from
handset manufacturers to provide modifications to the mobile operating system to in-
corporate the required BIP gateway. An open source repository, the SEEK for Android
project [322], previously included SCWS features, but they are no longer available at
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time of writing. The SCWS might also benefit from the proposal for a high powered
USB contact on the chip, but the lack of available real examples hinders testing. The
other communication option, via HTTPs and a TCP/IP stack, will not be possible
until SIM cards able to support JavaCard 3.0 Connected Edition become available.
This situation could change in future, as was seen with the NFC m-payment ecosys-
tem: a “killer app” or a supportive manufacturer could alter the landscape. Alterna-
tively, the functionality and desirable security properties of the SCWS may become
available in other security devices/chips, in which case the solutions presented in this
thesis will contribute secure applications for this new ecosystem.
8.4 Chapter Summary
This chapter provided a more in-depth analysis of the security features of the SCWS
and its applications. In particular, the SCWS defences against relevant OWASP Top
Ten 2013 vulnerabilities, and the residual risk of using the SCWS environment were
identified. The security analyses of the use cases that had been presented in earlier
chapters were then extended. A discussion followed which noted implementation issues
for SCWS solutions.
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This chapter summarises the work presented in this thesis and the contribu-
tions made, and assesses how well the research aims have been met. Future
research directions are then identified and the thesis is concluded.
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9.1 Summary and Conclusion
The main goal of this work was to to design solutions using mobile devices that would
enhance security in challenging environments, and secondly to design improved authen-
tication methods that can be used in both RW and VW scenarios. Security solutions
from three RW application areas were proposed, covering a good spread of challenging
environments, and then two of these areas were investigated in the VW. A summary
of the application areas and use cases now follows.
9.1.1 Application Area: e-Voting
Chapter 4 introduced the Remote e-Voting application area, which has been the
subject of extensive academic research. However, schemes which use mobile phones
for voting are not easy to find, due to the difficulty in ensuring that the mobile device
will process votes in the correct manner (the secure platform problem). Using a phone
for voting would have great benefit in areas where it may be dangerous or practically
impossible to reach an electoral poll site, for example in remote communities, or due
to physical immobility of voters. A “front-end” SCWS generic e-voting model was
proposed, and two e-voting schemes, Preˆt a` Voter and Estonian I-voting, were used as
examples of its applicability in use cases EV-1 and EV-2 respectively. The solution
presented distributed web server functionality to voters’ SIMs, so that there was no
central vote-processing web server to target: an attacker would need to compromise
many phones to successfully affect the election result. The use of the SIM’s tamper-
resistant environment for the storage and processing of sensitive voter credentials also
addresses the secure platform problem. Thus the principle of using a ubiquitous device
(the phone) with an SCWS application that provides a secure distributed architec-
ture for remote e-voting was established. The SCWS voting application protects the
e-voting system by making the effort required to attack vote casting prohibitively high.
CONTRIBUTIONS:
EV-1/EV-2: The SCWS was used in a solution that provides tamper resistance and
protection against DDoS attacks in remote e-voting, which was illustrated using e-
voting systems Preˆt a` Voter and Estonian I-voting as examples [1] [2].
9.1.2 Application Area: m-Payment
Chapter 5 covered the M-Payment application area, where there are many existing
solutions (and corresponding security issues) as discussed in [27].
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In use case MP-1, a branchless banking scheme was presented that used PKI-
capable SIMs equipped with a SCWS to process withdrawals, deposits and transfers
in a secure and user-friendly manner. Even though these specialised SIMs are more
expensive than conventional SIMs, this is a cheaper overall solution than setting up
physical bank branches. A preliminary security analysis indicated that the security of
this proposal is higher than that offered by the most widely used m-payment scheme
in the developing world, M-PESA.
All systems present a trade-off between usability and security, and the second use
case in this area, MP-2, presented a pragmatic solution where infrastructure constraints
limit the security options available. It described how Bitcoin transactions could be
made in an area where Internet connectivity is not available, that would enable a
charitable organisation to provide humanitarian aid in Bitcoin. The proposal included
hosted Bitcoin wallets maintained by the charity, an SMS based mobile payment sys-
tem and an OTP token-based two-factor authentication method.
CONTRIBUTIONS:
MP-1: The SCWS and its tightly managed, standardised management protocols were
used in a branchless banking application, to provide enhanced security compared to
other SIM-based m-Payment schemes, such as M-PESA [3].
MP-2: Access to secure blockchain technology was enabled via an SMS m-payment
system, for use by charitable organisations in oﬄine humanitarian aid scenarios [4].
9.1.3 Application Area: Authentication
Chapter 6 discussed Authentication techniques. Use case Auth-1 proposed a Single
Sign-On (SSO) solution for disconnected environments by using the tamper-resistant
security properties of the SCWS installed in a SIM (SIM-SCWS) with in another SCWS
smart card chip (MOD-SCWS) embedded within an electronic assembly. Local authen-
tication on the mobile device SIM-SCWS produces a security token that is sent to the
MOD-SCWS over local wireless channels communications. The distributed authentica-
tion approach avoids a single point of failure i.e. a centralised SSO server, and as seen
before, attacks against an individual SCWS are not scalable as they require physical
possession of the SIM-SCWS or MOD-SCWS.
In contrast, use case Auth-2 investigated the potential for using depth cameras
on a smart phone as sensors for dynamic biometric authentication, using the DTW
algorithm to analyse the captured data. As depth camera phones are not currently
commercially available, preliminary experiments were done using Kinect and Leap Mo-
tion devices to assess the accuracy and practicality of the approach, with promising
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results.
CONTRIBUTIONS:
Auth-1: Secure oﬄine authentication in an SSO application was facilitated by using the
SCWS (installed in both a SIM and a security module) and near field communications
to exchange security tokens [6].
Auth-2: An investigation into the feasibility of using gesture recognition as a two-factor
one-step dynamic biometric authentication method was carried out [5, 7, 8].
9.1.4 Application Area: VW Applications
Chapter 7 took two of the previously studied application areas (authentication and
e-voting) and applied them to the VW environment as VW Applications. VW-1
again used the SCWS for authentication, but this time in conjunction with OTPs and
geolocation to offer security improvements on the current static username/password
authentication that is often used for VW login. Use case VW-2 provided secure and
private in-world voting by locating code voting processes in a trusted external zone, the
TSL: VCLs were sent to the user’s RW mobile phone in order to complete the voting
process.
CONTRIBUTIONS:
VW-1: Authentication of online log-in to VWs was enhanced using the SCWS, geolo-
cation and OTP processes [9].
VW-2: Privacy was introduced into a VW e-voting application via knowledge fragmen-
tation across four distinct zones, using a mobile phone to receive security information
over a second channel i.e. the MNO network [10].
9.1.5 SCWS Solutions
The SCWS was used in five of the solutions presented: the main strength of using the
SCWS is that it uses standardised hardware, protocols and communications to protect
sensitive information, without the need for specialised equipment and phone applica-
tions. By storing security information on the tamper-resistant SIM, local authentication
can be done by the SCWS without communicating credentials across a network. Us-
ing existing tamper-resistant hardware (the SIM) with standardised features (SCWS)
along with the MNO’s FAP (via HTTPs), means that sensitive information can be
protected at all times. The security of these standardised elements has been exten-
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sively investigated by the expert community. It is difficult to mount large scale attacks
against the proposed solutions, as credentials and applications stored on each SIM must
be targeted individually. The SCWS has not been implemented widely yet, but the
solutions presented could contribute secure applications if SCWS functionality was to
become available in other security devices/chips in future.
9.1.6 Meeting Research Objectives
The chosen methodology of proposing solutions for use cases in three application areas
has led to the investigation of a wide range of security challenges. Having analysed
the relative successes of each solution with respect to stated security requirements for
each use case in Section 8.2, it is possible to assess how well the research objectives/
research questions outlined in Chapter 1 have been met i.e.
1. Research Questions
• RQ-1: How can introducing a trustworthy infrastructure based on mobile
devices and/or alternative methods of authentication address the differing
security requirements of a range of use cases in these environments?
• RQ-2: How can a trusted element in a mobile device be used to enhance
security in challenging environments, where there may be limited access to
technical infrastructure and resources?
2. Research Objectives
• RO-1: (Main Objective) Design security solutions using mobile devices to
enhance security in a range of use cases in challenging environments.
• RO-2: (Secondary Objective) Design improved authentication methods
that can be used in challenging environments.
Table 9.1 shows which research questions and objectives have been addressed by
which use cases. (Use case Auth-2 is shown as “Part” because the work described is
still at a preliminary stage.) It can be seen that by using a good spread of use cases
the aims of the thesis have been met.
9.2 Future Work
There are many areas which could benefit from further research, some of which are
outlined now.
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Table 9.1: Research Questions/Objectives vs Use Cases
RQ/RO EV-1 EV-2 MP-1 MP-2 Auth-1 Auth-2 VW-1 VW-2
RQ-1 X X X X X X X X
RQ-2 X X X X X
RO-1 X X X X X Part X X
RO-2 X X X X X X
As seen in Section 8.3 the Smart Card Web Server has not been widely adopted in
the SIM environment at the time of writing, so one of the major research directions
could be to investigate if its functionality and desirable security properties could be
applied to other security devices/chips in future. In particular, based on the work
presented, it would be interesting to investigate the possibility of creating a research
platform that abstracts away from the Java card, which could be used with alternative
Trusted Execution Environments. If this became a reality, practical implementations
of the solutions presented would enable performance measurements to be taken, to
give an indication how speed of processing will impact their usability/ security, and
suitability for use with various phone handsets.
In this case (or if the SCWS becomes more widely available generally), the SCWS
solutions proposed in this thesis could be extended in a number of ways. For example,
the generic e-Voting model described in Chapter 4 could be amended to process votes
from multiple voters. Here, each voter would need personalised ballot forms on the
SCWS, accessible to them only once they are suitably authenticated. Confirmation
SMS messages from the voting authority could go to a nominated phone number, not
necessarily back to the SCWS used to vote. Since the SCWS does not need to be online
to process votes, the proposed SCWS voting method could be used as a portable voting
booth in situations with no network connectivity: votes could then be uploaded to the
e-voting system at a later stage, perhaps via a transfer point in a controlled voting
kiosk area, or once connectivity is restored. Also, investigating measures that could
minimise the involvement of the MNO in the voting process would be worthwhile.
The SCWS branchless banking approach from use case MP-1 could be extended
to interface with the Bitcoin processes detailed in use case MP-2, for use in areas
with more than minimal connectivity: this would enhance the security of the Bitcoin
m-payment proposal. Additionally, devising NFC m-payments schemes that use the
SCWS could provide an interesting research direction.
Application of “thin SIM” technology and its security could merit further investi-
gation: m-payment solutions have been suggested that use these stick-on Overlay SIMs
(e.g. [323, 324]) but the GSMA have cautioned that there are security issues - such as
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trojans, eavesdropping and unauthorised access to SIM card configuration settings -
that first need to be addressed [325].
Investigating how to interface the SCWS with authentication results from gesture
recognition performed on a phone could merit further research, along with testing
implementations of SE/HCE match-on-card applications that use other feature extrac-
tion algorithms as well as DTW. When 3D depth cameras become available on phones,
future work on gesture recognition biometric authentication on phones could be under-
taken, as current research in this area is still at an early stage.
As testing applications in RW challenging environments can be difficult and dan-
gerous, a study into the feasibility of creating a VW tool that could be trained and
optimised to detect insecure actions in VW models of RW scenarios could be useful.
VWs are providing new features that will make the immersive experience more realistic,
such as the inclusion of Virtual Reality functionality in SL’s forthcoming new social
world, “Sansar” [326], that could be used with gesture recognition authentication and
add value to VW security modelling.
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Appendix A
Supplementary Information
This Appendix gives additional information pertaining to the use cases dis-
cussed in this thesis.
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A.1 Background
A.1.1 One Time Passwords (OTP)
Characteristics desirable in a One Time Password (OTP) are that it should be easy
to compute, but very difficult to identify credentials used to create it. Typical OTP
lengths are 8 digits or 6 alphanumeric characters.
OTPs fall into two categories: they use either
1. the HMAC-Based (HOTP) algorithm based on the HMAC-SHA-1 which is
applied to an increasing counter value. This is converted to shorter, user-friendly
values using a Truncate function with K (shared secret) and C (counter value)
HOTP(K,C) = Truncate(HMAC-SHA-1(K,C))
Relevant standards are RFC4226 [327] and RFC2289 [272]. Or
2. the Time-Based (TOTP) variant of the HOTP algorithm, where a time vari-
able T, replaces the counter C in the HOTP computation. This is standardised
in RFC6238 [271].
Hardware Tokens that generates HOTP passcodes when the user requests are known
as “event-driven”, and these codes remain valid until used by the authenticating ap-
plication: TOTP tokens generate new codes automatically after a set period of time,
which limits the time available to use the OTP. Hardware tokens can be security cer-
tified by The Initiative for Open Authentication (OATH) [328].
A.2 EV-2: Supplementary Information
A.2.1 Estonian I-Voting - 2017 Framework
The Estonian I-voting system was updated after the 2015 Elections, and a report de-
tailing the changes was published in June 2017 [19]. The main changes are the inclusion
of individual vote-verification features, and verification by third party (auditors) who
are now able to check all input/output files throughout the process. New terminology
is used in the revised system: “Collector” is the server that lists candidates, checks
voters’ digital signatures, performs vote verification processes and passes the vote onto
the “Processor”, where various administrative tasks can be carried out such as an-
nulling repeated i-votes. The Processor mixes the votes and and forwards them to the
“Tallier” for counting. The new system is illustrated in Figure A.1.
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Figure A.1: EV-2: Estonian I-voting (post-2015) - Services and Components (adapted
from [19]
Voters can verify their vote using a separate smart device with camera and internet
connectivity: this device should not have been used to cast the vote. As seen in Sec-
tion 4.5.1, the vote is constructed thus: (candidate choice, random number) encrypted
with the public key of the VCA - i.e. a cryptogram. The cryptogram is signed with the
voter’s signing key SV , and the voter’s certificate CertV is added before sending to the
I-voting system server. The server generates a session code, and returns the random
number and session code to the voter application to be displayed as a QR code. The
verification application on the smart device reads the QR code, extracts the random
number and session code, then sends the session code to the I-voting server. The server
returns the voter’s digitally signed vote to the smart device along with the list of can-
didates. The verification application then creates cryptograms for all the candidates
using the random number, and once it finds one which matches the vote received from
the i-voting server then the vote is verified successfully.
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A.3 MP-2: Supplementary Information
A.3.1 Bitcoin Transaction Processing
The two Bitcoin payment processing methods relevant to this use case are Option 1:
Multi-Signature Addresses and Option 2: Smart Contracts. The full protocol is shown
in Figure A.2 and is now described using notation shown in Table A.1.
Figure A.2: MP-2: Bitcoin SMS m-Payment - Full Protocol
Option 1: Multi-signature Process
The BPS first generates a Raw Transaction (RawTr) which includes the Full Redeem
Script (ReSc), the new multi-signature address associated for the receiver where the
payment is going to, TrAmt and TrFee. The RawTr then needs to be signed by min-
imum 2 participants in turn to generate a valid Bitcoin transaction. The BPS first
signs the RawTr using the corresponding Payer private key SP and forwards the Par-
tial Signed Transaction (ParTr) to the HQ for signing.
BPS→HQ: ParTr = (ReSc,AddrR,TrAmt,TrFee)SignSP
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Table A.1: MP-2: Full Protocol Notation
Notation Description
AddrX Bitcoin Multi-signature Address for entity X
BPS Bitcoin Payment Server(entity)
BALX Bitcoin balance in Account ACX for entity X
BAL′ Updated Bitcoin balance in Account ACX for entity X
EK(Z) Encryption of data Z with key K
HQ Head Quarters (entity)
HQB Head Quarters Backup Location (entity)
LO Local Office (entity)
OTPX One Time Password generated by entity X
P Payer(entity)
PhX Phone Number of entity X
PKX/ SKX Public/ Secret Key pair of entity X
R Recipient(entity)
SX/ VX Signing/ Verification key pair of entity X (Bitcoin keys)
TrAmt Transaction Amount
TrNo Transaction Number
TXID Unique Transaction ID of a transaction recorded in the
blockchain. Also referred to as the Transaction Hash (TrHash)
TrHash Transaction Hash
X→Y: Message sent from entity X to entity Y
(Z)SignK Signature on data Z with signature key K
TrFee Transaction Fee paid to the Bitcoin miner
RawTr Raw Transaction created for signing
ParTr Partial Signed Transaction created after signing RawTr
ComTr Complete Signed Transaction created after signing ParTr
ReSc Full Redeem Script used for the Bitcoin multi-signature ad-
dress
RSKHash Rootstock Transaction Hash
RSK-AddSC RSK Smart Contract Address, unique for the contract and
never changes
RSK-
AddX−Y
RSK public key (RSK address) of entity X kept securely with
entity Y
SRSK−X−Y RSK private key of entity X kept securely with entity Y
Gas Transaction fee paid to execute instructions on the smart con-
tract
To authorise the payment request, HQ first verifies the ParTr to check the payment
amount and number of signatures needed. Once satisfied, HQ signs this using its private
payer Bitcoin key SP−HQ to generate the Complete Signed Transaction ComTr and
sends this back to the BPS.
HQ→BPS: ComTr =(ParTr)SignSP−HQ
203
The BPS then broadcasts the ComTr to the Bitcoin peer-to-peer network. Once
broadcast, a unique transaction-id (TXID) or the recipient’s Bitcoin address can be
used to trace the transaction on the blockchain. The Bitcoin miner who first publishes
the valid block in the blockchain that also includes our Bitcoin transaction is paid the
TrFee for the payment. This is the first confirmation for the transaction. The BPS
then waits for the transaction to be confirmed in the agreed number of blocks before
generating the SMSs.
Option 2: Smart Contract Process
The BPS calls the Smart Contract and authorises the TrAmt and the fee for executing
the transaction also called Gas is paid by using the SRSK−P−BPS .
BPS→RSK: = RSK-AddSC ,RSK-AddP ,RSK-AddR,TrAmt,Gas
Once the message gets broadcast in the RSK network, the HQ or the HQB calls the
smart contract which act as the second set of instructions needed by the smart contract
to execute the transaction. HQ/HQB uses the SRSK−P−HQ/HQB to authorise the paid
amount TrAmt and the transaction fee Gas.
HQ/HQB→RSK: = RSK-AddSC ,RSK-AddP−HQ,RSK-AddR,TrAmt,Gas
When instructions are received from both BPS and HQ/HQB, the Smart Contract
executes a transaction to transfer the value TrAmt to the recipient. The unique trans-
action details are recorded instantly on the RSK blockchain in the format of a hash
(RSKHash). The BPS does not need to wait for a transaction confirmation as there is
instant confirmation when using the RSK platform.
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Appendix B
Scyther Scripts
This Appendix describes the formal security analysis tool Scyther, and lists
Scyther scripts and verification results for various protocols presented in
this thesis.
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B.1 The Scyther Formal Security Analysis Tool
Scyther performs an automatic formal analysis of security protocols under the perfect
cryptography assumption (the Dolev-Yao model, where it is assumed that an adversary
can learn nothing from an encrypted message unless they are in possession of the
relevant decryption key [329]), for an unbounded number of instances [30, 330]. The
Scyther tool can be used to find problems that arise from the way a protocol has been
constructed.
Scyther allows users to verify protocols based on the security properties defined in
an input file (using the Verify protocol option). It is possible to vary verification param-
eters such as maximum number of runs, matching type and types of attacks to search
for. A pop-up window gives the results of the verification, with clickable links to graph-
ical representations of any attacks found. By convention, Scyther protocol description
files (scripts) have the extension .spdl (Security Protocol Description Language).
B.1.1 Scyther Roles, Events and Claims
Scyther models security properties via roles. Each entity involved in a protocol is
considered as one role, and events and claims are made for each role. Events are
messages that are exchanged between entities: each “send” event within a role must
have a corresponding “receive” event specified in the receiving role. There is a facility
to check if the roles can complete the protocol i.e. they are “reachable” (by using the
Characterise role option). Claims are the security properties to be verified, based on
the entity’s local view of the state of the system.
A Scyther script starts with function declarations, and then events and claims are
set out for each role.
Authentication properties are verified through agreement, aliveness and synchroni-
sation. Claims that can be included in scripts are as follows:
• Secrecy (Secret): this verifies confidentiality of secret keys or data.
• Weak agreement (WeakAgree): this verifies the data exchanged between entities.
• Aliveness (Alive): verifies the authentication of communication partners
• Non-injective synchronisation (Nisynch): verifies that entities know who they are
communicating with, and agree on the content and order of messages. This is a
stronger authentication requirement than aliveness.
• Non-injective agreement (Niagree): verifies that communicating entities agree on
the content of variables.
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Definitions of these properties can be found in the works of Cremers et al. [331, 332]
and Lowe [333].
B.1.2 Verification Results
A description of the results that can be obtained after verifying claims can be seen in
the Scyther User Manual [334]. Results may include the following:
• verified as “OK” in the “Status” column and “No attacks within bounds” in the
“Comments”. This means that no attack was found within the bounded states-
pace but there may be attacks that can occur outside the bounded statespace.
• verified as “OK” in the “Status” with “Verified” and “No attacks” in the “Com-
ments”, this means that no attack was found within the bounded or unbounded
statespace; the security property has been successfully verified..
• “Status” can show “falsified”, which means at least one attack on the protocol is
possible
.
B.2 EV-1/EV-2: SCWS Remote e-Voting
This script is for the SCWS generic e-Voting protocol described in Chapter 4.1, Sec-
tion 4.3. There are two roles specified in the script, RAS and SIM, and claims are made
about the secrecy of credentials, along with Non-injective agreement (Niagree), Non-
injective synchronisation (Nisynch) and Aliveness (Alive). The Scyther verification
result (No attacks within bounds) is shown in Figure B.1.
B.2.1 EV1/EV2: SCWS e-Voting Generic Model Protocol
usertype PublicKey;
usertype PrivateKey;
usertype Vote;
usertype String;
usertype Application;
secret https: Function;
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protocol Generic-eVoting(SIM, RAS) {
role RAS {
const PUBV: PublicKey;
const PUBVA: PublicKey;
const PKV: PrivateKey;
const VoterID: String;
const passWord: String;
const VoteApp: Application;
var vote:Vote;
send_1(RAS,SIM, https(PUBV, PUBVA, PKV));
not match (RAS,SIM);
send_2(RAS,SIM, https({VoterID, passWord, VoteApp}PUBVA) );
recv_3(SIM,RAS, https({vote}PUBVA));
claim_RAS0(RAS,Running,SIM,vote);
claim_RAS1(RAS, Secret, PKV);
claim_RAS2(RAS, Secret, VoterID);
claim_RAS3(RAS, Secret, passWord);
claim_RAS4(RAS, Secret, VoteApp);
claim_RAS5(RAS, Secret, vote);
claim_RAS6(RAS, Niagree);
claim_RAS7(RAS, Nisynch);
claim_RAS8(RAS, Alive);
claim_RAS9(RAS,Weakagree);
}
role SIM {
const vote:Vote;
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var PUBV: PublicKey;
var PUBVA: PublicKey;
var PKV: PrivateKey;
var VoterID : String;
var passWord: String;
var VoteApp: Application;
recv_1(RAS,SIM, https(PUBV, PUBVA, PKV));
recv_2(RAS,SIM, https({VoterID, passWord, VoteApp}PUBVA) );
send_3(SIM,RAS, https({vote}PUBVA));
not match (SIM,RAS);
claim_SIM0(SIM,Commit,RAS,vote);
claim_SIM1(SIM, Secret, PKV);
claim_SIM2(SIM, Secret, VoterID);
claim_SIM3(SIM, Secret, passWord);
claim_SIM4(SIM, Secret, VoteApp);
claim_SIM5(SIM, Secret, vote);
claim_SIM6(SIM, Niagree);
claim_SIM7(SIM, Nisynch);
claim_SIM8(SIM, Alive);
claim_SIM9(SIM,Weakagree);
}
}
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Figure B.1: EV-1/EV-2: SCWS Generic e-Voting Protocol - Scyther Verification
B.3 MP-1: SCWS Branchless Banking
These scripts are for the SCWS Branchless Banking protocols (Withdrawal, Deposit
and Transfer) described in Chapter 5, Sections 5.3.4, 5.3.5 and 5.3.6. The three roles
specified for Withdrawal and Deposit are Agent (A), Bank (B) and Customer (C):
Transfer has Bank (B) Customer (C) and Recipient (R). Claims are made about the
secrecy of credentials, along with Non-injective agreement (Niagree), Non-injective
synchronisation (Nisynch) and Aliveness (Alive). The Scyther verification results are
shown in Figure B.2, Figure B.3 and Figure B.4 respectively. The results are either
(No attacks within bounds) or Verified No Attacks.
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B.3.1 MP-1: SCWS-Banking Withdrawal Protocol
/*
* Withdrawal protocol
*/
secret https: Function;
// The protocol description
protocol BBwithdrawal(A,B,C)
{
role C
{
fresh nc: Nonce;
fresh TrCount: Nonce;
var nc1: Nonce;
var TrNo: Data;
var BalC: Data;
const Trans: Data; // Tr, TrAmt
send_1 (C,B, https({C,B,{Trans,A,nc,TrCount}pk(B)}sk(C)) );
not match (A,C);
not match (A,B);
not match (B,C);
recv_5(B,C, https({{Trans, TrNo, A,nc1,BalC}pk(C)}sk(B)) );
not match (A,C);
not match (A,B);
not match (B,C);
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claim(C,Secret,nc);
claim(C,Secret,nc1);
claim(C,Alive);
claim(C,Weakagree);
claim(C,Niagree);
claim(C,Nisynch);
}
role B
{
fresh na1: Nonce;
fresh na2: Nonce;
fresh nb: Nonce;
fresh nb: Nonce;
fresh nb2: Nonce;
fresh nc1: Nonce;
var Trans: Data;
var TrCount: Nonce;
var nc: Nonce;
var nb1: Nonce;
var na: Nonce;
var ChC: Data;
const TrNo: Data;
const NameC: Data;
const BalC: Data;
const BalA: Data;
const BalA1: Data;
recv_1(C,B,https({C,B,{Trans,A,nc,TrCount}pk(B)}sk(C)) );
not match (A,C);
not match (A,B);
not match (B,C);
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send_2 (B,A, https({B,A,{C, TrNo,Trans,NameC,BalA,nb}pk(A)}sk(B)) );
not match (A,C);
not match (A,B);
not match (B,C);
recv_3 (A,B, https({A,B,{TrNo,Trans,ChC,nb1,na}pk(B)}sk(A)) );
not match (A,C);
not match (A,B);
not match (B,C);
send_4(B,A, https({B,A,{Trans,C,nb2,na1,BalA1}pk(A)}sk(B)) );
not match (A,C);
not match (A,B);
not match (B,C);
send_5(B,C, https({{Trans, TrNo, A,nc1,BalC}pk(C)}sk(B)) );
not match (A,C);
not match (A,B);
not match (B,C);
claim(B,Secret,nc);
claim(B,Secret,nc1);
claim(B,Secret,na);
claim(B,Secret,na1);
claim(B,Secret,nb);
claim(B,Secret,nb1);
claim(B,Secret,nb2);
claim(B,Alive);
claim(B,Weakagree);
claim(B,Niagree);
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claim(B,Nisynch);
}
role A
{
fresh na: Nonce;
fresh nb1: Nonce;
fresh ChC: Data;
var nb: Nonce;
var nb2: Nonce;
var na1: Nonce;
var Trans: Data;
var TrNo: Data;
var NameC: Data;
var BalA: Data;
var BalA1: Data;
recv_2(B,A, https({B,A,{C, TrNo,Trans,NameC,BalA,nb}pk(A)}sk(B)) );
not match (A,C);
not match (A,B);
not match (B,C);
send_3 (A,B, https({A,B,{TrNo,Trans,ChC,nb1,na}pk(B)}sk(A)) );
not match (A,C);
not match (A,B);
not match (B,C);
recv_4(B,A, https({B,A,{Trans,C,nb2,na1,BalA1}pk(A)}sk(B)) );
not match (A,C);
not match (A,B);
not match (B,C);
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claim(A,Secret,na);
claim(A,Secret,na1);
claim(A,Secret,nb);
claim(A,Secret,nb1);
claim(A,Secret,nb2);
claim(A,Alive);
claim(A,Weakagree);
claim(A,Niagree);
claim(A,Nisynch);
}
}
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Figure B.2: MP-1: Withdrawal Protocol - Scyther Verification
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B.3.2 MP-1: SCWS-Banking Deposit Protocol
/*
*Deposit protocol
*/
secret https: Function;
// The protocol description
protocol BBdeposit(A,B,C)
{
role A
{
fresh na: Nonce;
fresh TrCount: Nonce;
var na1: Nonce;
var TrNo: Data;
var BalA: Data;
const Trans: Data; // Tr, TrAmt
send_1 (A,B, https({A,B,{Trans,C,na,TrCount}pk(B)}sk(A)) );
not match (A,C);
not match (A,B);
not match (B,C);
recv_5(B,A, https({B,A,{TrNo,Trans, C,na1,BalA}pk(A)}sk(B)) );
not match (A,C);
not match (A,B);
not match (B,C);
claim(A,Secret,na);
claim(A,Secret,na1);
claim(A,Alive);
claim(A,Weakagree);
claim(A,Niagree);
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claim(A,Nisynch);
}
role B
{
fresh na1: Nonce;
fresh nb: Nonce;
fresh nb2: Nonce;
fresh nc1: Nonce;
var Trans: Data;
var TrCount: Nonce;
var nc: Nonce;
var nb1: Nonce;
var na: Nonce;
var ChA: Data;
const TrNo: Data;
const BalA: Data;
const BalC: Data;
const BalC1: Data;
recv_1 (A,B, https({A,B,{Trans,C,na,TrCount}pk(B)}sk(A)) );
not match (A,C);
not match (A,B);
not match (B,C);
send_2 (B,C, https({B,C,{TrNo,Trans, A,BalC,nb}pk(C)}sk(B)) );
not match (A,C);
not match (A,B);
not match (B,C);
recv_3 (C,B, https({C,B,{TrNo,Trans,ChA,nb1,nc}pk(B)}sk(C)) );
not match (A,C);
not match (A,B);
not match (B,C);
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send_4(B,C, https({B,C,{TrNo,Trans,A,nb2,nc1,BalC1}pk(C)}sk(B)) );
not match (A,C);
not match (A,B);
not match (B,C);
send_5(B,A, https({B,A,{TrNo,Trans, C,na1,BalA}pk(A)}sk(B)) );
not match (A,C);
not match (A,B);
not match (B,C);
claim(B,Secret,na);
claim(B,Secret,na1);
claim(B,Secret,nb);
claim(B,Secret,nb1);
claim(B,Secret,nb2);
claim(B,Secret,nc);
claim(B,Secret,nc1);
claim(B,Alive);
claim(B,Weakagree);
claim(B,Niagree);
claim(B,Nisynch);
}
role C
{
fresh nc: Nonce;
fresh nb1: Nonce;
fresh ChA: Data;
var nb: Nonce;
var nb2: Nonce;
var nc1: Nonce;
var Trans: Data;
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var TrNo: Data;
var BalC: Data;
var BalC1: Data;
recv_2(B,C, https({B,C,{ TrNo,Trans, A,BalC,nb}pk(C)}sk(B)));
not match (A,C);
not match (A,B);
not match (B,C);
send_3 (C,B, https({C,B,{TrNo,Trans,ChA,nb1,nc}pk(B)}sk(C)) );
not match (A,C);
not match (A,B);
not match (B,C);
recv_4(B,C, https({B,C,{TrNo, Trans,A,nb2,nc1,BalC1}pk(C)}sk(B)) );
not match (A,C);
not match (A,B);
not match (B,C);
claim(C,Secret,nc);
claim(C,Secret,nc1);
claim(C,Secret,nb);
claim(C,Secret,nb1);
claim(C,Secret,nb2);
claim(C,Alive);
claim(C,Weakagree);
claim(C,Niagree);
claim(C,Nisynch);
}
}
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Figure B.3: MP-1: Deposit Protocol - Scyther Verification
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B.3.3 MP-1: SCWS-Banking Transfer Protocol
/*
* BB Transfer protocol
*/
secret https: Function;
// The protocol description
protocol BBTransfer(C,B,R)
{
role C
{
fresh nc: Nonce;
fresh TrCount: Nonce;
var nc1: Nonce;
var TrNo: Data;
var BalC: Data;
const Trans: Data; // Tr, TrAmt
send_1 (C,B, https({C,B,{Trans,R,nc,TrCount}pk(B)}sk(C)) );
not match (R,C);
not match (R,B);
not match (B,C);
recv_3(B,C, https({{Trans, TrNo, R,nc1,BalC}pk(C)}sk(B)) );
not match (R,C);
not match (R,B);
not match (B,C);
claim(C,Secret,nc);
claim(C,Secret,nc1);
claim(C,Alive);
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claim(C,Weakagree);
claim(C,Commit,B,nc);
claim(C,Niagree);
claim(C,Nisynch);
}
role B
{
fresh nc1: Nonce;
var Trans: Data;
var TrCount: Nonce;
var nc: Nonce;
const TrNo: Data;
const NameC: Data;
const BalC: Data;
const BalR: Data;
recv_1 (C,B, https({C,B,{Trans,R,nc,TrCount}pk(B)}sk(C)) );
not match (R,C);
not match (R,B);
not match (B,C);
send_2 (B,R, https({B,R,{TrNo,Trans,NameC,BalR}pk(R)}sk(B)) );
not match (R,C);
not match (R,B);
not match (B,C);
send_3(B,C, https({{Trans, TrNo, R,nc1,BalC}pk(C)}sk(B)) );
not match (R,C);
not match (R,B);
not match (B,C);
claim(B,Secret,nc);
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claim(B,Secret,nc1);
claim(B,Alive);
claim(B,Weakagree);
claim(B,Niagree);
claim(B,Nisynch);
}
role R
{
var Trans: Data;
var TrNo: Data;
var NameC: Data;
var BalR: Data;
recv_2 (B,R, https({B,R,{TrNo,Trans,NameC,BalR}pk(R)}sk(B)) );
not match (R,C);
not match (R,B);
not match (B,C);
claim(R,Alive);
claim(R,Weakagree);
claim(R,Niagree);
claim(R,Nisynch);
}
}
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Figure B.4: MP-1: Transfer Protocol - Scyther Verification
B.4 Auth-1: SCWS Single Sign-On
This script is for the SCWS Single Sign On protocol described in Chapter 6, Section 6.3.
There are three roles specified in the script, USER, SIM and MOD, and claims are made
about the secrecy of credentials, along with Non-injective agreement (Niagree), Non-
injective synchronisation (Nisynch) and Aliveness (Alive). The Scyther verification
result (No attacks within bounds) is shown in Figure B.5.
B.4.1 Auth-1: SCWS Single Sign-On Protocol
/*
*SSO protocol
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*/
secret https: Function;
// The protocol description
protocol SSO(USER,SIM,MOD)
{
role USER
{
var Info: Data;
const Password: Data;
const IDUSER: Data;
send_1 (USER,SIM, https(IDUSER,Password) );
not match (USER,SIM);
recv_4(SIM,USER, https(Info));
not match (USER,SIM);
claim(USER,Commit,SIM,Password);
claim(USER,Alive);
claim(USER,Weakagree);
claim(USER,Niagree);
claim(USER,Nisynch);
}
role SIM
{
fresh T: Data;
var Password: Data;
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var Info: Data;
var IDUSER: Data;
const IDSIM: Data;
const L:Data;
recv_1 (USER,SIM, https(IDUSER,Password) );
not match (USER,SIM);
claim(SIM,Running,USER,Password);
send_2 (SIM,MOD, https(SIM,MOD,{L,T,IDSIM}sk(SIM) ));
not match (SIM,MOD);
recv_3 (MOD,SIM, https(Info) );
not match (SIM,MOD);
send_4 (SIM,USER, https(Info) );
not match (SIM,USER);
claim(SIM,Commit,MOD,L,T,IDSIM);
claim(SIM,Secret, L);
claim(SIM,Secret, T);
claim(SIM,Secret,IDSIM);
claim(SIM,Secret, Info);
claim(SIM,Alive);
claim(SIM,Weakagree);
claim(SIM,Niagree);
claim(SIM,Nisynch);
}
role MOD
{
const Info: Data;
var T: Data;
var IDSIM: Data;
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var L:Data;
recv_2 (SIM,MOD, https(SIM,MOD,{L,T,IDSIM}sk(SIM)) );
not match (SIM,MOD);
send_3 (MOD,SIM, https(Info) );
not match (SIM,MOD);
claim(MOD,Running,SIM,L,T,IDSIM);
claim(MOD,Secret, L);
claim(MOD,Secret, T);
claim(MOD,Secret,IDSIM);
claim(MOD,Secret, Info);
claim(MOD,Alive);
claim(MOD,Weakagree);
claim(MOD,Niagree);
claim(MOD,Nisynch);
}
}
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Figure B.5: Auth-1: Single Sign-On Protocol - Scyther Verification
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